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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  ) 
 ) 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
 ) 
vs.                             )     Supreme Court No. 41762 
 ) 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, ) 
 ) 
     Defendant-Respondent. ) 
 
 
 
 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District,  
 in and for the County of Nez Perce 
 
 
 
HONORABLE CARL B KERRICK 
 
 
 
SCOTT CHAPMAN      LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, AG 
Attorney for Respondent     Attorney for Appellant 
LEWISTON, ID      BOISE, ID 
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Date: 3/18/2014 
Time: 11 :54 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay 
User: BDAVENPORT 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Date Code User Judge 
1/29/2013 NEWI IMPORT New Case Filed, Citation Import Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
CRCO TRISH Criminal Complaint Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
AFPC TRISH Affidavit Of Probable Cause Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
HRSC TRISH Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 01/29/2013 Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
09:00AM) ***2nd Offense DUI NEEDS SEEN BY 
JUDGE*** 
PROS TRISH Prosecutor Assigned Nicholas D Lepire Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
ARRN MEENA Arraignment I First Appearance Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
NORM LEONA Notification Of Rights-misdemeanor Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
CHJG MEENA Change Assigned Judge Jay P. Gaskill 
HRSC MEENA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial- County 02/12/2013 Jay P. Gaskill 
10:15 AM) 
PLEA MEENA A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-8004(1 )(a) Jay P. Gaskill 
{M}{2} Driving Under the Influence-( Second 
Offenses)) 
MEENA Notice Of Hearing Jay P. Gaskill 
HRHD MEENA Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
01/29/2013 09:00AM: Hearing Held ***2nd 
Offense DUI NEEDS SEEN BY JUDGE*** 
BNDC TRISH Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1420 Dated Jay P. Gaskill 
1/29/2013 for 1 000.00) 
BONV TRISH Bond Voided Jay P. Gaskill 
BNDS TRISH Bond Posted -Surety (Amount 1000.00) Jay P. Gaskill 
BONV TRISH Bond Voided Jay P. Gaskill 
BNDS TRISH Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 1000.00 ) Jay P. Gaskill 
2/1/2013 NOAP JENNY Notice Of Appearance Jay P. Gaskill 
ATTR JENNY Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay Attorney Retained Jay P. Gaskill 
Scott M Chapman 
RQDD JENNY Request For Discovery-defendant Jay P. Gaskill 
2/6/2013 RSDP JENNY Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff Jay P. Gaskill 
2/12/2013 PTMO JANET Pretrial Motion And Order Jay P. Gaskill 
CONT JANET Continued (Pretrial- County 03/05/2013 01:00 Jay P. Gaskill 
PM) 
JANET Notice Of Hearing Jay P. Gaskill 
2/14/2013 CHJG MERILYNN Change Assigned Judge Jeff P. Payne 
ORDR MERT Order- Appointing Judge Jeff P. Payne 
2/20/2013 CONT MERT Continued (Pretrial- County 03/07/2013 11:30 Jeff P. Payne 
AM) Special Set - Pretrial 
MERT Notice Of Hearing Jeff P. Payne 
3/5/2013 MISC BDAVENPORT Petition Requesting Appointment of Special Jeff P. Payne 
Prosecutor 2
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Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay 
User: BDAVENPORT 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Date Code User Judge 
3/6/2013 ORDR BDAVENPORT Order for Appointment of Special Prosecutor Jeff P. Payne 
MCON BDAVENPORT Motion To Continue Pre-Trial Conference Jeff P. Payne 
AFFD BDAVENPORT Affidavit in Support of Motion to Continue Jeff P. Payne 
Pre-Trial Conference 
ORDR BDAVENPORT Order to Continue Pre-Trial Conference Jeff P. Payne 
CONT BDAVENPORT Continued (Pretrial - County 03/14/2013 02:00 Jeff P. Payne 
PM) Special Set - Pretrial 
BDAVENPORT Notice Of Hearing Jeff P. Payne 
PROS BDAVENPORT Prosecutor Assigned E Clayne Tyler Jeff P. Payne 
3/13/2013 MOTN BDAVENPORT Motion-D Jeff P. Payne 
AFFD BDAVENPORT Affidavit of Scott Chapman in Support of Pretrial Jeff P. Payne 
Motions 
3/15/2013 HRHD BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Pretrial- County scheduled on Jeff P. Payne 
03/14/2013 02:00PM: Hearing Held Special Set 
-Pretrial 
HRSC BDAVENPORT Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 04/18/2013 Jeff P. Payne 
10:00 AM) 
HRSC BDAVENPORT Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 05/21/2013 Jeff P. Payne 
1 0:30 AM) telephonic-parties to call in to Idaho 
Co 
HRSC BDAVENPORT Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/07/2013 08:30 Jeff P. Payne 
AM) 
BDAVENPORT Notice Of Hearing Jeff P. Payne 
4/8/2013 MISC BDAVENPORT State's Witness and Exhibit List Jeff P. Payne 
RQDP BDAVENPORT State's Request For Discovery and Demand for Jeff P. Payne 
Alibi-plaintiff 
RSDP BDAVENPORT State's Supplemental Response To Defendant's Jeff P. Payne 
Request For Discovery-plaintiff 
MEMO BDAVENPORT Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Pretrial Jeff P. Payne 
Motions 
4/12/2013 RSDD BDAVENPORT Response To Request For Discovery-defendant Jeff P. Payne 
.. 4/17/2013 MEMO BDAVENPORT States Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's Jeff P. Payne 
Pretrial Motions 
4/18/2013 HRHD BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Pretrial Motions scheduled on Jeff P. Payne 
04/18/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
MINE BDAVENPORT Minute Entry Jeff P. Payne 
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions 
Hearing date: 4/18/2013 
Time: 10:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: none 
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport 
Tape Number: crtrm4 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Tyler 3
Date: 3/18/2014 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 11:54AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Date Code User Judge 
4/22/2013 MISC BDAVENPORT Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Jeff P. Payne 
Regarding Pretrial Motions 
ORDR BDAVENPORT Order Regarding Pretrial Motions Jeff P. Payne 
5/22/2013 HRHD BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Final Pretrial scheduled on Jeff P. Payne 
05/21/2013 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
telephonic-parties to call in to Idaho Co 
HRVC BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jeff P. Payne 
06/07/2013 08:30AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC BDAVENPORT Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea & Jeff P. Payne 
Sentencing 06/05/2013 09:00AM) 
BDAVENPORT Notice Of Hearing Jeff P. Payne 
6/5/2013 CONT BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Change of Plea & Sentencing Jeff P. Payne 
scheduled on 06/05/2013 09:00AM: Continued 
Judge Payne & Tyler to appear telephonically, 
Chapman and Colvin in person 
HRSC BDAVENPORT Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea & Jeff P. Payne 
Sentencing 07/11/2013 08:30AM) Tyler to 
appear telephonic 
BDAVENPORT Notice Of Hearing Jeff P. Payne 
MISC BDAVENPORT Rule 11 Agreement Jeff P. Payne 
7/11/2013 HRHD BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Change of Plea & Sentencing Jeff P. Payne 
scheduled on 07/11/2013 08:30AM: Hearing 
Held Tyler to appear telephonic 
NOPE BDAVENPORT Notification Of Subsequent Penalties Jeff P. Payne 
AMCO BDAVENPORT Amended Complaint Filed (118-8004 {M} Driving Jeff P. Payne 
Under the Influence) 
REDU BDAVENPORT Charge Reduced Or Amended Jeff P. Payne 
GLTY BDAVENPORT Guilty Plea Or Admission Of Guilt (118-8004 {M} Jeff P. Payne 
Driving Under the Influence) 
STAT BDAVENPORT Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk Jeff P. Payne 
action 
SNIC BDAVENPORT Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {M} Driving Jeff P. Payne 
Under the Influence) Confinement terms: Jail: 
120 days. Suspended jail: 1 05 days. 
PROB BDAVENPORT Probation Ordered (118-8004 {M} Driving Under Jeff P. Payne 
the Influence) Probation term: 2 years. 
(Unsupervised)-stayed pending appeal 
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Date: 3/18/2014 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 11 :54 AM ROAReport 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Date Code User Judge 
7/11/2013 MINE BDAVENPORT Minute Entry Jeff P. Payne 
Hearing type: Change of Plea & Sentencing 
Hearing date: 7/11/2013 
Time: 8:35am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: none 
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport 
Tape Number: 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Tyler 
JDMT BDAVENPORT Judgment Jeff P. Payne 
BVEX BDAVENPORT Surety Bond Converted I Exonerated (Amount Jeff P. Payne 
1 ,000.00) 
JDMT BDAVENPORT Amended Judgment Jeff P. Payne 
ORDR BDAVENPORT Order Staying Judgment Jeff P. Payne 
7/12/2013 NTAP DEANNA Notice Of Appeal Jeff P. Payne 
APDC DEANNA Appeal Filed In District Court Jeff P. Payne 
CHJG DEANNA Change Assigned Judge Jeff M. Brudie 
7/15/2013 BNDC DEANNA Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11252 Dated Jeff M. Brudie 
7/15/2013 for 150.00) 
BONC DEANNA Condition of Bond Reporter's Transcript Jeff M. Brudie 
7/19/2013 ORDQ JANET Order Regarding Disqualification of Judge Jeff M. Brudie 
(Brudie) 
TRAN PAM Transcript Filed Jeff M. Brudie 
7/23/2013 BNDC DEANNA Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11769 Dated Jeff M. Brudie 
7/23/2013 for 22.25) 
BONC DEANNA Condition of Bond Balance due for Reporter's Jeff M. Brudie 
Transcript 
BNDO DEANNA Bond Converted to Other Party (Transaction Jeff M. Brudie 
number 1210 dated 7/23/2013 amount 150.00) 
BNDO DEANNA Bond Converted to Other Party (Transaction Jeff M. Brudie 
number 1211 dated 7/23/2013 amount 22.25) 
7/30/2013 ORAJ JENNY Order Assigning Judge (Kerrick) Jeff M. Brudie 
CHJG JENNY Change Assigned Judge Carl B. Kerrick 
8/2/2013 ORDR JENNY Order Scheduling Briefs And Argument Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 11/19/2013 Carl B. Kerrick 
11:00 AM) 
9/12/2013 BRFD JENNY Appellant's Brief Carl B. Kerrick 
10/16/2013 BRFD JENNY Respondent's Brief Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2013-0000676 Current Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
Defendant: Colvin, Gaylord Jay 
User: BDAVENPORT 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Date Code User Judge 
11/19/2013 MINE JENNY Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 11/19/2013 
Time: 11:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM #1 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Tyler 
DCHH JENNY District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 1 00 pages 
ADVS JENNY Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on Carl B. Kerrick 
11/19/2013 11:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
12/18/2013 OPOR JENNY Appellate Opinion & Order Carl B. Kerrick 
RMAN JENNY Remanded To Magistrate Court Carl B. Kerrick 
CHJG JENNY Change Assigned Judge Jeff P. Payne 
1/7/2014 NTAP BDAVENPORT Notice Of Appeal Jeff P. Payne 
1/9/2014 MERT Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Jeff P. Payne 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Mia Carlson Receipt number: 0000526 Dated: 
1/9/2014 Amount: $16.00 (Credit card) 
MERT Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost- CC Jeff P. Payne 
Paid by: Mia Carlson Receipt number: 0000526 
Dated: 1/9/2014 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
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Idaho State Police- Unh~--~--m-C-it_a_t-io_n __ -1 s-IG_N_A_T-UR_E ___ -~---·-·---------------, 
1 hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on[X]01/28/2013 In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has 
J·ust and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on: Signature of Officer: --'i .. - ---------------Officer Name:J TALBOTT Officer ID:3431 
Citation #: Agency Name: IDAHO STATE POLICE 
ISP0205648 
Date/Time: 01/28/2013 11:07 PM DR#: L13000111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
~~~;E~~~ANH~_PERCt R 1 3 - 0 0 67 6 
)viOLATOR 
Last Name: COLVIN 
First Name: GAYLORD 
Hm. Address:3131 4TH ST D 
MI
DOB
Phone
Cty, St, Zip: LEWISTON, ID 8350100000 
. Height: 509 Weight: 175 Sex: M Eyes: BRO Hair: BRO 
DL# DL State:ID Lie. Expires:2016 
Class:D 
Hazmat:N GVWR 26001+:N 16+ Persons: N 
Commercial vehicle driven by this driver: N 
Bus. Name: 
Bus. Addr: 
Bus. Phone: 
I REGISTRATION 
Yr. Veh: 1992 Veh. Lie#: N164008 
Make: TOYT Model: SR5 
Color: WHI Style: PK 
VIN: JT 4RN01 P6N0028137 
Carrier US DOT #: 
I LOCATION 
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely: 
SOUTHBOUND 5TH ST NEAR STEWART AVE 
I VIOLATIONS 
State:ID 
Did commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute, 
Infraction Citation: N Misdemeanor Citation: Y 
Posted Speed: Observed Speed: Accident: N 
Date/Time:01/28/2013 10:24 PM 
Violation #1: 118-8004{1){a) {M}{2} 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUEN E {SECOND OFFENSE WITHIN 10 
YEARS)- BRAC .123/.134- PRIO 4/7/11 
Violation #2: 
COURT INFORMATR»J ~ 
NEZ PERCE COUNT AGISTRA TE COURT 
~ 0 
1230 MAIN STREET c--.! 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
(208) 799-3043 
Court Date: 02/15/2013 
Court Time: 08:30 AM 
Fine #1: MUST APPEAR 
Fine #2: 
Fine #3: 
Fine #4: 
Witness: 
Address: 
Department: Serial#: 
I OFFICER NOTES 
READ CAREFULLY 
This is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which: 
NOTE: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your 
appearance, another charge of failure to appear may be filed 
and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your 
expense unless the judge finds you are indigent. 
You are entitled to a trial by jury if requested by you. 
PLEA OF NOT GUlL TY: You may plead not guilty to the 
charge by appearing before the clerk of the court or the 
judge, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which 
time you will be given a trial date. 
PLEA OF GUlL TY: You may plead guilty to the charge by 
going to the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your 
appearance, at which time you will be told if you can pay a 
fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to appear 
before the judge; 
OR 
You may have your fine determined by a judge at a time 
arranged with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed 
for your appearance. 
You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can 
sign a plea of guilty and pay the fine and costs by mail. 
I plead guilty to the charges. 
Defendant (if authorized by clerk of magistrate court) 
MAIL TO: 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
PO BOX896 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
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Departmental Report # L 1~ooo 111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND JUDICIAL DIS~~TrO~THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JimzlJ!JtRCE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
COLVIN, Gaylord Jay 
Defendant. 
DOB
SSN/DL:
State: Idaho 
State of Idaho, 
County of NEZ PERCE 
znn JRN zg Rfl s ss 
I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Idaho State Police. 
2. The defendant was arrested on January 28, 2013 at 2257 hours for the crime of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) 
pursuant to Idaho code section 18-8005( 4). Second or more DUI offense in the last ten years? 
Yes - Misdemeanor 
Other Offenses: 
3. Location of Occurrence: Southbound 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce 
County, Idaho 
4. Identified the defendant as: COLVIN, Gaylord Jay by: Driver's License 
5. Actual physical control established by: Observation By Affiant 
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because 
·of the following facts: 
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed 
and what you learned from someone else, identifying that person): 
Page 1 of 3 8
Departmental Report# L1:5000111 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: 
On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott of 
the Idaho State Police (ISP), stopped a white colored, 1992, Toyota SRS (Idaho registration 
N164008) for failure to signal when merging (merged from the right lane into the left lane 
without signaling) southbound on 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and 
noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver identified himself as Gaylord Jay 
COLVIN (date of birth with his Idaho Driver's License. COLVIN admitted to 
consuming alcohol prior to driving (two beers). After running a driver's check, I asked 
COLVIN to exit the vehicle to perform the standardized field sobriety evaluations. 
COLVIN performed and failed the evaluations (See AIR). I detained COLVIN for breath 
samples. After listening to the ALS advisory and after the mandatory fifteen minute 
waiting period, COLVIN provided two breath samples on the Life Loc FC20. During the 
mandatory fifteen minute w·aiting period I remained in close proximity to COLVIN with 
nothing between us. I did not hear or see him burp, belch, or vomit. His results were 
.123/.134 BrAC. I arrested COLVIN for DUI. The ISP Regional Communications Center 
advised me COLVIN had a prior DUI on 4/7/2011. I transported him to the Nez Perce 
County Jail. COLVIN was booked into the Nez Perce County Jail for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) pursuant 
to Idaho code section 18-8005( 4). 
Video: Arbitrator 
D.U. I. NOTES 
Odor of alcoholic beverage: Yes 
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage: Yes 
Slurred speech: No 
Impaired memory: No 
Glassy/bloodshot eyes: Yes 
Other: 
Sobriety Tests-Meets Decision Points? 
Gaze Nystagmus: Yes 
Walk & Turn: Yes 
One Leg Stand: Yes 
Crash Involved: No Injury: No 
Drugs Suspected: No Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed: No 
Reason Drugs are Suspected: 
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of 
refusal and failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The 
test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004 (4), Idaho Code, and 
the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement. 
BrAC: .123/.134 Breath Instrument Type: Life Loc FC20 Serial# 90205678 
Name of person administering breath test: Jeffory R. Talbott 
Date Certification Expires: 11/30/2014 
Videotape # Arbitrator 
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Departmental Report# Ll...,OOOlll 
By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of 
Idaho, I hereby solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached 
reports and documents that may be included herein is true and correct to the best of my 
information and belief. 
4 ~ // t / ~ / n-
Signed: __ _.l.C~~ =/""_,/'1__,..--;""--"l-=-i,;..:;_/+-/ __ 1 --,~-/_· -"e1"""~d~4" --r=~~=-=-------'-~,;.::.1--~f ______________ _ ( - ~ (affiant) 
Subscribed and sworn to me on D I /-zcr j '"Z e 13 -----~---+~,~~(~~-me-)~~------
~,4-C ---.~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC~O 
Residing at: k~ ( S""ro N ( ::t:D . 
My Commission expires: I rlor lz.D(f 
I I 
OWER ~ 
Based upon the above Affidavit, the Court hereby fmds that he~ 
Probable Cause to believe that a crime or crimes has been commi d, 
and that the Defendant committed said crime or crime/ 
Page 3 of 3 
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Contacts [ ] Yes [ vfNo Glasses 
Eyes tracking ~qually [ vrYes [ ] No 
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS 
EYES 
Idaho State Police 
INFLUENCE REPORT 
PRE-TEST 
L I 3 CJt.:CJ t I I 
] Yes [v(No Remove Gl"asses [ ] 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
ADDITIONAL SOBRIETY TESTS 
~~ ~ L.::J Eye does not pursue smoothly 
0 [Zf Distinct Nystagmus at max. deviation 
[2r 0 Nystagmus onset before 45 degrees 
0 I TOTAL 
VERTICAL NYSTAGMUS DYes GrNo 
PUPIL SIZE CONSTRICTED [ ] NORMAL [ / DILATED [ 
WALK~.9TURN 
LJ Cannot keep balance during instructi,ons 0 
NYSTAGMUS 
2 3 4 5 6 
0 
,r---+---,_---r---+--_,--~r-~ D Starts too soon 
D Stops too soon 
C2r Misses heel to toe 
[~( Steps off line 
g Raises arms 
D Wrong number of steps 
D Improper turn 
D Cannot do test 
'-/ I Total 
ONE~STAND 
L.:::J Sways 
G2( Raises arms 
D Hops 
D Puts foot down 
D Cannot do test 
Total 
Audio Tape y N 
Video Tape {J) N 
2 
r---+---~--~---+~~----~~ 
WALK 3 AND 4 r---+---,_---r---+-'-_,~---t------7'1 
TURN 5 6r---+---~--~---+--~--~~~ 
7 
sr---+-~;---~---+---1----r-~ 
OBSERVATIONS 
Eye Color i3 tt..D Eye Condition 3Lo?o - Speech ________ _ 
.:>.d-t;> r 
Foot Wear t3;Z.a;.~.h-J l20zvrt::o's. Ground Surface ____________ __ 
CHEMICAL TEST 
c=z( Breath C:=J Blood 
C:=J Other Test Result ." le23 /1.3''-(-
D Refused test, Why?-------------------------------
Office~Sig~a~re~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;~k=d~~~-~· t~A~,~t--------------~ D~e--~t~-~~~~~~~~~t-~~---------­
EH 07 05-01 ( REV. 1/07 
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lr 
Instrument Operations Log Instrument Serial Number: 90205678 - LE#61464 
Agency: Idaho State Police 
:This log should contain all of the evidentiary testing results for the instrument indicated by the serial number listed above. 
Date Time Subject•s Name Test Results Operator•s Name Comments 
tlvtff\~ (~---13'-l . ,:)o ~fl.·" ?.u. <' ~e?.l.~ \ .::.;_ I ~\-- ((,_,. 'T' A,-~.. .. i(:3' !'"';;:11(1'"'- l -:~ :r I ;:), ~ 0(_, I c.:s~)\i- cFtSi 
\ ;.~/ ~~ 0'73""1 !0"?\ 1\....{. (y,..j IJ.\...). n(~,4f.> .I)J 1·f' 't ~ r2. • ·r A-·Len-y:nr- /l<'""jT i . ::JVb I I t=50C\ CY/,)u 
~/ct,) ?3 c:n31 ,f)":.? ·f...'tor0 ?-0~ , o··;b I()")(.,., _:r. ,z.. '"q-A L{~ rK!0 I 0 1J I ()'~DI I f) OCT r\~taD I 
:1! lz.~J11 42W.CJ {!\:..LUiJI/ G.::.<'H LC,:iLO ; I[].-~ ,j 3~ . ·,-. t2.. ... Cl'f.l-1 ;::) 6 J.-. i I..~ I;;) C)l),) / i I 
I 
.:: t /.--;c~/;,1 t i OIL I .o~ ?_0, "-• : t_.)'') b .Q~) $"' -::\. ¥- < M )'?) ·z-,., •"""''~' Lo- iQ?sol ·a en--' r,I~O 
,;: 
., 
i 
I 
1.: ~ J~ N(Y) .jJ 0 ('11 0 qo ~ qo .-1 .-IONO(Y) 0 ::I0.-10.-1 N [J} •••• (.J ·'Uooo ........ Q) ~ ,.,. Oqor-,:( 00 ~ !i:; S::NI.Oj:Q N H •10 ........ ~I 1.00 .-1 ffiffi.-IN ':> N 0 Q)qoqoll)ll) ~ [J} 0 8 ..•..•.. Q) en ·..-INNNN ~ ,. ·..-I 1:-<NNNN \/~ tJ> 0 r-1 -
·-
.!><:.JJ.!><:.JJ ':< (. s:: [J} s:: [J} 
....... z 
., Q) 0 .. rn Q) rn Q) ) ~~ E-< 0 .-IE-< .-IE-< J!o-1 Q.IZ j:Q j:Q _J.JJ 3 ~ 0 0 z Q) 0 0 0 0 s:: .-I •• ~!o-I.JJ!o-I.JJ 0~ u . .jJ .-IQ)ctl[J} .jJ •• 
·..-1 ::1·..-1 ::I rn 
~ g.·d:;: s:: Q) ,:(,:(,:(,:( ~ ·n So-l Q).jJ ..Q Q ID...._j 
·..-1 Q) Q) s:: :> rn 
----
::I 0. 
..:IOOOOp IZIQ '11=.-IN(Y)"'' 00 H 0 
.· 
-
: I certify that this document is a true, exact, complete and unaltered photocopy of the original instrument operations log. _______________ _ 12
8IP0112372928-JAN-2013 22:25:1600ILETS Reply 
001/28/2013 23:24 
DIP0112 Message Received From DMV 
KR.IDISP0320.DMV .*MRI9234960.TXT 
OLN/KA121401J 
MAY BE THE SAME AS: PAGE 01 FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSES ONLY 
OLN/KA121401J. 
NAM/COLVIN, GAYLORD 
RES/ 
3131 4TH ST D 
LEWISTON 
JAY. 
ID 
SEX/M. HAI/BRO. EYE/BRO. 
HGT/509. WGT/175. 
83501. 
PRIVACY FLAG. 
** OPR STATUS/VALID. 
** CDL STATUS/NOT LICENSED. 
CLASS/D. ** EXP/07-14-2016. 
OLT/DRIVER LICENSE. 
TRANSACTION/DUPLICATE. 
END/MCY. 
ISS/07-08-2011. REC/350111890023. CNTY/NEZP. 
AKA OLN/518171362. AKA OLS/ID. 
CITN/10-27-2006C. 10-20-2006A.BASIC RULE. ISP.LEWIS. 
ORD DEGREE/INFR. 
CITN/04-07-2011 WHJD.01-17-2011A.DUI. CTY.LEWISTON. 
ORD DEGREE/MISD. 
ADDITIONAL LICENSE TYPES CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE ... 
MAY BE THE SAME AS: PAGE 02 FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSES ONLY 
CARD ONLY - NOT A DRIVERS LICENSE ***** 
PRIVACY FLAG. 
***** IDAHO IDENTIFICATION 
OLN/KA121401J. 
NAM/COLVIN, GAYLORD JAY. 
RES/ 
3131 4TH ST D 
LEWISTON ID 
SEX/M. HAI/BRO. EYE/BRO. 
HGT/509. WGT/175. 
AKA OLN/518171362. 
END OF RECORD 
END OF MESSAGE ... 
ID CARD STATUS/VALID. 
** EXP/07-14-2015. 
83501. OLT/IDENTIFICATION CARD. 
ISS/01-24-2011. REC/350110240025. CNTY/NEZP. 
AKA OLS/ID. 
MRI 9234962 IN: DMVI01 18985 AT 2013-01-28 23:24:51 
OUT: ISPC 6087 AT 2013-01-28 23:24:51 
Page 1 of 1 
http://1 0.2.192.129/PRD? 41/Html/SystemDocs/CADinterface.aspx?MVIEW+Message:M... 1/28/2013 
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8IP0112372928-JAN-2013 22:57:58DDILETS Reply 
001/28/2013 23:57 
DIP0112 Message Received From NCIC 
NL0100CF,MRI9236642I 
NL0100CF,MRI9236642 
IDISP0320 
NO IDENTIFIABLE RECORD IN THE NCIC INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX 
(III) FOR NAM/COLVIN,GAYLORD J.SEX/M.RAC/U.DO PUR/C. 
END 
MRI 9236643 IN: NCIC 16606 AT 2013-01-28 23:57:37 
OUT: ISPC 6162 AT 2013-01-28 23:57:37 
Page 1 of 1 
http://10.2.192.129/PRD741/Html!SystemDocs/CADinterface.aspx?MVIEW+Message:M... 1128/2013 
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lTD 3814 (Rev. 01-12) 
Supply# 019680909 
for Failure of Testing 
(Advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code) 
Mailing Address 
/ / . ./. 
City State Zip 
,l1 .::=~~_;;; c:~::_;; (~·l ~ ~~ Fi: 
Citation# 
State License Class 
_/ 
Operating CMV? D Yes El No 
Transporting Hazmat? D Yes ~;a~i\Jo 
1. I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol, dtugs, or other intoxicating substances. You are required by law to take one or more evidentiary test( s) to determine the 
concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you 
may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional test(s) made by a person of your own choosing. You do not have the 
right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating s~_l?stances in your body. 
2. If you refuse to take or complete anY. of the offered tests pursuant to Section 18-8002, Idaho Code: 
A. You are subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). 
B. You have the right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of for a 
hearing to show cause why you refused to submit to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be 
suspended. 
C. If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, the court will sustain the civil penalty and your license will be 
suspended with absolutely no driving privileges for one (1) year if this is your first refusal; and two (2) years if this is your 
. second refusal within ten (1 0) years. 
3. If you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code: 
A. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becon1es effective thirty (30) days from the date of service on this 
notice suspending your driver's license or driving privileges. If this is your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five 
(5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for ninety (90) days with absolutely no driving privileges 
of any kind during the first thirty (30) days. You tnay request restricted non-commercial driving privileges for the remaining 
sixty ( 60) days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow you to operate a commercial motor vehicle. If this 
is not your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be 
suspended for one (1) year with absolutely no driving privileges of any kind during that period. 
B. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension before the Idaho Transportation Department to show cause 
why you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be suspended. The request must be made in writing 
and received by the department within seven (7) calendar days from the date of service on this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION. 
You also have the right to judicial review of the Hearing Officer's decision. 
4. If you are admitted to a problem solving court program and have served at least forty-five (45) days of an absolute suspension of 
driving privileges, you may be eligible for a restricted permit for the purpose of getting to and from work, school, or an alcohol 
treatment program. 
If you have failed the evidentiary 
test(s), your driving privileges are hereby suspended per #3 above, 
commencing thirty (30) days from the date of service on this notice. 
If a blood or urine test was administered, the department may serve a 
Notice of Suspension upon receipt of the test results . 
..._- .. ,,"",, .... -.,..,"' for Failure or Refusal 
the Court. Please refer 
White Copy- If failure- to lTD; if refusal- to Court Yellow Copy- to Law Enforcement Pink Copy - to Court Goldenrod Copy- to Driver 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAFFIC COURT- SPECIAL 
ARRAIGNMENT 
9:00a.m. 
JUDGE: Greg Kalbfleisch 
CLERK: Meena Cole 
COURTROOM: 2 
DATE: 1/29/13 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
ARRAIGNMENT- DEF. PRESENT 
NAME: __ ___:G::::..::a=.z-yl=o=-=rd=-=-J=..<ay---'C=-.:::o:...:...;lv:..=in-=-------
D.O.B.: ___ 0:::::.....!7..:.....:11::......:.4.:.....:::11~97..:......;4:....__ ________ _ 
CASE NUMBER: _ ___;;C~R=1.=:;_3-....;:;_0.;;_:67~6 _______ _ 
CHARGE(S): SECOND OFFENSE DUI 
Defendant is advised of rights, charges and penalties. 
TRAFFIC COURT MINUTES 16
IN THE DISTRIC ~ COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
) 
) 
FlLED 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. ~f? fS- ~l3f~ 29 RP1 8 59 
vs. 
_j e.1 Co \~:v 
~l~~Z?~R~~T 
Defendant, ) 
The purpose of the initial appearance is to advise you of your rights and the charge(s) against you. 
• You have the right to be represented by an attorney at all times. 
• If you want an attorney, but cannot pay for one, the court may appoint one to help you. You 
may be ordered to reimburse Nez Perce County for the cost of your defense. 
• You have the right to remain silent. Any statement you make could be used against you. 
• You have the right to bail. 
• If you plead not guilty, you can have a trial before a judge or jury of six people. 
• You can cross-examine all witnesses who testify against you. 
• You may present evidence, testify yourself if you wish, and have witnesses ordered to testify 
by subpoena. 
• If you plead guilty, you waive your right to a trial, your right to remain silent, and your right 
to confront witnesses against you. If you wish to make a statement before you are sentenced, 
you may do so. You can appeal the court's sentence by filing a timely Notice of Appeal. 
If you have any questions about the charge(s), about your rights, or about the court process, don't 
hesitate to speak up. It is important that you understand. 
Acknowledgement of Rights 
I have read this entire document, and I understand these rights as set forth above. 
Date i /zc:; J l3 
I I 
Defendant's Signature ~ £ 
// 
----:72~-· _t':_ ... _· _____ waives right to public defender at this time 
Moneysaver Printshop 35475 
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/ 
St~:=?::Pnd Judicial District Court, State ofJ1::3ho 
In and For the County of Nez Perc\. 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
STATE OF IDAHO, F\LE ) ) 
Plaintiffl313 JRN 29 Hrl 11 no ) 
vs. ) Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PATTY 0. WEEKS ) 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, <,cl.ERK or m.xJo1JC~lcir:Y/~ 
Defendant . WUiY ) 
~...: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial - County 
Judge: 
Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:15 AM 
Jay P. Gaskill 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday, 
January 29, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, ID 8350100000 
Nicholas D Lepire 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ x_ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered_x_ 
Dated: Tuesday, January 29, 2013 
Patty 0. Weeks 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: ~Qy~~ 
DOC22 7/96 
i. 
18
B~ INSURANCE CO. 
P .0. Box 33015 
St.. :Petersburg, Florida 33733-8015. 
. . 
vs. 
,l~:::N~~~:s~~~~~~~-TO: 
~>.o. Box 33615 
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-8015 
AND 
4-NTHONY WILLIAMS 
ABOVE ALL BAIL BONDS 
.3123 9th Street, Lewiston, lD 83501 
--:--- } I That we, .'> c. ffo C 0 I) • "'-... as Principaland BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
as surety (Identified by attached ower of Attorney No.): :;-r;: /;(3 9 r? '2 3.3> ~-_3. 
are held and firmly b~und unto t~~ • 5> ~ Court, · /;:; <--0,' 5 7<....__ City, i-"'-.. ~- Co~nty, ~ 
intbesurnof /C~'CJD z~-~~-~"~--~ __ _ Dollars,forthepayment~-er~ofweJJ,andtrulytobemade /. "'""'···· . 
. we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, su~~essors and assigns~ jointly and severally firmly .~Y these presents. 
c·ce:-- .----:;---
Signed and sealed tws·-~____,.~--Z=-··...L..1.-.:·----- day of ______ ..:::~:::..--~ _ _:::_· _______ __,. A.D. 20 l 3 
The condition of this obligation i• such tbatifthe said --:5' ~ C 0 J tJ i ..., 'orincipal, 
shall appear at tbe next regular or special term of the j/1---., ':> -~ ·· (Na~e) 
/ ' v Court /.12 --~ ·, S -:--o--..... (Loeation) to be held in ~nd for said _County to answer a charge of 
.,__T) ~ J::. - ::J::?.a 0~.:2s-6l! &"- andshallappearfrom dayt~daya~r.d term t-O term of 
v . 
said Court and not depart the same without leave then this obligation is void, otherwise to remain in fun force and effect •. 
Taken before and approv-ed by me: 
{L!S.f 
; j 
-~(L.S.) · 
i) .. 
THIS BOND NOTVALID UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUALLY NUMBERED POWER OF ATIORNEY PROPERLY EXECUTED, Olt !F 
MORE THAN ONE (1} POWER OF AT£0RNEY IS AIT~CHED. 
NOTE: TUIS IS AN APPEARANCE BOND AND CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A GUARANTEE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE PAYMENTS, BACK 
ALIMONY PAYMENTS, FINES OR WAGE CLAIMS, NOR CAN IT BE USED AS A BOND ON APPEAL. 
-----------~-------------------~------------------------------------
MOTION AND ORDER: TO EXONERATE BOND 
PLEASE MAIL FORM TO: 
Anthony Williams 
ABOV.E ALL BAIL BONDS 
3123 9th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
This is tocertify that I have examined the records of 
the court and found the Jiability of BANKERS 
INSURANCE CO. for the bond shown witb 
corresponding puwer number was .terminated on: 
Court _______________ ..;.__ ______ _ 
J~Y---,-------------{Seal) 
Signature of Clerk or o1her officer of the Court 
BOND NO. ______________________________________ __ 
DEFEND .ANT 
------------------~-------------------
~OUNT$ ______________ ~---------------------------
DATE~STED __________________________________ ~--
CHARGE _________________________________________ _ 
CASENO. ___________________________ ~----------
1.,_. 
19
;x -Enhanced DUI (2nd OffenstiJ 
_Excessive DUI (.20 or Higher) 
Gc>-{[ lbn~ Lc, t tJ~ 
Date: -I) B ~ /[}o I 3 
--~~------~~----~~--
NEZ PERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
Your bond is your guarantee to appear in court. You_ will be required to appear at theN ez 
Perce County Courthouse for further proceedings regarding your case. 
You are required to appear I La:. 9 Lf).o 13 
{ \ ( 
at 9:00am. Should you fail 
to appear as required, a warrant will be issued for your arrest. 
Deputy Sheriff 
NOTE: THE POSTING OF A BOND DOES NOT CLOSE A CASE. 
I hereby certify that I have read the above notice, and I agree to appear as directed. 
20
'~- -,.- -~- -----------------:.._-_-.._-_ .. _~_-_-_..,_·_-:...-_-_":..,. - L·-·------- .. -"'.-- ~,. ........... -.--~--- ---- _-;; c.._._ ___ -;_-_-:.._------":..-:..·-·-·--_-;;_-:...----·-----------""-' - :_--_ .. _----~---- .... --- •,. ---------- ____ :___-:;: - ... ,._"' ...__,..-"".,..,----- --- ...-- ~. ------·---------"" ~ .!:..--·--------- ~'"-- --------------- ---- ,._ 
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SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
Fll 
ZD13 FEB 1 PrJ 2 OS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
15 STATE OF IDAHO, 
16 Plaintiff, Case No.: CR13-676 
17 vs. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
Take notice Scott Chapman, of Chapman Law Offices, PLLC, makes an 
appearance on behalf of the above-named defendant, in the above-entitled 
matter. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 1 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 21
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Defendant hereby requests the Court set this matter for a pre-trial 
conference. 
DATED this J$1' day of February, 2013. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 
a true and correct copy 
of the fQregoing was on 
this_/~_ day of February, 2013, 
Mailed 
Hand Delivered 
Faxed 
17 _J!_ Messenger 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
to the following: 
Nicholas Lepire 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 2 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 22
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
I -~~ ----~~~~---------------- _] i 
~-~-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.,:-:.:-:-::-:-:-::-::-=-:-,:,:-:-:-:c:-:-:-::o;: E-:-:.;:.·.:-:.;:.·.---.-.---,-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~-:-;; .:--~..:-.:-.::.-..::-:.-:-:-::.._-..:-.:.-::.-::.-:. -:.-.:.-:--::...:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::---------..... - ~ =-..::--:.-:--... - ... - ... -.._-..,_ ---.,. -.. ---..._-... - --~-----.: ------~---:.._-;_-..:_-.:~ 1..--.. -.. ---.. -.,::·------~--... -... -... "'-:-:-.::-:::-:--,:.. :..;:-: -: -~ ~.:-:-:-..: -=-=--~ 
SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
FJ LE 
Z013 FEB 1 Pen ? r~a ~ I ... U 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CR13-676 
vs. REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Scott Chapman, attorney for the above-named defendant, 
and requests discovery from the Prosecuting Attorney pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 16(b ), for disclosure of evidence by the prosecution as follows: 
I. 
The defendant be apprised of and/or be permitted to copy, inspect, or 
photograph: (a) any relevant written or recorded statements made by the 
defendant in the above-entitled matter, or copies thereof; (b) the substance of 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 1 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
1-:-:-:-:-------------
23
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
- ~------1 -- ·---- ~--------- ---------- - ---
"-- ------------------"- .,..._._m- ~-- ______ , - ~-- ------------------------ - _..., - ~------------------------------- - .. ______________________________ -; 
any oral relevant statements made by the defendant whether before or after 
defendant's arrest, to any peace officer or prosecuting official, or agents thereof; 
and (c) substance of any oral relevant statement made by the defendant to 
defendant's counsel, whether made before or after defendant's arrest, including 
statements made during any court proceedings. 
Said statements shall include those in the possession, control, or custody 
of the plaintiff, as well as those which by the exercise of due diligence would be 
available to plaintiff. Recorded statements are meant to include transcriptions of 
statements recorded stenographically, mechanically, electronically, or otherwise 
and whether rriade in person to the plaintiff or its agents or transmitted to them 
telephonically and/ or by any other electronic device, with or without the consent 
and/or knowledge of the defendant. 
II. 
The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant a copy of defendant's 
prior criminal record, if any, as is now or may through the exercise of due 
diligence become known to the plaintiff. 
III. 
The defendant be permitted to inspect and copy or photograph books, 
papers, documents, photographs, and tangible objects which are in the 
possession, custody or control of the plaintiff or its agents, and which are 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC · 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 2 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 24
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
material to the preparation of defendant's defense, or which may be used by the 
plaintiff as evidence at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. 
IV. 
The defendant be apprised of and be permitted to copy, inspect, or 
photograph the results of or reports on any scientific tests or experiments made 
in connection with this case. 
v. 
The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant a written list of names, 
current addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons having knowledge of 
the facts relevant to this matter, who may be called by the plaintiff as witnesses 
at trial, together with the record of any prior felony convictions of such persons, 
whether said record be in the knowledge of the plaintiff or its agents or available 
to it by the exercise of due diligence. 
VI. 
Pursuant to Rule 16 (b )(7) of the Idaho Criminal Rules a written summary 
or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to Rules 
702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The 
26 summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for 
27 
28 
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions 
regarding mental health shall also comply with the requirements of I.C. § 18-
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 3 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 25
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
207. 
VII. 
The defendant be apprised of all evidence in the possession of the plaintiff 
and its agents, exculpatory of the defendant or in mitigation. 
VIII. 
The defendant be apprised of the repair records and any journal of use for 
the life of the intoximeter used, if any. A copy of the log sheet for the breath 
testing devices used, or which would have been used, to test the Defendant's 
blood alcohol, which log sheet should reflect all testing administered thirty (30) 
days before and after the Defendant's test; a copy of the COBRA download data 
for the breath testing device used in this case for the same time period of thirty 
(30) days before and after the Defendant's test or, if your response is made less 
than thirty days after the Defendant's test, then COBRA data up through the date 
of your response. 
IX. 
The plaintiff be required to furnish to defendant all evidence discoverable 
under Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 82, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 82 Sup. Ct. 1104 
(1963). 
Defendant further requests that the State of Idaho continue to respond to 
this Request for Discovery in compliance with Idaho Criminal Rule 16(i), 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 4 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 26
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
----
J -- --~ _i 
~--- .._- ~- -- -~--- ~~ ------~- ~--· ·-------------__ ""':._ .. :!:.."'"-"'"-"'"-":....-_-_-:__-... •- ~ --"'""'"- .. -- ... _-- ~--- ... --· ~- -----: ... :-:.....--·----_-_ ... _ ... _ ... :_-_-:_~;.._-;_•• .. :: .. :~ ... -... • ... -... - ... "'" .. "'".-=.! - :...-... - ... - ... - ... - ... - ... "'" ... "'" ... "'" ... "'" ... - ... "'" ... "'" ... "'" ... "'"~- "'"•"'""'",. .. E •-·~ .,.·,. ..... .,-;, 
requiring a continuing duty to disclose. 
DATED this/ §:1-day of February, 2013. 
I HEREBY_CERTIFY 
a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was on 
this }~day of February, 2013, 
Mailed 
Hand Delivered 
Faxed 
:~:~S,PLLC 
15 )( Messenger 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
to the following: 
Nicholas Lepire 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY . 5 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 27
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
NICHOLAS D. LEPIRE 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 8461 
F\LED 
1013 fEB 6 Pn 12 06 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAY COLVIN, 
A.K.A.: GAYLORD J. COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2013-0000676 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL: 
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the following 
Response to Request for Discovery. 
The State has complied with such req~est by providing the following: 
1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or 
copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of 
which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due 
diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the 
defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, or 
the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed, made available, or are attached 
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 1 28
_[ 
2. Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance 
of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest 
in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace 
officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney, have been disclosed, made available, or 
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. 11 
3. Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed, made 
available, or is attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, 
or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody, or 
control of the prosecuting attorney and which are material to the preparation of the 
defense or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or 
belonging to the defendant have been disclosed, made available, or are attached 
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. 11 
5. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of 
scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or copies 
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney, the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise 
of due diligence have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set 
forth in Exhibit "B." 
6. A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having 
knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial is 
set forth in Exhibit "A." Any record of prior felony convictions of any such persons 
which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all statements made by 
the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting 
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attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to any official involved in the 
investigatory process of the case have been disclosed, made available, or are attached 
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A. II 
7. Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney 
which were made by any police officer or investigator in connection with this 
investigation or prosecution of this case have been disclosed, made available, or are 
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. II 
8. All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession 
or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or 
which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed, made 
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. II In addition, with regard 
to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State 
requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense which will be 
asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any additional material 
or information may be material to the defense, and thus fulfill its duty under I.C.R. 
16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
9. Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials have 
been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B, 11 such 
indication should not be construed as confirmation that such evidence or materials 
exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials exist, they have 
been disclosed or made available to the defendant. Furthermore, any items which are 
listed in Exhibit "B 11 but are not specifically provided, or which are referred to in 
documents which are listed in Exhibit "B, 11 are available for inspection upon 
appointment with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. 
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10. The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this 
response if and when more information becomes available. 
11. The State objects to requests by the defendant for anything not 
addressed above on the grounds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR are 
irrelevant under I.C.R. 16. 
~ day of February 2013. 
it~ 
DATED this 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of 
the foregoing RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was 
(1) hand delivered, or 
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Scott M. Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
-·~ .J. 
tf:.fl/'-· 
DATED this . / day of February 2013. 
S ENA SAVAGE 
Legal Assistant 
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1. NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
PHONE: 
2. NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
PHONE: 
EXHIBIT "A" 
LIST OF WITNESSES 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. JAY COLVIN 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2013-0000676 
JEFFORY R. TALBOTT 
Idaho State Police 
2700 N&S Hwy 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 799-5151 
BART M. JARRETT 
3533 6th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208} 790-2277 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
LIST OF REPORTS 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. JAY COLVIN 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2013-0000676 
1. Copy of Citation, page 1. 
2. Copy of Idaho State Police Incident Report, pages 2-8. 
3. Copy of Report Concerning Reason for Arrest, page 9. 
4. Copy of Defendant's Driver's License and Registration, page 10. 
5. Copy of Detailed Call History, pages 11-12. 
6. Copy of Criminal History, pages 13-15. 
7. Copy of Driving History, pages 16-22. 
8. Copy of Notice of Suspension, pages 23-24. 
9. Copy of Idaho State Police Influence Report, pages 25-26. 
10. Copy of Instrument Operations Log, page 27. 
11. Copy of Lifeloc Printout, page 28. 
12. One (1) DVD: containing one (1) AVViewer video. 
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SF:-- ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF T - HO 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
PRETRIAL MOTION, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO vs. JAY COLVIN CASE NO. CR20 13-0000676 
TICKET NO.: ~t!3blbol}:i1i\ ADDRESS: 3131 4th Street D Lewiston, ID 83501 
AGENCY: Idarlo sfathbiice 
D.O.B.: 
D.L.N.: 
S.S.N.: 
I. 
07/14/1974 
KA121401J 
XXX-XX-1362 
The prosecutor or defendant moves the Court as follows: 
( ) For a bench warrant; defendant failed to appear. 
( ) bond set at $ ___ _ 
( ) any existing bond forfeited. 
( ) For default judgment; defendant failed to appear. 
lUl3 FEB 12 PPl 2 36 
PATIY 0. WEEF.S 
- CLER4..,0F T,Hf:t.DJ~T. COURJ 
. - C{/L-lrU~ I ftlefCt).lf( 
DEPUTY 
( ) To amend the charge to a violation of Idaho Code ____ _ 
p6 To set this matter on , at for: S' (,.o<.;"='t:J:1" 
K) continuance ( ) with waiver of speedy trial ( ) trial by ( ) court or by ( ) jury 
( ) To dlsmiss the chrage in the interests of justice. 
( ) Posted bond of$ be forfeited and the case closed. 
( ) I waive my right to a jury trial. 
( ) Quash the bench warrant and re-set for pretrial. 
II. Defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea: 
(X) The plea is voluntary. (X) Defendant has been informed of maximum and minimum penalties. 
(X) Defendant waives the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to 
confront witnesses against he/she. (X) Defendant has been informed of the nature of the charge. (X) NO promises 
have been made other than the plea bargaining agreement set out below. (X) Defendant understands that this 
court IS NOT bound by the agreement. (X) Defendant gives up the right to appeal the judgment. (X) Defendant 
understands that he/she has the right against compulsory self-incrimination during any court ordered evaluation. 
MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT ARRAIGNMENT. I UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS 
AND GIVE THEM UP. I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE(S) SET FORTH ABOVE. I ADMIT TO THE TRUTH 
OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND AGREE TO THE RECOMMENDED SENTENCE. 
III. Plea Bargain and/or RECOMMENDED sentence: 
( ) Fine $__/$ __ suspended ( ) Jail__/ __ suspended ( ) Community Service ____ _ 
() Probation---------------------------------
With the following recommendations: 
( ) Report to the Probation Department withint 48 hours of today's date. 
( ) Commit no Crime. 
( ) Sign a probation agreement and abide by all the terms and conditions of that Agreement. 
( ) Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address. 
( ) Obtain alcohol evaluation. 
( ) Refuse no evidentiary test for the presence of drugs or alcohol. 
( ) No Contact Order as term of probation. 
( ) Driver's License Suspension ______ _ 
( ) Restitution to be paid in the sum of$ to _______________ _ 
Restitution to be paid in monthly installments of$ month beginning and 
To be paid in full on or before end of defendant's probationary period. Restitution to be paid to the 
Nez Perce County Clerk of the Court, P.O. Box 896, Lewiston, ID 83501, or at the window on the 
second floor of the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the form of a money order and/or cashier check. 
( ) No Contact Order vacated. ( ) No Contact Order remains in effect with-------------
91' OTHER: Cf::..,_,. ('a.-.Jfl. w( J&..JC, c~.16:'--
DATED '2 -f'Z-r"? 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY _______ _ 
DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE..------------PROSECUTOR~ -
MAGISTRATE JUDGE c ~a-= DATED ---------./~::'t____.__.}.__"'-----='\-:':J-1---
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
Defendant. 
S~~ond Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Nez Perc 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
lD13 FEB 12 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
.. CLE~· K. 0 f r.r;rn,.... r: r ~fc~. ~. r; 110. _1 , ~~ (J h '; ,'·f, • ~v_,_XO,'' 
. fi'V0' v:- . , c {A '-(" 
DtPUTY J 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial - County 
Judge: 
Tuesday, March 05, 2013 
Jay P. Gaskill 
01:00PM 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday, 
February 12, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, ID 8350100000 
Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Nicholas D Lepire 
Mailed -----Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed __ Hand Delivere~ 
-Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Dated: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 
Patty 0. Weeks 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: ~L Depycleli 
DOC22 7/96 
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)··· . '' Fn · 
IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRifT OFTHE'STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lbtf{{f-y~ PP) J 02 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________ ) 
The Honorable JeffP. Payne is hereby appointed to preside over this matter. 
DATED this \4 +---day of February, 2013. 
I hereby certify that on this _Li_ day of February, 2013, a true copy of the foregoing 
was delivered to the following: 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~Valley Messenger Service 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
Nick Lepire 
County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER APPOINTING JUDGE 1 
__ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~Valley Messenger Service 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
Scott Chapman 
Attorney At Law 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
Serond Judicial District Court, State of lrf~ho 
1 and For the County of Nez Perce 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
F l LE 
2013 FEB 2 0 Ar1 11 L.\8 Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
NOTICE OF HEARING PATTY 0. 'fiE~ ~~ CLERK OF 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial - County 
Judge: 
Thursday, March 07, 2013 11 :30 AM 
Jeff P. Payne 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
February 20, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, I D 83501 00000 / 
Mailed Hand Delivered __ 
Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 j 
Mailed Hand Delivered __ 
Nicholas D Lepire 
Mailed __ Hand Delivered I 
Dated: Wednesday. February 20. 2013 
Patty 0. VVeeks 
Clerk Of The District ,curt 
By: 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S. B. N. 2923 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
JAY COLVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. ctZ-13 -0 0f.l7 (, 
PETITION REQUESTING 
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR 
COMES NOW Daniel L. Spickler, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, 
State of Idaho, in cooperation with the Court under Idaho Code §31-2603(a), and by 
this instrument, and Petitions this Court for the appointment of E. Clayne Tyler, 
Clearwater County Prosecutor, and/or his designee, as Special Prosecutor to assume 
the duties of Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney in the above-entitled case, to act 
with all the power as the Prosecutor for Nez Perce County. This appointment is 
requested on the grounds that Jay Colvin is a prior Deputy Sheriff with the Nez 
PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR -1- 39
Perce County Sheriff's Office, therefore a conflict of interest exists. E. Clayne Tyler, 
and/or his designee, has agreed to proceed with criminal charges if warranted in this 
matter. 
DATED this 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Nez Perce ) 
day of March 2013. 
ss. 
/) /" lJ!~~~ 
DANIELL. SPICKLER?' 
Prosecuting Attorney 
'-~ On this ~ day of March 2013, before me, a Notary Public for Idaho, 
appeared Daniel L. Spickler, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed 
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR -2-
N6tary Publidfbr the State of Idaho 
Residing at: t!ewiston, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 03/18/2016 
40
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy 
of the foregoing PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
was 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
. // 
\_./ 
hand delivered, or 
hand delivered via court basket, or 
sent via facsimile, or 
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
11-
DATED this ~~ ~ day of March 2013. 
~;f(Acurytafu 
SHELLY L. p~MATO 
Executive Senior Legal Assistant 
PETITION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR -3- 41
I 
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QEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. l_.z \3 ... ()0 ti7 (., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
HAVING REVIEWED the Petition Requesting Appointment of Special Prosecutor 
in this matter, and being fully advised, I hereby find that there is good cause for the 
appointment of a Special Prosecutor in this matter; now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that E. Clayne Tyler, Clearwater County Prosecutor, 
and/or his designee, is hereby appointed as Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor 
under the provisions of Idaho Code §31-2603(a). The Special Prosecutor shall assume 
the duties of Nez Perce County Prosecutor in the above matter, to act with full power 
as a Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County. 
DATED this .s-"""'- day of March 2013. 
JUDGE 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR -1- 42
____ I 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, was 
(1) __ V" __ hand delivered, or 
(2) ____ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) ____ sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, addressed to the following: 
E. Clayne Tyler .... 11\(J..A'{ uf.-
Ciearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Daniel L. Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this~ day of March 2013. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR -2- 43
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E. CLA Yr~E T\'l .. ER,: ISBN 5277 
Ptos·ecuting Attorney 
C-cn.tRd:y of. Clea.n'rat{6.t 
"Post Office Box 2fD27 
l)rof.Bno~ Idaho 83544-2627 
l'dephone: (_208) 416-56)11 
·Fa~: C~Q~f) 47![~~97lU 
Ff 
IN TI-lE IHSTRICT COURT Ofi' Tli.E- SECOf~D J UtHClAL .DftS'fJI.-{JCT OJf 
TllE STATE OF JDAHOj IN ANU !FOR THE COUNTY OF NJi2Z }iiERCE 
STATE OF lDAlHJ, 
G,~-\:YLORD ,J. (:OLVIN!t 
) 
) 
} 
) 
} 
) 
) 
J 
) 
------~--~---) 
CASE NO. Clt 2U13-0U676 
l'VtOT.ft:O:r~ TO COIYTKNUE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
CO.YvfES NO'V the State of Idaho, by and tl'u·ough E. Clayr1e Tyler, Si:tec.i.a1 Prosecuting 
Attorney for 1"J.e'? P.erce C..ou.nty ~ and hereby n.1.ove.s: .the Court tor .an Order Continuing ·the Pre~ 
trial Conference currently: scheduled for I\1arch 7~ 2013 at 11:30 <:un. 
This Ivfotion is sttppotted by the Afl:1da.vit of E. Claync Tyl~r tiled co.ncvrrenJly -hs;re:\yith. 
DATED t._h.is //./'l.d11y ofM.arch. 2:013. 
J\10TJON TO COh~D\lJE 
E. CL(}Y'NE TYLER 
Pto.situting. Attonlt-:;y 
44
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CER'I'IFIGATE OF DELlv'"ERY 
The undersigned hert;by- certifies that a tn1e and conecl t.:~t!py of-the foregolr1g wa:1 f~l.ict:d 
to the foll.o>vving .on this ( !:&td.ay of l\1arch. 2013. 
~·cott Chap1nan 
CHAPl'vfAN LAW OFFTCES, PLLC 
PO Box 446 
LeYviston, ID 83501 
By5j~~:L c:~>~~;·~~ ..... ;,.~"'~". 
' Slliiron Haines 
Pata1egal 
lVfOTION TO CONTll\fUE 2 
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Fax Server 
To: 
Attn: 
Fax: 
Fr01n: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Pages: 
cc: 
Fax: 
__ I 
3/6/2013 10:09:42 AM PAGE 
E. CLA YNE TYLER 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
CLEAR,VATER COUNTY 
P.O. BOX2627 
OROFINO, IDAIIO 83544 
208-476-5611 
FAX (208)476-8989 
DEPUTY: LORIM. GILMORE 
FAX COVER SHEET 
Nez Perce County District Comi 
Brittany Davenpmt 
208-799-3058 
Sharon Haines 
State vs. G. Colvin 
tv1arch 6; 2013 
7, including cover 
Scott Chapman 
208-743-1266 
iv1ESSAGE: 
2/008 Fax Server 
Enclosed for filing please fmd the Niotion, Affidavit, and Order to Continue the pre.-trial 
conference scheduled for March 7, 2013. 
Also, could you provide 1ne with a copy of the Court file on this case. ·"'.rc have only received a 
copy of the "Investigative File. 
Thank you, 
Sharon ·Haines 
** ** * ***** *** *** *** ** ** * *** ** * * W ARN"ING ** * ** * * * * * * * * ~'<--:1<* * *** ·k>'< *~r}r ·k *~~ *•': *~' ir >'rYr~'< 
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed anrJ 
may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exen1pt from disclosure under 
applic,able law. If you have received Lhis fax in etTor please contact this office immedialely. 
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E. CLA YNE TYLER: ISBN 5277 
J>rosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544-2627 
Telephone: (208) 476-5611 
Fax: (208) 476-9710 
Deputy: Lori Gilmore, ISBN: 5877 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD J. COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Clearwater ) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-00676 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
E. Clayne Tyler, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the State of Idaho, hereby st·ates as 
follows: 
Your affiant ·was appointed as Special Prosecuting Attorney to handle the above-
captioned case on March 5, 2013 . 
. That on March 6, 2013, your affiant received notice that a pre-trial conference -vvus 
scheduled for Thursday, March 7, 2013 7 at 11 :30 a.m. 
That your affiant has previously scheduled court requb:ernents and therefore rcsricctfully 
moves the Court for an Order continuing the pre-trial conference to a date convenient wiih the 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF lviOTION TO CONTINUE 
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Court and Com.tsel.. 
/ 
.~-'",.~~t..':· 
DATED tl:iis: /~:~---~~-·day oflVIru:ch, 2013. 
-------·-·· _____ ::.: ___ ..... ------------ -···.-~--·· 
E .. CLAYl'JE TYLER 
Pros.ccutitig AttornE:y 
/,.,., ... -. ... , ..•. ,\ 
t ., 
~,,_;'~)LL--=~~~"""''·14----
Not.ar)T Public jn mHJ fbr Idaho 
~:;;;sf~~ ~~;:t~>i~;v~ ., /, (, 
The undersigned her~ by certifies that a true and eorr.ect copy ottl"Jc lbregotug "\va.;; i~t:zcd 
to the foUo\vi.ng on this J,;d±1.day.ofl\rfarch, 201.3". 
Sc:-oU Chapman 
CHAPiv1AN Li\. w.~ OFFICES, PLLC 
PO B'.Jx.446 
Lewiston~ TD 83501 
By~:f.:::~:\~21-tJt ~'if-) 
·-s11~it'on Hair,es -... ,... ·· 
.Paraleg~iiJ 
AFFIDAVIT ll~ S'CJPPORT OF l\,10TION TO CONTlJ--:JU.H 
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E. c:L.ll'll1\TI~ "I''lllJtR~ ISBN 5277 
Pr-osecuting Atio.tney 
Ccfr.-:-.f.Jflty of Cleaff·water 
1)o;$t OffL::!) Bo:x 262'7 
Ort{}Hr.w, Idaho 83544 .. .2627 
T~~e:}?1Mrno: (2-0g) t~76-56U 
'l'fi!.)t.:: (208) 4;7'6,..9110 
7 08 Fax Se}."V~r 
It~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
~rJIE STATE OF IDA.l:IO~ IN AND FOR Tim CO"Ur\'r"fY OF NEZ PER.CE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
·-~--w~•-•·~·----------.J) 
CASE NO. CR2013-00676 
ORDER. TO CONTINUE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
BA.S:SD up on th<; r.aotion. and supportlni affidavit fl.led in thls nlattcr I'f IS IIERRUY 
Th·) Final Pre-tti~ Conference scheduled in 1hls matter for the 7111 day of March~ 2013
1 
h 
hr.~reby· "'l:acatcd and ~cschecLuted to the 14m day of March 2013 at the hour of 
' 1 J 
Dl\TED this~ day ofM~h, 201~. 
Of<D.Y:~R 'TO CONTl1'flJE 1 
l~nOJ lJI~lSIO 
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CE'RTlF1CATE OF DELIVERY 
8 08 Fax Server 
I • 
The utldersiLtned h~~eby certifies that a true and eorrecl copy of the foregoing WU:i faxcr.1 
to the following 0.11. this~ day ofMarch1 2013 
Scolt Chr~pn1a:ri 
. C':'HAP1\.1A.N LA \f..T OFFICES~ PLLC 
PO Bo)(44G 
J,\;;:.\i\/lston7 lD 83 5(rl 
:E. Clay.ne Tyler 
Cl. EJ\.RvV ATER COu.f\rrY PROSEC1JTING ATTOR:NEY 
}'.0. }3ox 2627 
ORJ)gRTO CONTTh1U.E 2 
L / !_ ( . ' • -1 9 1 ()·~ '0 I~" ; 0 Nl 
f. I' (, •.) l) 
l~nO:) l:JI~lSia t.,,,,.-,- I"' I INri Hf.: l 
r' ,......, '" •\llllll 
'f.l 0 7. ·g '1 t!IAI 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
S ::~_ond Judicial District Court, State of" t:=:lho 
In and For the County of Nez PercL 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial - County 
Judge: 
Thursday, March 14, 2013 02:00PM 
Jeff P. Payne 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
March 06, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, I D 83501 00000 
Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered_x_ 
_x_ 
Dated: Wednesday. Mar.cR:Q~3 
By: 
Pa~ekS / 4~ourt 
Deputy'®----:/7 
DOC22 7/96 
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SCOTT CHAPMAN 
.CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar# 3467 
_j 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CR13-676 
vs. MOTION 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the defendant by and through his attorney of record, Scott 
Chapman, and makes the following pre-trial motions: 
1. For an order suppressing any and all evidence obtained as a result 
of the "stop of the defendant's vehicle and/or seizure of his person" based upon 
a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop, probable cause to arrest and further to 
suppress any and all statements made subsequent to the "arrest" and prior to 
advising the defendant of various constitutional rights for the reasons and on the 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
MOTION 1 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 52
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grounds the stop and/or arrest of the defendant was without a reasonable or 
articulable suspicion and lack probable cause in violation of Article I Sections 
13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
2. For an Order to exclude any comment and/or reference and/or 
questions regarding information and/or responses given to questioning by law 
enforcement agent( s) based upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as well as Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution. 
3. To exclude any evidence of "prior bad acts", including but not 
necessarily limited to, prior convictions if any, pursuant to Rules 402, 403, 
404(b ), 608, and 609 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
4. To require the state establish, outside the presence of the jury, 
adequate foundation for any opinion and/ or expert evidence pursuant to Rule 
702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and to further prevent the State 
from mentioning any said opinion( s) and/ or expert evidence until the requisite 
foundational requirements are met. (See also, Rule 16(b )(7) of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules). 
5. To exclude witnesses pursuant to Rule 615(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and further 
request the Court to admonish any witnesses who have testified to not discuss 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
MOTION 2 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 53
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their testimony with other witnesses and if any witnesses remain In the 
courtroom, they shall be barred from further testimony. 
This motion is based upon records and files herein, the affidavit of Scott 
Chapman, and evidence to be adduced at hearing. 
DATED this I Ziay of March, 2013. 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
MOTION 3 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 54
It 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 . 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 
a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was on 
this J3 day of March, 2013, 
Mailed 
Hand Delivered 
_K_ Faxed JDR l./7t;-x9!9 
Messenger 
to the following: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County 
Post Office Box 262 7 
Orofino, ID 83544 
MOTION 
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SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar# 3467 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss . 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Case No.: CR13-676 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN 
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL 
MOTIONS 
SCOTT CHAPMAN, being first and duly sworn on his oath, deposes and 
states that: 
1. He is the attorney for the above-named defendant. 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the Police Report (narrative) 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION 1 56
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of Jeffory R. Talbott, an investigating officer in the above-entitled matter. 
3. The above referenced document is a true and accurate copy of the 
original constitute official court documents in the above-entitled matter and/or 
are capable of judicial notice and/or are investigative reports by police and other 
8 law enforcement personnel offered by the accused in a criminal case. 
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DATED this I~ day of March, 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this \3 day of March, 
2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN 
c 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: £ 0 I)~ t±O\ rb 
My Commission Expires: g~2;3-tJ 
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION 2 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 57
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2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that 
3 a true and correct copy 
4 of the foregoing was on this I~ day of March, 20 13, 
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Hand Delivered 
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9 to the following: 
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11 E. Clayne Tyler Prosecuting Attorney 
12 Clearwater County 
13 Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83 544 
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Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT CHAPMAN Post Office Box 446 
IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL MOTION 3 Lewiston, ID 83501 58
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Incident Report 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
L13000111 
Reported Date 
01/28/2013 
Nature of eaa 
DUI. 
Officer 
Supplement No 
ORIG 
TALBOTT I JEFFORY R 
On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffory R. Talbott of the 
Idaho State Police, stopped a white colored, 1992, Toyota SR5 {Idaho registration N164008) for 
failure to signal when merging (merged from the right lane into the left lane without signaling) 
southbound on 5th St. near Stewart Ave., Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. I subsequently 
arrested the driver, identified as Gaylord Jay COLVIN (date of birth: 7/14/1974) by his ld.aho 
Driver's License, for driving under the influence (DUI) second offense. COLVIN provided breath 
samples on the Life Loc FC20. His results were .123/.134 BrAG. The vehicle was released to 
lillian K. DAVIS (date of birth: I transported COLVIN to the Nez Perce County jail 
~here .he was incarcerated. T op and arrest was recorded on the Arbitrator video 
·system, file 062231.AV. 
Rep;Jrt Officer 
3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R 
Printed At 
02/04/2013 09:34 Page 1 of 4 
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Incident Report 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
L13000111 Supplement No ORJ:G 
(jailed) 
1. On January 28, 2013, approximately 2224 hours, I, Senior Trooper Jeffery R. Talbott of the 
Idaho State Police (ISP), was traveling south on 5th St. approaching Stewart Ave., Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. The weather was cool and cloudy with a light rain falling. The 
·roadway was wet, clear of any obstructions and partially illuminated by streetlights. I was in a 
;marked ISP patrol vehicle and I .was in uniform.· 
2. As I was traveling, I witnessed a white colored pickup traveling south in front of me. As I was 
behind the pickup, it appeared to be weaving in its lane and traveling 30 Miles per Hour (MPH) 
in the posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup th~n activated its right hand turn signal and moved into 
the right hand lane as we passed a traffic sign indicating the ri.ght hand lane was ending. The 
pickup then continued south and merged back· to the left in front of me without signaling. I 
activated my vehicle's overhead emergency equipment and the .pickup began to slow. The 
pickup passed Stewart Ave., pulled to the right and stopped. I could see the rear license plate 
Printed M. 
02/04/2013 09:34 Page 2 of 4 
3 61
Incident Report 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
L13000111 Supplement No OlUG 
Narrative 1 : 
was Idaho N164008 and two occupants inside. 
3. I contacted the driver, a male, and explained the reason for the stop. The driver stated he 
moved to the right. I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the 
vehicle and noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver handed me an Idaho driver's 
license identifying himself as Gaylord Jay COLVIN (date of birth: I recognized the 
driver as an off-duty Nez-perce-eounty-Sheriffs-f)eputy;-·1- he-should-know-abou\---
signaling when merging and asked if he forgot about signaling, he stated his clutch was going 
out of his pickup and that he didn't want to stall me. I asked for his vehicle registration and proof 
of insurance. I asked Mr. COLVIN where he was coming from, he stated "I left downtown 
and?". I asked where at downtown, he stated "I had a beer at the barn. I asked if it was just the 
one drink, he stated ''Yes sir". While retrieving his paperwork I noticed Mr. COLVIN would 
repeatedly look at the same pap~rs and appeared distracted by my questions. I asked his 
passenger, a male, if he was at the bar with Mr. COLVIN, he stated yes. l asked if he had his 
identification with him, he stated no. I asked which bar they were at, Mr. COLVIN stated the 
Wrangler. 
4. I returned to my patrol car and requested the ISP Regional Communications Center (RCC) 
pheck Mr. COLVIN's driving privileges. I deactivated my vehicle's overhead emergency 
equipment leaving just the rear 1ights activated for safety. 
5. I contacted Mr. COLVIN and asked if he had just the one drink tonight, he stated he had two. 
I had Mr. COLVIN turn in his seat and face me. l sa~ that he was not wearing glasses and 
asked if he wore contacts, he stated no. I had Mr. COLVIN follow the tip of my thumb with just 
his eyes. He appeared to show some signs of Nystagmus. 
6. I returned to my patrol car and repositioned it to allow more room between our vehicles. I 
contacted Mr. COLVIN and asked him to exit his pickup and meet me near the tailgate, he did. 
had Mr. COLVIN perform the standardized field sobr!ety evaluations. The area where the 
evaluations were performed was the paved. asphalt shoulder and roadway. I saw that Mr. 
COLVIN was wearing brown colored "Romeo" shoes and I noticed no strong breeze blowing. 
7. I asked Mr. COLVIN if he'd had any recent head injuries, he stated no. I asked if he was 
taking any medications, he stated no. 
8. Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: I observed both of Mr. COLVIN's eyes were tracking equally 
and his pupils appeared to be the same size. I observed a Jack of smooth pursuit, a distinct and 
sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, as well as onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees, 
in both of Mr. COLVIN's eyes. Mr. COLVIN scored six out of a possible six decision points with 
a failing score of four or more. While conducting the evaluation, I could smell the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage coming from Mr. COLVIN's breath. 
9. Walk and Tum: I asked Mr. COLVIN if he had any problems with his hips, knees or ankles, 
he stated no. I asked if he felt comfortable walking in his shoes, he stated yes. I explained and 
demonstrated the instruction phase of the Walk and Tum evaluation. Mr. COLVIN lost his 
balance and stepped out of the heel to toe position. He then started wiping his shoe on the 
ground as if trying to remove pebbles or rocks. I could not see anything near his feet that would 
impede his ability to stand in the heel to toe position. He then stated "I'm a little nervous". After 
Report Officer 
3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R 
Prtn\edN 
02/04/2013 09:34 J?age 3 of 4 
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Incident Report 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
L13000111 Supplement No ORJ:G 
Narrative : -
· resuming the heel to toe position, I explained and demonstrated the walking phase of the 
evaluation. I asked Mr. COLVIN if he understood, he stated yes. I asked if there was anything 
he wanted me to go over or demonstrate again, he stated no. During the walking phase Mr. 
COLVIN stepped offline, missed placing his heel to his toe and raised his arms for balance. Mr. 
COLVIN scored four out of a possible eight decision points with a failing score of two or more. 
--i-G-;--9Re-l::eg-S-tand:-t-explained-and-dem-onstrated-the-ene-teg-Stand-eva1uation-and-asked-Mr. 
COLVIN if he unde~stood, he stated yes. I asked if there was anything he wanted me to go 
over or demonstrate again, he stated no. During the evaluation Mr. COLVIN raised his arms for 
balance and was _swayed visibly. Mr. COLVIN scored two out of a possible four decision points 
with a failing score of two or more. 
11. I infonned Mr. COLVIN I was detaining him for breath samples. I seated him in the rear 
passenger side seat of my car sitting sideways with his feet outside the vehicle. I checked Mr. 
~OLVIN's mouth for foreign material, none was found. I instructed him not to burp, belch, or 
vomit. I read the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) advisory to Mr. COLVIN. During the 
mandatory fifteen minute waiting period I remained in close proximity to Mr. COLVIN with 
nothing between us. I did not hear or see him burp, belch, or vomit. During the observation 
period, ISP Sgt. Ken Yount arrived on scene. Approximately 14 minutes and 30 seconds of the 
observation period Mr. COLVIN made a deep sound out of his mouth. I asked Mr. COLVIN if he 
had burped, he stated "That wasn't a burp''. After the mandatory fifteen minute waiting period 
and after listening to the ALS advisory, Mr. COLVIN agreed to submit to a breath test. Mr. 
COLVIN provided two breath samples on the Life Loc FC20. His results were .123/.134 BrAC. 
12. I had Mr. COLVIN meet me near the front of my patrol car. I informed Mr. COLVIN I was 
placing him under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI). I placed 
Mr. COLVIN · in handcuffs and checked the handcuffs for proper fit. I then double locked them 
·and searched Mr. COLVIN for contraband and/or weapons in front of my patrol camera, none 
were found. I secured Mr. COLVIN in the rear seat of my patrol vehicle on the passenger side 
with a seatbelt. 
13. At Mr. COLVIN's request, I contacted Lillian K. DAVIS and released his vehicle to her, after 
she arrived on scene. I contacted the passenger and identified him as Bart M. JARRETI (date 
of birth: by his Idaho driver's license. I searched the vehicle for evidence of DUI, 
none was found. The RCC informed me Mr. COLVIN had a prior DUI conviction on 4n/2011. I 
transported Mr. COLVIN to the Nez Perce County Jail. 
14. I booked Mr. COLVIN into the Nez Perce County Jail for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) pursuant to Idaho code 
section 18-8005( 4 ). I released Mr. COLVIN to the custody of the Nez Perce County Jail staff 
and had no further contact with him. 
Report Officer 
3431/TALBOTT,JEFFORY R 
Printed At 
02/04/2013 09:34 Page 4 of 4 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
.. _! 
Se :0::-:·.,d Judicial District Court, State of ld~~bo 
an and For the County of Nez Perce 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
FILED 
Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
vs. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pretrial Motions 
Judge: 
Thursday, April18, 2013 
Jeff P. Payne 
10:00 AM 
Tuesday, May 21, 2013 
Jeff P. Payne 
10:30 AM 
Final Pretrial 
Judge: 
Jury Trial 
Judge: 
Friday, June 07, 2013 08:30AM 
Jeff P. Payne 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday, March 
15,2013. 
Defendant: Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, 10 8350100000 
Mailed_ Hand Delivered_ 
Private Counsel: Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, lD 83501 Mailed_ Hand Delivered_x_ 
Prosecutor: E Clayne Tyler Mailed_x_ Hand Delivered_ 
) 
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\:AX 
To: Clerk of the Court 
. Company: Nez Perce County District Court 
Fax: 12087993058 
Phone: 
From: _Sharon Haines, Clearwater County Prosecuting Atty's Off 
Fax: 208-4 76-8989 
Phone: 208-4 76-5611 
E-mail: 
NOTES: 
Enclosed for filing please find State's Supplemental Response to 
Defendant's Request for Discovery, State's Witness and Exhibit List 
and State's Request for Discovery in State vs. Gaylord J. Colvin. If 
you would please file these documents I would appreciate it. 
Sincerely, 
Sharon Haines 
Paralegal 
cc: Scott Chapman, Attorey for Defendant 
Date and time of transmission: Monday, April 08, 2013 12:43:50 PM 
Number of pages including this cover sheet: 12 
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E. CLAYNE TYLER, ISBN 5277 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Cleru·V\rater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-5611 
Fax: (208) 476-8989 
Deputy: Lori M. Gilmore, ISBN 5877 
F f LE 
2013 APR 8 Prl 2 11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO} IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR2013-676 
STATE'S \VITNESS AND EXHIBIT 
LIST 
C01VIES NOW, E. CLA YNE TYLER, Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Clcmvv·aler 
advises the Court that the State expects to call the following prin1ary witnesses al Lbe t.rin1 
scheduled in this n1atter: 
·witnesses: 
Jeffory Talbott 
ISP 
Bart Jarrett 
Further, the State advises the Defense and the Court that there are other witnesses 
previously listed with the Court as ·witnesses, whon1 the State 1nay need to call depending on. ho\v 
evidence and testimony are presented and occur at trial on the matter. rfl1c State respectfully 
submits that these witnesses should also be eligible as witnesses should the state need to call 
STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST -1 
66
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them. 
For exhibits the state expects to introduce or anticipates the use of lhc foiJ.o,v.ing: 
Exhibits: 
Video/ Audio Recording 
Administrative License Suspension Fonn 
Certified Copy ofJudgn1ent of Conviction for Case No. CR2011-396, Nez Perce County 
LifeLoc.Printout 
State reserves the right to call any witnesses or use any exhibit at the trial in this matler 
which has been previously provided in State's discovery or in the DefendanCs discovery Jnd/or 
\Vitness and exhibit list. 
. . -~ dn,n/ 
Dated this~ day of~'eh, 2013. 
STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT UST - 2 
~~ /1t~ E. CL~ ~i TYLER 
Speci8.1 Prosecuting Atton1ey 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELNERY 
· · "~ _L"y;.vvt 
I, the undersigned, hereby cmiify that on the~ day of'Nfm'eh~ 2013, a true and conc,cl 
copy of the foregoing STATE'S vVTTNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST \vas __ 1nailcd or 1:!.:!_ 
delivered in com1house n1ail to the following: 
Scott Champan 
Chapman Law Office 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston) lD 83501 
~'~ \. 1\~ \_· 
·····-.'- L~:-eC~'¥(~~ 
Sharon Haines 
Paralegal 
STATES WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST- 3 
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1 E. CLA YNE TYLER ISBN:5277 
Prosecuting Attorney 
FIL 
2 Clearwater County l013 APR 8 Prl 2 11 
3 
4 
5 
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7 
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10 
11 
13 
14 
17 
18 
20 
Post Office Box 262 7 
Oroflno~ Idaho 83544-2627 
Telephone: (208) 476-5611 
Chief Deputy: Lori M. Giln1ore ISBN:5877 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DJSTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ThT AND FOR TI-lE COUNTY OF 1'-JEl PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN~ 
CASE NO. CR2013-676 
STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOV.EIZ Y 
AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI 
21 To inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or me.ntal or medical 
23 
22 exa1ninations, care and treatn1ent of the defendant and of scientific tests or experiments mode i.n ! 
connection with the particular case or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the clcfcndunt~;, I 
24 which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or ·which were prepared by a witue~~s I 
25 whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the 
26 'vitness. 
27 
28 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY & DEMAND FOR ALIBI 
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I 
I 
1 III I 
l 
Furnish the Clearwater County Prosecutor1s office -vvith a list of nmnes and addresses of any \"/it !lt.~;:.:~c:; l 
- l 
3 he intends to call at trial. l 
2 
! 
l 
I 4 This shall be a continuing request pw:suant to Idaho Crhninal Rt1lc 16 (i). 
5 FURTIIER, THE STATE HEREBY DEMANDS OF THE DEFENDANT NOTJ.Cl~ Ol·· I 
I 
6 DEFENSE OF ALIBIPURSUANT~O IDAHO CODE 19-519 AND TDAIIO CRITv1INi\L R.UJJ~ 1'2-1.1 
DATED this ~day offt~l, 2013. ! 7 
I 
8 
9 
10 l 
I 
11 
12 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF J\1AILING OR DELIVERY ,~, t I 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and couect copy of the foregoing \Vas £~i:~~d{e~f~- -----· I 
14 
15 
delivered by courthouse mail to the following on 1he ~heiay offv'larch, 201J. 1 
16 . I 
17 
Scott Chapman 
Chapman Law Office 
P.O. Box 446 
18 Lewiston, ID 83501 
19 .. -·· -~~- . ·- :::1. i - . 
20 ·"·-; ·-_ ·--~----u'~ 
Sharou'1Haines 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
REQUEST' FOR DISCOVERY & DEMAND FOR ALIBI 2 
l 
l 
i 
I 
I 
ii 
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E. CLA YNE TYLER: ISBN 5277 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearvvater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino., Idaho 83 544-2627 
Telephone: (208) 476-56l1 
Fax: (208) 476-9710 
Deputy: Lori Gilmore, ISBN: 5877 
Fl LED 
1013 APR 8 PPl 2 11 
1'\I THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD J. COLVfN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________ ) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-00676 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RJ~SPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL: 
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled n1atter, and submits the follovving State's 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery. 
The State has con1plied with such request by providing the following: 
1. Any relevant written or recorded state1nents n1ade by the dcfendunt
7 
or 
copies thereof: vvithin the possession, custody or control of the State~ the existence of whjch is 
known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due di ligcnc.e; and also the 
substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after urrcst to 
a peace oHicer> prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been di~K.loscd, 
n1ade available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit 11B. n 
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2. Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the su.lbstance 
of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendm}t whether before or after anest j n response 
to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the 
prosecuting altorney, have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set. forth in 
Exhibit "B. 11 
3. Defendant's prior criminal record, if any~ has been disclosed, n1adc available, or i0 
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit ''B." 
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or 
places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession_, custody, or control of the 
prosecuting attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use 
by the prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the defendant have been 
disclosed, m.ade available, or are attached hereto as sel forth in Exhibit "B. 11 
5. Any results or reports of physical or n1ental exan1inations, and of scientific tests or 
experin1ents, n1ade in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the 
possession, custody, or control ofthe prosecuting attorney, the existence of,vbich is known or is 
available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed, ru0dc 
available, or are attached hereto as sel forU1 in Exhibit "B.,. 
6. A ~'Tillen list of the nan1es and addresses of all persons having kmnvJedge of 
relevant fa.cts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial is set forth in Exhibit "A.'' 
Any record of prior felony convictions of any such persons which is within the kno'\vledge of lhc 
prosecuting attorney and all staten1ents made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective 
prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecutjng aUon1ey's agents or to any 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY -2 
72
Fax Server 4/8/2013 12:44:48 PM PAGE 4/012 Fax Server 
' 
official involved in the investigatory process of the case have been disclosed
1 
nmde available, or 
arc attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
7. Any reports and 1nemoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney which \Vcrc 
made by any police officer or investigator in cmmection with this investigation or prosecution of 
this case have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B. 1' 
8. All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession 
or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the oiTense charged or \vhich 
would tend to reduce the punishtnent therefore have been disclosed, made available, or are 
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit ''B." In addition, with regard to material or infonnation 
which may he exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State requests that the defendant inforn1 the 
State, in writing, of the defense which will be asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can 
determine if any additional material or information may be material to U1e defense, and thus 
fulfill i.ts duty under l.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
9. Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or 1naterials have been 
disclosed~ made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B, 11 such indication 
should not be construed as coni1rmation that such evidence or materials exist, but simply as an 
indication that if such evidence or 1naterials exist, they have been disclosed or made availab.lc to 
the defendant. Furthem1ore, any iten1s which arc listed in Exhibit "B" but are not specifically 
provided, or which are referred to in documents which are listed in Exhibit "B,If are available for 
inspection upon appointment with the Prosecuting Attomeis Office. 
10. The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this 
response if and when n1ore information becmnes available. 
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11. The State objects to requesls by the defendant for anything not culdrc~;~;cd ab<n·c 
on the gToLmds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR are irrclevnn! under 1.C.R. ! (). 
DATEDthis d LJ.~~ .... 1 day of~, 2013. 
~--------,.,.-~~ c ~7 --~.--:~~-~ ~/1 rfo~·-~-
~E- CLA ~E TYLER 
Spe9al,.,.Prosecuting Attorney for 
Nez Perce County 
CERTIFICATE OF lVlAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was rnai led 
to the following this Z?th day o1~~~2013: 
Scott Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC 
P.O.Box446 
Le·wiston, TD 83501 
(~~'" ~ By:\~ __ ):::)V\A.- §~kl.«~/~ 
Sharon Haines 
Para]egal 
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The State reserves the right to call, at trial or any proceeding in this matter, any 1v.it.ness Listed in 
or nan1ed in any discovery response or filing with the court, including those of !he dc.fcndant, to 
include but not limited 1.o the following: 
WITNESSES: 
NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
PHONE: 
NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
PHONE: 
JEFFORY R. TALBOTT 
Idaho State Police 
2700N&S Hwy 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 799-5151 
BART M. JARRETT 
3 53 3 6th Street 
Lewi.ston:> ID 83501 
(208) 790-22 77 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
1 . Copy of Citation, page 1. 
2. Copy of Idaho State Police Incident Report, pages 2-8. 
3. Copy of Report Conccn1ing Reason for Arrest, page 9. 
4. Copy of Defendant's Driver's Llcense and Registration, page 10. 
5. Copy ofDetailed Calll-Iistory, pages 11-12. 
6. Copy of Criminal History,. pages 13-15. 
7. Copy of Driving History, pages 16-22. 
8. Copy of Notice of Suspension, pages 23-24. 
9. Copy of Idaho State Police Influence Report, pages 25-26. 
10. Copy of Instrument Operations Log, page 27. 
1 1, Copy ofLifeloc Printout, page 28. 
12. One (1) DVD: containing one (1) A VViewer video 
13. Radio Logs from 2 hours prior to event, not numbered 
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Scott Chapman 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
11 06 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
F!L 
2013 RPR 8 PP) 2. 13 
~,;~·L;,I_.i~;~~:~i~~:;EM lA~ ~_,. \I L, , ~;tt/VJ~rr·" ' .. ""'-DEPUTY 
7 Lewiston, Idaho 83 501 
8 (208) 743-1234 
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Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
I. 
Case No.: CR13-676 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL 
MOTIONS 
FACTS 
The defendant Gaylord Jay Colvin (Jay Colvin) was arrested for Driving 
Under While Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Idaho Code 
§ 18-8004. He was stopped for failing to signal when two uphill lanes merged 
into one while he continued to travel in the right lane an alleged violation of 
Section 49-808 of the Idaho Code. 
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Jay Colvin has caused to be filed various pre-trial motions including a 
motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the stop of Jay Colvin on 
January 28, 2013. 
The stop was based solely upon in alleged violation of Section 49-808 of 
the Idaho Code which statute is unconstitutionally void as applied because it 
failed to provide fair notice that signaling is required when roadway design 
results in two lanes down to one and that the same section is unconstitutionally 
void as applied because it fails to establish minimum guidelines as to what is an 
"appropriate signal" to govern enforcement of the statute. 
Evidence at the hearing should adduce the following: 
1) On January 28, 2013 at a little before 10:30 p.m. State Trooper Jeffory 
Talbott stopped a vehicle being operated by Jay Colvin: 
2) The sole basis supplied by Talbott was: "As I was hehind the pickup, 
it appeared to be weaving in it lane and traveling 30 miles per hour 
(mph) in the posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup then activated its right 
hand tum signal and moved into the right hand lane as we passed a 
traffic sign indicating the right hand lane was ending. The pickup 
continued south and merged back to the left in front of me without 
signaling. I activated my vheihilces overhead emergency 
equipment ... "; 
3) All of the foregoing appears on video from the "dash cam" video in 
Talbots patrol vehicle and fails to support any contention of weaving. 
Further testimony will be adduced which will indicate the vehicle 
operated by Jay Colvin was and older model small pick up which will 
not go up 5th street grade (location of the stop) any faster than 3 0 mph 
which is why Jay pulled over to the right (actually changed lane with 
an appropriate signal) to let the car behind him (Talbott) by and 
Talbott chose not to pass. 
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4) The sign refered to and the Idaho Driver's License manual entry is as 
follows: 
Lane Ends/Merge Left: Two lanes of 
traffic will soon become one lane of traffic. Right lane 
traffic must yield when merging. 
5) Applicable portions of the Idaho Drivers manual read as follows: 
Keep to the Right 
In most cases, the law requires that we stay as far to the right side of the 
road as possible. The exceptions are: 
• When preparing to make a left turn. 
• When passing another vehicle going in the same direction. 
·When on a highway with more than two lanes where the right 
lane is designated for slow traffic. 
• When entering the left lane temporarily in order to avoid an 
obstruction, a pedestrian, or an animal. 
• When traveling on a road restricted to one-way traffic. 
• When traveling on a road with two or more lanes traveling in the 
same direction. 
2-5 
Using Your Turn Signals 
Always give a turn signal when you: 
• Change lanes or pass another vehicle. 
• Turn at an intersection or into a driveway. 
• Enter or leave a freeway or interstate highway. 
• Pull away from a parked position along a road or street to enter the 
traffic lane. 
• Pull over to the side of the road. 
Proper signalling may prevent a rear-end collision. Signals must start at 
least 1 00 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on freeways 
or highways) before you turn or change lanes. If you plan to turn just 
beyond an intersection, signal just after you pass through the intersection so 
you won't confuse other drivers. You may use either electric turn signals or 
arm signals. 
The correct arm signals 
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Regulatory Signs - Regulatory signs are generally black and white, 
although some are red and white, and must be obeyed at all times. 
Warning Signs: Most warning signs are black on yellow and most are 
diamond-shaped. They also include the fluorescent yellow/green school 
warning signs, and the orange and black construction zone signs. These 
signs warn you to slow down and be prepared to stop if necessary; a 
special situation or hazard is ahead. Some common warning signs follow. 
3-2 
6) There will be evidence showing that no discernible left ward movement 
or motion is required for a vehicle to continue straight forward movement down 
5th street. Further that no "turn" is required. 
7) Random observation of traffic will establish virtually no vehicles signal 
at the point in question. 
II 
ARGUMENT 
a. 
Section 48-808(1) of the Idaho Code 
is Unconstitutionally Void 
State v. Morgan, 2013 SLIP opinion No. 14 at Page 3, states: 
"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment." State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 
16, 19 (2007). Limited investigatory detentions are 
permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about 
to commit, a crime. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 
P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable suspicion must be 
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences 
that can be drawn from those facts." Id. Reasonable suspicion 
requires more than a mere hunch o~ "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion." Id. (quoting United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). The test for reasonable 
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known 
to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Id. 
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with 
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited" and that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 
(2003). 
Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[ s] to provide fair 
notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[ s] to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. 
Id. at 712. The statute involved in this matter, I.C. § 49-808(1) is 
unconstitutionally void for both of these reasons. 
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications," i.e. invalid in toto. Id. However, even if a statute is not facially 
vague it may still be vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. Id. 
Burton is not arguing that I.C. § 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is 
void as applied to her conduct. 
Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code states: 
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a 
vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit 
from a highway unless and until the movement can be made 
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_____ I 
with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate 
signal. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 7 46, 7 48, 240 
P.3d 933, _ (Ct.App. 2008) in construing said statute under remarkably 
similar circumstances states: 
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what 
the State commands or forbids" and that "men of 
common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the 
meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 
612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 
P.2d 244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, premised upon the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a 
statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil 
sanctions[ fn1] be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded 
in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. FlipsideJ Hoffman Estates) Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 
362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 
711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 
Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App. 2009). Thus, a 
statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 
Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
The court goes on to hold: 
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This vagueness in application occurs because the 
statute does not specify how much or what type of 
movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the 
duty to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation 
of the statute might lead to a conclusion that a signal is 
required when two lanes simply merge because a 
driver in either lane must move the steering wheel at 
least slightly in order to steer into the emerging lane. 
But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly 
literal application to every type of side-to-side 
movement, for a vehicle literally moves to the left or 
the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her 
lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but no 
one would contend that a signal is required in those 
instances. It is simply not apparent from the language 
of Section 49-808(1) whether a signal is required when 
two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary 
intelligence can only guess at the statute's directive in 
this circumstance. Therefore, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's 
conduct. 
Because Section 49-808(1) could not be 
constitutionally applied to her, Burton has shown that 
no legal cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop that 
led to her breath tests. 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749-750, 243 P.3d at 
It might be reasonably anticipated the state will raise the 
spectre 
of State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.3d 388 (Ct.App. 1999). 
In that respect the Burton court stated: 
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in 
State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 
(Ct.App. 1999). The driver there contended that the 
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signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not 
apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended 
and two traffic signs as well as painted arrows on the 
highway advised motorists that the right lane was 
ending and traffic should merge left. The Dewbre case 
generated a separate opinion from each of the three 
Court of Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that 
the signal requirement applied in that circumstance. A 
second judge concurred in that result but did not join 
in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge 
dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not have 
precedential value bearing upon the present case for 
several reasons. First, the Court in Dewbre was not 
called upon to address the constitutional issue 
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that 
commanded a majority, and third, Dewbre is factually 
distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and 
arrows on the roadway informed motorists that the 
right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must merge 
into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, 
there is no evidence of such signage or other indicator 
that one lane was ending and the other surviving. 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P. 3d at_. 
The crucial element is the necessity of some distinct movement left or 
right prior to the requirement of a signal. The position of Jay Colvin is no 
distinct movement herein was required. And application of the Section 49-
808(1) of the Idaho Code is void for vagueness to the circumstances of the case. 
Section 49-808 was last amended by the legislature in 2005. The Burton 
decision came down in 2008. The legislature has been in session four times 
since and has done nothing to clarify or remediate the statute's infirmity. One 
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must assume the legistlature has placed its seal of approval on the Burton, 
interpretation of its statute. 
The Idaho Drivers manual does not at any place require a signal must be 
used in the "Colvin" situation. In fact the signage indicating a lane ends is 
denominated as "advisory" ... not mandatory. If a driver goes around a comer 
faster than the "advised" speed on a yellow sign there is no law violation 
warranting a stop (absent exceeding the overall posted speed limit). 
Lastly and most importantly ... the evidence herein will show that no 
distinct right to left movement was made by Jay on the night of the stop 
requiring a signal. .. nor is such a movement ever required at that location 
making the statute void for vagueness as applied herein. 
While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to 
avoid a deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in 
the road is not. Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45°-
90° tum is not. Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and 
more in vogue is not. In fact, signaling in these latter situations would actually 
constitute a hazard. 
Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The 
passing lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one. 
Thus, it is the lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that 
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proceeding down a three lane road, moved to the right-hand lane and continued 
in that lane, never changing direction, exiting or merging. 
Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho 
Code, a person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is 
appropriate and, therefore, required. The vagueness doctrine does not require 
every word in a criminal statute to be statutorily defined. State v. Casano, 140 
Idaho 461, 464 (Ct. App. 2004). However, "a statute must be construed so that 
effect is given to every word and clause of the statute" and "words and phrases 
are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language." 
19 Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 656. Therefore, effect must be given to the word 
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"appropriate" as it is used in this statute. 
"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, 
person, occasion" (http://www.dictionary.co1n, accessed Oct. 15, 2009) or 
"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" (http://www.encarta.msn.com, 
accessed Oct. 15, 2009). Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the 
statute implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not 
appropriate. However, because the statute provides no definition of the term 
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"appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your "movement" 
could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary 
intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are 
many situations, including the one presently before the court, in which "the 
appropriate signal under the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." 
Jay Colvin was traveling in the right-hand lane of a road that narrowed 
from two lanes to one. Therefore, the design of the road forced Jay to continue 
forward in the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one. 
While the lanes merged (in a manner of speaking), Jay no more merged or 
changed lanes by remaining in the right-hand side than someone in the left hand 
lane in the same place may have merged or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an 
issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the merger, changes direction or 
changes lanes. The result, according to the anticipated State's position would 
actually require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one could envision a 
situation where a driver in the left-hand lane, would signal a right-hand tum and 
a driver in the left-hand lane would signal to tum left, even though both 
continued in the same direction with neither turning. 
There was no other traffic in the vicinity at the time whose travel was 
potentially impeded or interfered with by Jay's action. Therefore, it is likely 
that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However, 
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because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such situations, 
it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void. 
b. 
I. C. § 49-808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to 
This Case Because it Fails to Provide Sufficient Guidelines as to 
Whe~ a Signal is Appropriate Thereby Giving Police 
Unbridled Discretion in Enforcing the Statute. 
A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement 
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resol.ution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586 
(1990). This failure to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement is often 
"what tolls the death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. This is "perhaps the most 
meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine.". Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). 
In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing 
to provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 118 Idaho at 590. Under the 
ordinance, a person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to 
identify himself and offer an explanation for his presence and conduct. Id. 
However, the ordinance did not provide any guidelines for what constituted 
credible and reliable identification and, therefore, gave police officers complete 
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discretion to make that determination. Id. at 589-590. Although that ordinance 
was found to be facially void, the reasoning is equally applicable in this "as 
applied" vagueness challenge. 
Similar to Bitt, I. C. § 49-808( 1)' s use of the phrase "appropriate signal" 
without providing further enforcement guidelines impemissibly gives officers 
complete discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. 
Although a facial challenge of I. C. § 49-808(1) might not prevail because there 
are obvious situations in which a person of ordinary intelligence would 
understand a signal to be appropriate, the statute is vague as applied to Jay 
Colvin's conduct. 
As discussed above, there are many situations in which a signal is not 
necessary. Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase 
"appropriate signal" leave a person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a 
signal is "appropriate," this failure to provide minimal guidelines provides 
22 police with unbridled discretion in determining whether the statute has been 
23 violated. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Therefore, Section 49-808( 1) of the Idaho Code is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to Jay Colvin because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as 
to when a signal is appropriate thereby giving police officers unbridled 
discretion in enforcing the statute. 
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Obviously, virtually the entirety of the State's case will be "opinion" 
8 evidence offered by way of "expert" testimony. Defendant has moved to 
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exclude this opinion or reference to said opinion until requisites of Rules 
702, 703 and 705 have been met. 
Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by 
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field 
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The 
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give the reasons therefore without prior to disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, provided that the court may 
require otherwise, and provided further that, if requested 
pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying facts or 
data were disclosed. The expert may in any event be 
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
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examination. 
The Court of Appeals has held in State v. Eytchison, 30 P.3d 988, 136 
Idaho 210 (Ct. App. 2001) as follows: 
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by 
Idaho Rules of Evidence 702, which provides: "If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise." *fn1 The five sources of expert qualifications 
identified in the rule, knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, are disjunctive. Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414, 
3 P.3d at 539; State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 6 81, 7 4 7 
P . 2 d 8 8, 9 0 (Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, academic 
training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an 
expert; practical experience or specialized knowledge 
may be sufficient. *fn2 Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414, 3 P.3d 
at 539. However, there must be some demonstration that the 
witness has acquired, through some type of training, 
education or experience, the necessary expertise and 
knowledge to render the proffered opinion. Konechny, 134 
Idaho at 414, 3 P.3d at 539. A witness may be qualified 
to render opinions about some things but not others. West 
v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 139,968 P.2d 228,234 (1998). 
The procedure advocated by the defendant was also apparently 
argued in State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 73 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2003). The 
only thing being requested by Defendant is the requisite showing be made 
outside the presence of the jury before reference (even in opening statements) 
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be made thereto. 
Rule 16(b )(7) of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the 
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any 
testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to 
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial 
or hearing. The summary provided must describe the 
witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and 
the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions 
regarding mental health shall also comply with the 
requirements of I. C. § 18-207. The prosecution is not 
required to produce any materials not subject to disclosure 
under paragraph (f) of this Rule. This subsection does not 
require disclosure of expert witnesses, their opinions, the 
facts and data for those opinions, or the witness's 
qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories 
that have not been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial. 
While the state has certainly provided some information by no means 
does that information comply with the requirements of Rule 16(b )(7) of the 
Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure. Absent such compliance such and expert 
testimony should be excluded. 
d 
Witnesses should be excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of other 
witnesses and further the court should admonish any witnesses who have · 
testified to not discuss their testimony with other witnesses and if any 
witnesses remain in the courtroom, they should be barred from further 
testimony. 
Rule 615(a) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence states: 
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At the request of a party the court may order witnesses 
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other 
witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. 
This rules does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is 
not a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party 
that is not a natural person designated as its 
representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose 
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the 
presentation of the party's cause, or ( 4) a crime victim 
whose exclusion is prohibited under Article I, Section 22 
of the Idaho Constitution. 
The ruling on this motion is discretionary with the court, State v. 
Danson, 
113 Idaho 746, 747 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1987), but the purpose 1s to 
prevent witnesses from being influenced by prior testimony. State v. Ralls, 
111 Idaho 485, 725 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Witnesses should be excluded until after their testimony, and if they 
remain in the courtroom following their testimony, they should be excluded 
from further testifying. Further, the witnesses should be admonished to not 
discuss their testimony with other witnesses in order to comport with the 
purpose of this rule. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2013. 
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Prosecuting Attorney 
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Orofino, ID 83544 
14 
15 ~g 16 17 A~r ofthe FifiD 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL Post Office Box 446 
MOTIONS 18 Lewiston, ID 83501 94
ll 
";1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
11 06 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
FIL 
A-PR 12 PPl 2. 16 
. c~p•.wc;_ 
_ _ DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CR13-676 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney of record, 
Scott Chapman and responds to the State's request for discovery as follows: 
I 
To inspect, copy and photograph any books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are in the 
possession, custody, or control of the defendant, and which the defendant 
intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 1 
. Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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RESPONSE: None at this time. Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement. 
II 
To inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or 
mental or medical examinations, ·care and treatment of the defendant and of 
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case or 
copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendants, which the 
defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared 
by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or 
reports relate to testimony of the witness. 
RESPONSE: None at this time. Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement. 
III 
Furnish the Clearwater County Prosecutor's office with a list of names 
and addresses of any witnesses he intends to call at trial. 
RESPONSE: Defendant reserves the right to call any individuals named 
by the State in discovery and further reserves the right to supplement. 
RESPONSE TO 
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This shall be a continuing request pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(i). 
FURTHER, THE STATE HEREBY DEMANDS OF THE DEFNEDANT 
NOTICE OF DEFENSE OF ALIBI PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 19-519 
AND IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 12-1. 
RESPONSE: None at this time. Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement. 
DATED this Ld day of April, 2013. 
RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
CHAPMAN LAW .OFFICES, PLLC 
~~U-
A/i<Fember of the Firm 
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Of'f~CE OF THE P.ROSEOUTING i~TTORNEV 
E. ·CLAYNE TYLER ISBJ\!:52.77 
Prosecuting· Attorney 
LORI ·M. GILMORE rSBN:5RTl 
Chief Deputy Prosecutinf~ Attorney 
C1eik of the Court 
Nez Perce County 
Fax~ 208~799-3.058. 
April 17~ 20.t 3 
RE: State vs. Gaylord Colvin, CR20J3.-676" 
Dear Clerk: 
POST OFFJCE BO.X 262'! 
OROFINO, ID 33EiiJ . .t1~2GZ/ 
F'HQNE (2C)8) ti'r13-5~)1·T 
FAX (2tlP..) 47fi-P.J]F.\D 
E.u~,V:\lL: ·Gccti!Jllt:)i(t~clfH;HvV.nterc-tiUll'cy .r:r>~l 
Enclosed please find State<s·l\;1.e.tnorandum in Objection to Defi:mdm1r s .Pre:~1:ri:::t1 Jvlobom:, lJ you 
would please file this, I \vould. a_ppretiate it. 
A-courtesy copy has been -faxed to Judge Payne in Idaho County. 
___ , __ _sincerely~ 
( __ ~)\~\V·--~~-:1:,~ C,?"~~-<-4 
/ ···s1·a;:~n Haln.es ! 
Paralegal 
:Enclosures as stated 
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OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
E. CLAYNE TYLER ISBN:5277 
Prosecuting Attorney 
LORI M. GILMORE ISBN:5877 
Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
FAX COVER SHEET 
To: Nez Perce County District Court 
Fax: 208-799-3058 
Frorn: E. Clayne Tyler, Prosecuting Attmney 
Subject: State vs. Gaylord Colvin, CR13-676 
Date: Aprill7, 2013 
Pages: 14, including cover 
cc: Judge Payne, Idaho County, Fax: 208-983-2376 
POST OFFICE BOX 262.7 
OROFINO, ID 83544-2627 
PHONE (208) 476-561·1 
FAX (208) 476-8989 
E-MAIL: 6ccounly@.dearwa\ercoun\y .orsJ 
Scott Chapman, Attorney for Defendant, Fax: 208-743-1266 
MESSAGE: 
See enclosed for filing. 
******************** 7'********** W ARNING***********-i(******•"**~•****-r.****-k**** 
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to ·which it is addressed and n\ay 
contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosm·e under applicable 
law. If you have received this fax in enor please contact this office immediately. 
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E. CLA YNE TYLER- ISBN 5277 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 2627 
2023 A-PR 17 Pfll 12 25 
Orofino, ID. 83544 
Telephone: 208-476-5611 
Facsitnile: 208-476-8989 
Special Prosecutor for the State 
IN Tffi~ DlSTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GAYLORD J. COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________ ) 
CASE NO: CR2013-00676 
STATE'S MEMORANDUlVI IN 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-
TRIAL 1\tlOTIONS 
The Defe.ndant was charged with Driving Under the Influence (Second Offense) 
fo11ov..ring a trai1ic stop on.January 28,2013 at about 10:24 p.n1., in the city of Lewiston, fdaho. 
Idaho State Police Trooper Jeffory Talbott conducted the stop after observing certain driving 
behavior, and following field sobriety tests, administered an alcohol evidentiary test resulting in a 
documented blood alcohollevd of .123/.134. 
The Defendant has filed a suppression motion, and a 111otion in litnine, requesting the 
fo II o \Ving: 
1. To suppress all evidence obtained following the traffic stop of the Defendant's 
vehicle, on the grounds that the officer lacked a reasonable articulablc suspicion 
of illegal driving behavior, or of commission of a crin1e, sufficient to justify a 
stop. 
2. To suppress all statements of the Defendant made prior to his arrest in that the 
Defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to his anest. 
3. To suppress aU staten1ents or responses .n1ade to law enforcement based on the 
Defendant's Slh An1endment right against self incrimination. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS--PAGE 1 
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4. To exclude any evidence of prior bad acts per the Idaho rules of evidence, 
including prior convictions. 
5. To require establishment outside of the presence of the jury of foundation for 
expen wih1esses pursuant to Rule 702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules ofEvidence. 
6. To exclude witnesses fr01n the courtroorn until they ha·ve testified, to admonish 
witnesses frmn discussing their testimony with other witnesses, and to bar ±l-orn 
further testimony any witness who ren1ains in the courtroom following testimony. 
I. 1VIotion to Suppress Based On Lack of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for Traffic 
Stop: 
It is anticipated that the. following will be offered into evidence at the suppression 
hearing: 
a. The defendant was operating a motor vehicle on 51h Street (a public road) in 
Lewiston Idaho, near Stewart Avenue, a 3 lane divided city street. There arc tvvo 
southbound lanes and one northbound lane. The Defendant was initially driving 
in the left hand southbound lane. 
b. There was no oncoming traffic~ and the Defendant Y\'as driving at a speed aboul 5 
n1iles per hour below· the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. 
c. The Defendant exhibited some weaving in his lane of traveL 
d. The Defendant activated his turn signal and changed lanes into the right hand lane 
of traveL shortly before the right hand lane ended. 
e. The Defendant failed to signal for the statutorily n1andated 100 feet prior to 
changing lanes into the right hand lane. 
f Approximately 10 seconds oftravel time later, the right hand lane ended and 
merged into the left hand lane . 
. g. The Defendant failed to signal when merging back into the left hand (through) 
Jane. 
Stop and investigatory detentions are recognized exceptions to the \.Varrunt requircn1cnt. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. C 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). An officer may stop and detain an jndividual 
i(, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on 
specific and articulable facts, that the suspect has been, is, or is about to engage in criminal 
activity, or lhallhe vehicle is being driven in violation of traffic laws. State v. Rawlingsl 121 
Idaho 930, 829 P .2d 520 (1992); State v. Gallegos! 120 Idaho 894, 821 P .2d 949 (1991 ). State v. 
Roe 140 Idaho 176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004). A stop is an intennediate response that allows 
an officer to maintain the status quo, identify the suspect and investigate possible criminal 
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activity, even though the officer docs not have sufficient information to establish probab1e canse 
to make an arrest. See Terrv supra. Therefore any assertion that the officer n1ust have probable 
cause to conduct an investigatory stop is a misstate1nent of the law. State v. Knight, 128 Tdaho 
862, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App 1996). 
To determine whether a stop is lawful, the reviewing Cotui must evaluate the facts known 
to the o±1icer at the time of the stop hased on the totality of the circun1stances or the 'vho]e 
picture. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002); ~(supra). In 
addition, an officer is permitted to draw rational inferences from the facts in light of his/her 
experience and training. See Temr, Gallegos (supra). 
The validity of the stop is reviewed against an objective standard. Therefore, the 
subjective thoughts of the officer and any grounds previously relied on by the State to justify the 
stop are not relevant. In re Deen 131 Idaho 435, 958 P.2d 592 (1998). 
The driving behavior of the Defendant lead to two possible reasons for engaging jn a 
trat1ic stop. 
First, the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of the comn1ission of a DlJI given 
the Defendant's driving behavior. The Defendant was driving well under the posted speed li111it, 
at approximately 10:24 p.m. without any traffic to justify a lower speed; the Defendant weaved 
within his lane; the Defendant failed to properly signal a lane change fron1 the left hand 
southbound lane to the right hand southbound lane; and. the Defendant failed to signal a rnerge 
into the through left hand lane when the right hand lane ended. 
· Second, the officer observed violations of traffic law which \Vould justify a lrafiJ.c stop. 
Those violations are of.ldaho Code 49-808: 
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge 
onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor 1vilhuul 
giving an appropriate signal. 
(2) A signal ofinlenl1on to tum or move right or left when required shall be given continuously to warn 
other traffic. On conLTolled-access highways and be-fore turning from a pa.rl(ed position, the signal shall be 
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other Instances, for not less than the last one 
hundred ( l 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning ... 
The De:fendant failed to engage his signa1 for 100 feet prior to conducting a lane change 
frmn the left hand lane into the right hand lane. The Defendant failed entirely to signal the n1erge 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRTAL MOTIONS--PAGE 3 
103
Fax Server 4/17/2013 12:05:31 PM PAGE 6/014 Fax Server 
back into the left hand lane. 
The Defendant argues that 49-808(1) as applied to him is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied, arguing Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2008) supports this 
argument. Burton involved a driver who, ~'hile driving dOVI711 a highway encountered a passing 
lane which began left of her lane. She continued in the right Jane, and at the end of the passing 
lane, continued forward along the high\vay. She was stopped for failure to signal the 
continuation. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals did hold the statute tmconsti.tuUonally 
vague as applied. 
Specifically, the Court described the facts as follows: 
"The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he 1:\LnppeJ. Burton's v~hicle 
after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton tcstiflcd that 
in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was traveling in the 
right lane, and when the two lanes became one, ~'the left lane disappeared." She said Lhal she passeu a sign 
which said that the lanes were going to merge, hut. there wag no evidence of signage i11dicating that one lan.e 
was terminating and one continuing. 
Bmton v. State, Dep't ofTransp., L49 Idaho 746, 749_, 240 P.3d 933, 936 (Ct. App. 201 0) 
The Defendant is correct in anticipating that the State be1ieves State v. Dewbre, 133 
Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999) provides the more appropriate guidance in tl:Us 
circumstance. 
Just after midnight on June l, 1996, an Idaho State police officer was traveling on Highway 57 in Bonner 
County, when he began follO\ving Dewbre's vehicle. Highway 57 is a two-lane road with an occasionf'll 
passing area where the single one-directional lane splits into two, creating a temporar)' passing 1ane, 
Dewbre entered one of these passing areas. A sign was located near the beginning of the passing area 
directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass. Two traffic signs and painted an·ows on the roaclw<1Y near 
the end of the passing area advised traffic that the passing lane was ending and tllat traffic should merge left_ 
Upon enlering this passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle into the right lane. After driviJJg beyond the last 
dashed line at the end of the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle from the right lane into the remaining 
single lane. Because Dewbre failed to signal \Vhile makb1g these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre [ur 
violating LC. § 49-808. State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 664, 991 P.2d 388, 389 (Ct. App. 1999) 
The Dewbre Court -vvent on to hold as follows: 
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be g;lven effect. The following holding 
from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's dcnlal of Dewbre's suppression motion corTectly 
analyzes the statute's application: 
When Dewbre approached the pmtion of the highway containing a passing laue, the sign required 
hjm to ''keep right accept to pass:, As such, Dewbre moved his vehicle Io the right to comply with 
this requirement. When Dewbre reached the end of the pottion ofthe highway that conlained a 
passing lane, lhe record clearly establishes that there was a slgn requiring Dewbre to merge back 
into the left lane. This required a turning movement to the left. It is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre 
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made these movements, and jt is also undisputed that he did not signal when l1e made either turn. 
By failing LO signal when he made these tums, Dewbre violated LC. § 49-808. 
It is true that at the point Dewbre made the.'>e turning maneuvers, 1he dl'lshed line did not separ<1te. 
the left and right northbound lanes. Ho,..vever, the statute does not strictly limit its application to the 
lane changes. h1stead, the statute requires a signal whenever an individual makes a "move right or 
left upon a highway." Had the legislature intended only to regulate tmns and lane changes, it could 
have stated so specifically. 13y moving first right, and lhen left, Dewbre came within the ambit of 
the statute, and \Vas required to make to lsic] signaL (Emphasis added.). 
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right in order to 
comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting, the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the left 
complying once again with the highway signage. There are no exceptions in LC. § 49-808 to 1J1e signal 
requirement. State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.l998). ·whenever a 
movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whelhcr lhc movement is made necessary 
to comply with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. § 49· 808. 
I do not attempt by this holding to define the boundaries of what constitutes a "movement to the rig.ht or len 
upon a highway." I conclude only that Dewbre•s movements placed him \Vithin lhc ambil of lhe statute. 
Until further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained f.o hold that ·whenever a 
vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane- splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into nne 
lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. § 49-808. Therefore, LC. § 49-808 required. De\vbre 
Louse an appropriate signal when he moved to the right \Vhlle entering the passing area and then to the left 
while exiting the passing area. 
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle movement can be macJe wilh 
reasonably safety. The plain language of l.C. § 49-808 provides that an individual may «move right or left 
upon a highway" iflwo requirements are met: (1) if"the movement can be made \Vith reasonable safely" 
and (2) if"an appropriate signal" is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved with reasonable safety, LC. § 
49-808 still requires the use of turn signals when making the movement lo the right or left. Ftn1hermore, Lhe 
Idaho legislature specifically amended the turn signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prj or to 
the amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was only required "in the event any other 
traffic may be affected by such movement.n 1953 Idaho Sess. Law 507. This exception was removed jn 
1977 by the Idaho legislature. 1977 Idaho Scss. Law 370. Consequently, the legislature intended thatturn 
signals be used when moving right or lefl on a higlnvay regardless of vvhether other traffic may be af.fected 
or a vehicle is moving vvith reasonable safety. I agree ·with the d1strict court that an appropriate signal 
requires "such a signal as would put others **392*667 on notice ofthe driver's intention to make a turning 
movement, and that it was not the inlcnt of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling ·when 
makingaturningmovement." Statev.Dewbre, l33ldaho663,666-67,99.\ P.2d388,391~92(CL.App.1999) 
Fortunately> the Burton Court anticipated the apparent inconsistency betvveen ,De\vbre and 
Burton, and provided guidance: 
Thjs CoUlt addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P .2d 3 8 8 
(Ct.App.1999). The driver there contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not 
apply where a lwo-lane portion of a highway ended and n~·o traffic signs as well as painted arrm:vs on the 
highway advised motorists that the right lane was ending and traffic should merge leU. The Dewbre case 
generated a separate opinion from each of the three Comt of Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that 
the signal requirement applied in that circwnstance. A second judge concmTed in that result but did not join 
in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge dissenled. The Devvbre opinion does not have 
precedeutial value bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First, the Cout1 in Dewbre was not 
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ea.lled upon to address the comtituti:o.l:.la11ssue p.re.sent~d here. Second, there was no opinion that 
cmnmandcd a majority, and third~ Dewbre is factually distinguitiha11lc bemmsc in Dewhre. roCJd signs and 
arrovi'S on the rcaclway informed motorists that the right-hand lane was· ending and that tra!Tic musr nwrge 
into the survivi11g, [eft-hand fane. In. the present case, there is no evidence of such s ign.age or other ind k:t.dor 
tbat one lan.e WHS ~ncling aml the olher sw·vi ving_ .... 
... \Vc aro persuaded tbatth.ere'.isznerlt in Burton's coDtention that Section 49--BCH~(l) ifi iJJ1-C(71i';l.ilutlol'w1ly 
vague as app-Ued in this circumstance, for lhe s.\atute do~s .not clearly indicate lhti.J .;:.~ sjgnal is required winrr1 
t¥lo lane·~ tiie'rg~ v~ith neithe.r lane clearly ehdirig and 1ieitlier cl~ar!~· c.or:itinuing. This situati.on ciifJ~rs 
srgnitkant:ly 1rom that where one ortwo lanes ends ·and the: other cm1tinae.s, as occun:·ed in D.!!H'bte. In ihe 
Dewbre circumst:111cc, t}tc statute plainly rcquin::s a signal because a ddver in Lhe terminaling 'lcme nws.t 
ch~ng:~ 1aTws· in wd~r. to ·cO.ntJnue navel on th.:;: higlrway~ and changing l.ancs const.hmos a nl.t.W0 to tile len tX 
right . .But when there is·n.o basis to discern that one: 1a:ne 'Is terminating and the C?ther Sllrv[vi.Ilg~ b111 rather 
ihe tvvo blend into u single lane, it is not clear that the continued tonvard rnove.riwnt cf n vebicl1~ ·t}r.~m .::~ither 
ofthe two 'lartes· ii1to the enxerging lai1e consiituks a ;.mo\·e ... tight ot 1eJ:r that :is st1bje'ct :to the Stc!ioiJ 
49····tW3( !) sigpc~l ryquireriJenl. · 
Burton v. &ta1e; De.p'i ofTn1ns.p., 149. ldaho 746, 749, 240 :P.Jd 933, 936 (Ct. Avp. 2.0l0) 
In this· particular case there exists·a dear ident1fica.ti.on that the Tight 1une oftravel in. 
which the Delendant had n1oved his vehicle ended~ and i.he·left lane of travel was the through 
lane. The following is a still frarne f1:om the video .ofOffic:er Talbott conducting the lrufl1c stop 
on the Defendant. Clearly depleted is a ttaff!c sign. 
STATE"'S :jvfEiV10RA.NDUM 1~ OBJECTlON TO DEFE~'DA..t~T'S·P.R.E:-T'.H.h\L MOTIONS-PAGE 6 
106
Fax Server 4/17/2013 12:05:31 PM PAGE 9/014 Fa.x Servc'r 
The mean)ng ofthis traffic -sign is as follo'V\-rs (FronT the 1d.abo Driver's ~"'1anu3l, Ju1y 20\2 
Edition~ Page 3-3)~ 
.l ... ~TI1e I~nd.sl.fvierge Left; Two ianer. of traff.ic \vill <.Y-.101.\ 
becQnle o:n-e lane of tr.nffic. Right lane Lr<tffi.c nms.t yield 1vhen 
.m.erging. 
The facts of this case are dear. Th.e Defendant.·wa.s· in th~ right .hand. lane. The right lwnd 
la·ne ended, and :shown by the 1ratt1c c<Jntroi sign depleted -abov~. The ~ig1:1 :i:I:-~E;tructed th~; 
detendant that ·he 1nus'l1nerge to the left:. and f\1rther thn.t he rnust yield to the traHic ill the leTt 
lane. 
This is not a. situ:ation such as in Rurton \vhere tWt} l.ane·s .tr.tetged, ·\vhhout 2-ny i.nd:i.c~:rlif)n 
that one ended and the ofh.er continued. 'fhis is mm:e akin to th¢ hii.:.~ -sii\latir)p. n1.l}~}~X!S~ \vf·(~~rr:.:-
one lane c-lear1y ends.: o.t1~ lan.e. is dearly the tl1r~,:1ug,h ln.nc, and th1.:;: driver in the-lane endi..ng is 
instructed to yield to the through.lan:e. The Bu1·ton co:t:ut ind.i:c.aJ;es i.n this- sitr:ra,tion ~ tun1 sjgnnl t:.~ 
required and the statute is not vague as applied~ 
This situation differs s:igr1ifi¢ahtly 1rom .that 1-vhere ohe oft"i;o lanes ends (tnd tbc· otll.cl' CnJttlnui~S, a::i 
occurred 111. De-.,.r.·bre_ ln th~ .De!i!bre Cin::t.\111'3tan~~. the statut~ pHthly requit~s a sig11;ji becau.se -s_ dr1'tm· in i.b.e 
t:errnina:ting lane must change lane~ in on.\e,r to coniinue tra:vd qn the· n1ghway, and ~hangmg .lane-3' 
constitutes. a move to tlw lett or r:lght But wh~n thGre is no oa1~Js to di-sc~rn t!1at \)l't\3 l~IH~ 1~ termm(3l.li:tt~ <.mll. 
the otbe.r p,unriv.ing., bnt rathe-r. the two blend into a sing~.e la.ne, it is.i1rYt ck~\1'lhat (he connrmedJonvartl 
move1.111;;Di of a v.ehi~le fTPm ~hb.l!T cr lhe twv.hm~::s. i.n.tp th~ ep)erg.l:ng lf!ne. con.sUtut.~s a '"nwv<! .,. right ot-
1etf." t11.at is stibject to the Section 4Y-!s-IH5('l) signal requirement. 
i3mt~.m v. State. Dep't' ofiranSJ.l., 149 Jdaho 7:!1-6, 741), 240 P,3c:l93:J, Y::i6 {Ct:_ App_ :liHIJ) 
This. .Defendant wa:~thus obligated to s~gna] his lane chq.nge trorn the rigl:J.t hnnr,! .ID,n_q J.nto 
thr,;; throug.h .lane .• 
His failure justit1es the traffic stop by -"T'roopet Talbott. 
"Il1e DefendanC s n1otion to Sll:ppress ·e-v·i.deric.e based. on the l~gality of the trrd:li\; st,)p 
should be den-ied. 
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II. Motion to Suppress Statements of the Defendant tnade prior to his arrest (the 
Defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to his arrest.) 
Idaho courts have clearly stated that Miranda d9es not generally apply to lJUl 
investigatory detentions (whether actual questioning by the Officers, or in cond·ucting l:.'STs, or 
both), even though the driver is not free to leave until the investigation is concluded. Sec for 
example: State v. Pilik, 129 Idaho 50, 52, 921 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1996) (Defendant not 1n 
custody while being questioned following a traffic stop regarding alcoholl..l."le, and while being 
subjected to Field Sobriety Tests); State v. Hartwig. 112 Idaho 370, 732 P .2cl339 (Ct.App.19W7) 
(verbal COID111Unications 1nade during sobriety testing were not rendered jnadrnissiblc in Lhc 
absence of a Miranda \vaming); and State v. Denefiel131 Idaho 226, 229, 953 P .2d 976~ 979 
(Idaho, 1998) (A person temponirily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop ]s not in c1Jslody for the 
purpose of Miranda, adopting a like federal approach set fotth in Berkemer v. A1cCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).) 
Neither is there any question in Idaho whether a person must be mirandizcd prior to bei1.1g 
offered an evidentiary test for breath or blood alcohol. In State v. Hannon. 131 Idaho 80, 84-gs, 
952 P . 2d 402, 406- 407 (Idaho App., 1998), the Idaho Court of Appeals has held: 
HamJOn asserts that because he \;vas not given l.1iranda warnings before he consented to the 
breathalyzer test~ the administration of the test violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against se1 f-
in crimination. The necessary remedy, he asserts, is suppression ofthe test results. We conclude, however, 
that the privilege against self-incrimination and Miranda rigllts are not implicated by the administration of n 
breath test. 
denied. 
The ~Miranda requirement that an accused he informed of the right to rernain. silent and the right to 
counsel before custodial interrogation was imposed by the United States Supreme Courl in order lo 
safeguard the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1Wranda v. Arizona, 3 84 lJ .S. 
436, 86 S.CL 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This privilege protects the accused only fhm1 compulsion to 
give testimony against himself or to otherwise provide "evidence o~a testimonial or communicative 11aturc." 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757> 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ( 1966). Tn 5'chmerher .. 
the United States Supreme Court held that a state-compelled blood test to dete.rmine alcohol conccntmtion 
is physical evidence, not testimoDy or a communicative act, and therefore is unprotected by the FiHh 
Amendment privilege, Id, at 760-65, 86 S.Ct. at 1830-33. Moreover, in South Dakota v, Neville, Lf59 U.S. 
553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Supreme Comt stated, "In the context of an ane.st for 
driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test .is no( an 
inteiTogation within the meaning of 1\1iranda." !d. at 564n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15. 
Accordingly) Hannon's breath test resu1ts are adm[ssible, notwith~.tanding the lack of 1\fira!lda 
warnings, because they are not testimonial or communicative evidence and because the otliccr's request for 
the test was not an interrogation. 
The Defendant's motion to suppress all statements he made prior to h.is mTest should 1Je 
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III Motion to suppress all statements or responses made to law enforcement. based on. 
the Defendant's 5th Amendment right against self incrhnination. 
Please see above. No 5th Amend1nent right against self incrimination was infringed upon. 
The Defendant answered questions while not in custody. He waived such right. 
IV. Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Bad Acts: 
The only evidence of a prior bad act intended to be introduced by the State is evidence of 
the Defendant's prior conviction, and then only in a bifurcated process through which t.he Jury 
will determine if the sentencing enhancement (2nd DUI within 10 ;rears) \vill aJJply. 
It is not the State,s intention to introduce any 404(b) evidence during the DUI portion of 
this case. 
V. l\1otion To Require Establishment Outside of the Presence of the .Jury of 
Foundation for Expert Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 702 and 705 of the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence: 
The Defendant argues that virtually the entirety of the State's case wi1l be "opinion" 
evidence offered by way of"expert~' testimony. The State is confused by this assertion. 
The evidence anticipated to be offered against the Defendant consists generally of: 
1. The Trooper's observations of the Defendant's driving behavior. 
2. The Trooper's observations of the Defendant (his odor, bearing, eyes, ability to 
follow instructions, etc.). 
3. Statements of the Defendant, especially state1nents regarding alcohol 
consumption. 
4. The Defendanfs performance on field sobriety tests. 
5. The blood alcohol test results. 
The only evidence ·which may delve into expert witness testim.ony would be the 
inferences drawn by the officer (n1ore factual testimony than expert), and perhaps the £del 
sobriety evaluations. In that vein, it is a1so anlicipated that Trooper Talbott will testif-y as to his 
training and experience jn D1JI evaluations so to describe for the jury the inferences he concluded 
from his obsenrations and interaction with the Defendant. 
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In reviewing each field sobriety evaluation individually: 
Idaho Courts have judicially recognized that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (HGN) 
is reliable. The State 1s not required to present, prior to admission, evidence that the HGN test is 
based on sufficient facts or data and derived fron1 reliable methods or principals. Purthcr, the 
State is allowed to elicit testimony from Trooper Talbott that the defendant's HGN test results 
indicate intoxication, although not a specific level of intoxication. 
In 1991~ in State v. Garrett 119ldaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488,491 (Iclaho,1991) the Idaho 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
The court ruled that the HGN test satisfies the p·rye standard. We have been furnished with no publieations 
or other authority which refutes the reasoned decision or tlle Arizona court. \Ve therefore hold l11r.11. the T-lC:iN 
test does satisfy the Frye standard, because the test is based on a generally accepted theory: Pc1·sons who are 
intoxicated (as well as some other non-intoxicated members oftlle populat]on) exhibit nystagmus. The 
courts of oLher jurisdictions, inc1uding A1aska, Arizona, Towa, Louisiana, Montana, 01Jio, and Texas have 
also decided that the HGN test satisfies Frye. 
Testi1nony regarding the HGN, to the extent it arises to expe1i testimony, is properly 
allowed. The foundation required for HGN testin1ony is established by case law: 
" Qualifying police officers as experts on the adminish·ation of the HG N test is a simple matter 
because ... "[t]he observation of HGN in a person and its interpretation as an effect of alcohol intoxication 
do not necessari1y require expertise in physiology, toxicology, or any otl1er scientific field. The nystagmus 
etfect can be observed without mechanical, electronic or chemical equipment of any kind. At least in lbc. 
simple form presented in this case, it requires no more medical training than administration of other flcld 
sobriety tests, such as the one-legged balance." 
Jd at 883, 811 P.2d at 493, (quoting People v. Ojeda, 225 Cal.App.Jd 404, 275 CaJ.R.ptr. 472, tJ7'1 (1990)). 
The foundational evidence presented in this case shows that deputy Schueller was qualified as an expert 
under the Garrett analysis. She was trained in the BON technique by the Idaho Stale Police, nnd she had 
received additional training on administration of the test at a separate seminar. Anderson's objection to her 
qualifications was properly ovenuled. 
State v. Anderson 130 Jdaho 765,767-768,947 P.2d 1013,1015-1016 
(Idaho App., 1997) 
Like-wise, anticipated testimony from Trooper Talbott regarding his remaining 
observations are not considered expert witness testimony in the manner asserted by the 
Defendant. 
l'The officer was competent to testify as to his own personal knowledge of the resu1ts oft he tests as 
compared to the field sobriety tests. His testimony was admissible under LR.E. 701, "Opinion testimony by 
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lay witness~" because the opin·i·on vvru:, rat!onaHy·bascd on the perception ofrhc 'vvitness; <Hrd \Vas J~~~lpfitl Lu 
the detemTination .of a fact in issue ... namely, >Nhdher Goerig ·w·as intoxicated v;.·hen stopped. 'rhe objections 
ra1!>I:~d by Goerig were: the proper subject of cross-ex:~mi11aiio11, but do not persuade ns that the trial court 
er:t·ed .f.rr admrt!:tng the rcst:irnony. State·v. Goerig 121 Idaho I OB, 1·12, 822 P.2d 1005, 1 ODlJ (Idalw 
App,.;l 991) 
In that the sdentl±1c YeliabiHty of the horizontal g~1ze nyst~tghTlis test has: bt~eil jTid.ici;;; ll y 
found to exist, and given the namre of the remu1ning fle1d sot-:n:iety eva1uat.ions n.s observations of 
an officer cmn.petcnt to make su.ch observation and co.n1petent to ·express an opinion rege:wding 
wht;ther the defendant passed or faile~l~ this Co.urt.shoul4 ~lcny tlw Pcfcndsnf $ rnoti{;m. /\,s 
establ1shed by Idaho ya$e law, the Troop~r~s observ~1.tion.s ;u~d r;ondrJsiv.r1sp in olig.ht vf l;h~~· 
TTQope(s tr11in.ing .~nd ·~:xperieu.G~~ ~r~ gpy(;rned by :tR.E. 701 than ;1s asscrt~d by the. D·~Jcw:bnl.. 
Of noie~ :then~: is no legal requircrnent .that the foundation rcq11i red prior to tcstin1cmy of 
Tro()per ·ralbott be d{,1.ne outside the presence of the jury .. In fad, :lt is c.ntixcl:y.propcr for tbc Jw·y 
to hear the .t{)undational qttestions so that the Jmy can evaluate the testimony in Eglrt .of sn.tne~ 
V:t l"'o: ex.dude witnesses. from the culilrt.nm.m until they h.av.e testified~. to arhli110T:ish 
w]tness·es .from djs,!!ussing th.ei.r ·testhnmlly wBth other 'tlidtnesses, axHJ {o b~ur frotn. 
fudher testinwny ali.ll.:Y '\'dtness wlw. remmins in H.w :etml:'t:nwm foHoYvi;ng fcNiiiill1inny. 
'I'his matter ·is. discretionary -vvith tl1e Court, and guided (as pointed ·out 1-Jy the Defencbn!) 
by LR.E. 615. Tl1e .Stale does not o'bj.ect to a m.otio:n to exdude vvitnesses. 1-fm:x:ever, ns u 
rebuttal witness cam1.ot be determined until. after the dose nf the Defense case, the SLate fed~; ;;m 
order stating that any person who remain:-: ·in the courtroom following the conclusion of their 
testhnony is. barred from further tes.tin1ony is not appropriate. 
I 
. . • :/"'?,/,#.-. ...• f"' .. ' •• : ·~ DATED thts. ---?+,_!,._day 01 Apn l~ 20 L .. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVKRY 
The tmdersigned hereby ce1iifles that a true and correct-copy Qfth<~ fmt~going ~.:vn.s 'fi:lxcd. 
to the foHo-..ving on the J-"1 +-~ay of April, 2013: · · · 
Scott Chapfna11 
CHAPMi\N LAVl OFFICES~ .PLLC 
P0Box446 
Le\\istori, ID 83501 
Fax;-·2..0&::743'-1266. {.... ~ '''""·..,~,. 
n} ,/\ '\c". ___ !C:f::l.ec"I~~e~~~ 
/ · -sl:i'fu~on Hai1'1es ' 
STATPS MEl\llORANDUM l'N OB.IH.CTiON TO DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRlAL\-10T10NS~"PAGE 12 
112
COURT :MINUTES 
CR-20 13-000067 6 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions 
Hearing date: 4/18/2013 
Time: 10:05 am 
Judge: JeffP. Payne 
Courtroom: 4 
Court reporter: none 
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport 
Tape Number: crtrm4 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Tyler 
100505 
100541 
100611 
100828 
101128 
E. Clayne Tyler present for the State. Gaylord Jay Colvin present with 
counsel, Scott Chapman. 
Tyler approaches bench with a copy of filing that was faxed, that includes 
clearer images. 
Chapman calls Trooper Jeffory Talbott. Talbott sworn by Clerk. 
Chapman begins direct exam. 
Tyler, objection-relevance. Chapman responds. Court instructs Chapman 
to continue. Chapman continues direct exam. · 
Tyler, objection-misstates Officer's Police Reports. Court instructs 
Chapman to restate question. 
Tyler, same objection. Court, overruled. 101149 
101400 Chapman approaches witness with a copy of Probable Cause Affidavit and 
provides a copy to Tyler. Chapman continues direct exam. 
101635 
101808 
101859 
102231 
102343 
102437 
103358 
103536 
103750 
103817 
Chapman questions Tyler if they can stipulate to entering the video 
footage of stop. CD containing video footage of stop is marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit A. Tyler agrees to stipulate. admission. Chapman 
continues direct exaJJ+. 
Chapman offers Defendant's Exhibit A, up to the actual stop. Tyler has 
no objection. Admitted. 
Chapman plays the video footage. 
Court asks for one replay of footage. 
Chapman continues direct exam. 
Chapman concludes direct exam. Tyler begins cross exam. 
Chapman begins re-direct. Chapman hands Trooper Talbott Defendant's 
Exhibit B, his Probable Cause Affidavit and continues re-direct. 
Chapman offers Defendant's Exhibit B. Tyler has no objection. Admitted. 
Tyler, objection- Chapman is asking witness to draw legal conclusion. 
Court questions Chapman regarding significance. Chapman responds. 
Tyler has no re-cross. 
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103932 
104044 
104505 
104609 
104647 
105025 
105056 
105257 
105351 
105517 
105738 
105748 
105820 
105832 
105922 
110110 
110146 
Chapman calls Gaylord Jay Colvin. Colvin sworn by Clerk. Chapman 
begins direct exam. 
Tyler, objects- Questions witness in aid of objection. Tyler questions 
Colvin re: if Trooper Talbott would have any knowledge of mechanical 
functioning of truck. Tyler moves to exclude testimony. Court-overruled. 
Chapman continues direct exam. Chapman approaches for Clerk to mark 
exhibit. Clerk marks CD as Defendant's Exhibit C. Chapman offers to 
admit Defendant's Exhibit C. Tyler questions witness. Witness responds. 
Tyler, objects to admission of 2nd part of video. Has no objection to first 
part. 
Chapman questions witness. Witness responds. Chapman still offers for 
admission. 
Court doesn't see relevance to what other vehicles are doing. Court will 
admit for purpose of showing layout of roadway. Admitted for those 
limited purposes. 
Parties view video. 
Chapman continues direct exam. 
Tyler, objects-relevance. Chapman explains relevance. Court instructs 
Chapman to continue. 
Tyler, renews objection. Court responds. Chapman continues. 
Chapman finishes. Tyler begins cross exam. 
Chapman, objection-legal conclusion. Court responds. Court will make 
legal determination. Tyler continues cross exam. 
Chapman has no re-direct. · 
Chapman has no additional witnesses. Tyler has no additional witnesses. 
Court addresses parties. 
Chapman has no additional arguments. Tyler has no additional 
arguments- asks that Court disregard the portion ofbriefmg re: statutorily 
mandated time period for signaling. 
Court addresses Chapman re: aspects of Motion. Court questions 
Chapman re: suppressing statements and prior bad acts. Chapman 
responds. 
Chapman has nothing further. Tyler has nothing further. Court will take 
under advisement and issue a written opinion. 
Recess. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND IDDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CODNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR 13-676 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING PRETRIAL 
MQTIONS 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
The defendant, Gaylord Jay Colvin, flied various pretrial motions. 'The tno1ions 
were heard on April 18, 2013. Mr. Colvin was personally present along witl1 hls 
attorney, Scott Chapman. The State of Idaho was present, represented by t11e prosecuting 
attorney, E. Clayne Tyler. Evidence was presented and tp.e parties submitted the matter 
on the evidence presented· and arguments contained in memorandums the parties had 
. previously filed. Thereafter, the court took the various motions under advisement. 
Pursuant to his various motions, Mr. Colvin sought to: 
• Suppress all evidence _obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle 
and/or seizure ofhis person; 
• Suppress all statements he made subsequent to his arrest and prior to 
being advised on his constitutional rights; 
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• Exclude any comment, reference, or questions regarding information 
andlor responses given to questioning by law enforcement agents; 
• Exclude any evidence of '~rior bad acts" :o specifically including any 
prior convictions; 
• Require the State to establish, outside the presence of the juzy, adequate 
foundation for any opinion and/or expert evidence, and prevent the State 
from mentioning any such opinions or expert evidence until the 
foundation requirements have been met; and, 
• Exclude witnesses from trial such that they cannot hear the testimony of 
other witnesses. 
After· considering the matter, the court makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On J~uary 28, 2013, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Idaho State Police Officer 
Jeffory Talbott stopped a vehicle being driven by Gaylord Jay Colvin in Le,;viston~ Idaho, 
which stop resulted in Mr. Colvin being charged with driving under the influence. 
Officer Talbott first noted Mr. Colvin's vehicle as it turned right onto 21st Street 
. . 
from gtll Avenue. Officer Talbott then follovred Mr. Colvin's vehicle as it traveled south 
on 21 sr Street, turned right on 16th or 19th A venue and proceeded to 17th Street, turned left · 
onto 17th Street and traveled south on 17th Street to where 17th Street became 5th Street 
and continued south on 5th Street. Officer Talbott then stopped Mr. Colvin's vehicle on 
5th Street. Officer Talbott estimated it vvas three to foirr miles from where he started 
following Mr. Colvin's vehicle to where he stopped :MI. Colvin. 
Weatp.er conditions were dark and cloudy, with light rain. Mr. Colvin ·was chiving 
a 1992 Toyota pickup. 
As Officer Talbott observed and/or followed J\.1r. Colvin's vehicle he made 
various observations about the operation of Mr. Colvin's vehicle, including; it weaved 
within its lane at times; it consistently traveled under the speed limit~ including traveling 
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on 5th Street at approximately 3 0 mph when the speed limit was 3 5 mph; and:r it signaled 
for and made three turns and one lane change. Officer Talbott did not observe or note 
any law violations related to the operation ofJVIr. Colvin's vehicle prior to 5th Street. 
As Officer Talbott and Mr. Colvin traveled south on 5th Street, 5th Street initially 
·consisted of three traffic lanes, a single northbound lane and two southbound lanes. The 
tw'o southbound lanes were parallel lanes, separated by a dashed white line. Officer 
Talbott and Mr. Colvin were both initially in the left-hand southbolll1d lane \Vith lv1r. 
Colvin's vehicle directly in front of Officer Talbott's vehicle. As Mr. Colvin traveled 
south in 'ili:e left-hand southbound lane he activated his right tum signal and moved frorn 
the left-hand southbound lane into the right-hand southbound lane and continued south. 
Officer Talbott remained in the left-harid southbound lane. Thereafter, while traveling in 
the right-hand southbound lane, .Mr. Colvin passed a yello·w, diamond shaped traffic sif,rn 
that contained a black symboL The sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of 5th. 
Street and appeared as follows: 
After passing by the above-referenced sign Mr. Colvin continued south in the 
right-hand southbound lane and the two southbound lanes converged to become a single 
southbound lane. N.Ir. Colvin passed through the area where the two southbound lanes 
converged and continued south in the single remaining southbound lane. l\1r. Colvin did 
not use any signals while he traveled in the right-~and southbound lane as he approached 
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and traveled through the area where the two southbound lanes converged into a. single 
remaining southbound lane. After Mr. Colvin passed through the area where thre tvvo 
southbound lanes converged Officer Talbott activated his overhead lights and stopped 
Mr. Colvin for failing to signal, in violation of I. C. § 49_-808. 
After stopping :t:Jr. Colvin, Officer Talbott contacted Mr. Colvin, adn1inistered 
field sobriety evaluations, and arrested Mr. Colvin for driving under the influence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. STOP OF VEIDCLE AND/OR SEIZURE OF PERSON 
Mr. Colvin seeks the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the stop of 
his vehicle and/or the seizure of his person. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the 
unreasonable searches and seizures of persons or property. A search or seizme conducted 
"Without a warrant issued on probable cause is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls 
within one ofthe established exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v_ Buell. 145 
Idaho 54. 55. 175 PJd 216. 217 (Ct.App.2008). ~ne such exception is an investig~~tive 
detention based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Buell, 145 Idaho at 55 .... 56; 
175 P.3d at 217-18), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (19681 
An investigative detention must be justified· by articulable facts raisjng reasonable 
suspicion that the individual has been or is about to be engaged in criminal conduct. 
Buell, 145 Idaho at 56, 175 P.3d at 218).. Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct at 18.8_D., 20 
L.Ed.2d at 906. The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause~ but 
more than a mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v_ Evan.r.,__j)4 
Idaho 560~ 563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App.2000). 
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An officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if thoro is 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being dliven contrary to traffic lavrs. 
Evans, 134 Idaho at 563 .. 6 P.3d at 419; United States v. Cortez~ 449 U.S. 41L 417._1Ql. 
S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. 628 (1981). 
In the current case, Officer Talbott could stop Mr. Colvin's vehicle to investigate 
possible criminal behavior if he had reasonable articulable suspicion that l\1r. Colvin's 
vehicle -vvas being driven contrary to traffic laws. 
Officer Talbott stopped Mr. Colvin's vehicle because Mr. Colvin did not t1se a 
signal when he proceeded from the right-hand lane of two parallel southbound lan.es of 
5th Street to the single southbound lane when the two southbound lanes converged .into a 
single southbound lane. Officer Talbott stopped lvf:r. Colvin for failing to signal, in 
violation of I. C. § 49-80S. 
Idaho Code Section 49-808 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) No person shall tum a vehicle upon a highway or move a vehicle right 
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and 
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor vvitl1out giving 
an appropriate signal. 
(2) A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On coutrolled~access 
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be 
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds au~ in all other 
instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the 
vehicle before turning. 
In the current case, Mr. Colvin did not use a signal when traveling in the right-
hand SOUfubound lane as he approached and proceeded through the area Vlhere the two 
southbo~d lanes converged into a single southbound lane. :Mr. Colvin asserts he ¥Vas not 
required to signal and I. C. §49-808 is void for vagueness as applied. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the applicability of I.C.§49--808 to 
signaling when tvvo same-directional traffic lanes converge into one same-directional 
traffic lane in Burton v. State Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 
933 CCt.App.2010) and State v. Dewbre. 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ctlqm.1999). 
Burton and Dewbre both involve situations in which the defendants vvere driving 
on two lane highways that ~ad passing areas ·where a single one-directional lane v.rould 
split/expand into two same-directional lanes and then at the end of the passing area the 
two same-directional lanes would converge back into one same-directional lane. In both 
cases the defendants were stopped for failing to signal, ip. violation· of LC. § 49-808, 
when the defendants proceeded from the right-hand lane of a two same-directional lane 
configuration to the si~gle remaining lane without signaling. 
Ip. Burton the defendant sought vacation of a suspension of her driver's lic;ense by 
the Idaho Transportation Department. The defendant asserted the law enforce1nent 
officer lacked legal cause to stop her vehicle because I. C. §49-808 was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to the facts of her case. On appeal the Court of Appeals held I.C. §49~ 
808 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. 
In Burton the defendant was driving in the right-hand lane of a two same-
directional lane configuration and when the two same-directional lane confit,ruration was 
about to ·end the defendant saw. a traffic sign indicating the two same-directional lanes 
merged. The defendant did not signal as she approached the end of the t\vo san1e-
directional lane configuration. Thereafter, a patrol officer stopped the defendant for 
failing to signal, in violation of I. C. §49-808. 
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In Burton the Court of Appeals was persuaded there -vvas merit in the defendant's 
contentioD; that LC. §49-808 was unconstitutionally :vague as applied in her circumstaJ1Ce~ 
because the statute did not clearly indicate a signal was required when hvo lanes n1exged 
with neither lane clearly ending and neither clearly continuing. As stated in Burton: 
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section 
49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for 
the statute does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when D:vo 
lanes merge with neither lane clearly ending and neither deady 
continuing. This situation differs significantly from that where one uf 
two lanes ends and the other continues, as occurred in Dewbre._. In the 
Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a signal because a 
driver in the terminating lane inust change lanes in order to continue 
travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move 'to the 
left or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is 
terminating and the other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single 
lane, it is not clear that the continued folWard movement of the v'ehi cle 
from either of the two lanes into the emerging lane constitutes a 'move 
... right or left' that is subject · to the Section 49-808(1) signal 
requirement." (Emphasis added). Burton. 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 
936. 
It Burton two same-directional lanes blended into a single remaining lane end it 
was unclear which of the two lanes ended and which lane continued. Ho·wever, in the 
current case it is clear which lane of the two same-directional lanes ended ancl·which lane 
continued because there was a traffic warning sign advising motorists that the right-hand 
southbound lane ended and the left-hand southbound laue continued ... 
The Idaho Department of Transportation has adopted rules govenu11.g traf£jc 
control devices, mcluding the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways (1illTCD). IDAPA 39.03.41.000 et.seq.; IDAPA 39-03.41.004; Id@.o 
Department of Transportation Traffic ManuaL January 2012, Section 151.01. 
, The most recent version of the MUTCD, the 2009 versio~ was published on 
December 16, 2009~ and adopted changes were effective January 15, 2010. 
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MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section lA.Ol provides in part: 
The purpose of traffic control devices, as well as principals for their use, is 
to promote highway safety and efficiency be providing for the orderly 
movement of all road users on streets, highways, b.ikeways, and private 
roads open to public travel throughout the Nation. 
Traffic control devices notify road users of regulations and provide 
warning and guidance needed for the uniform and efficient operation of 
all elements of the traffic stream in a manner intended to minilnize the 
occurrence of crashes. 
MUTCD, 2009 Edition~ Section 2C.Ol provides in part: 
Warning signs call attention to unexpected conditions on or adjacent to a 
highway, street, or private roads open to public travel and to situations 
~hat might not be readily apparent to road users ... (Emphasis added). 
MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section 2C.03 provides iri part: 
Except as provided in Paragraph 2 or unless specifically designated 
otherwise, all warning signs shall be diamond-shaped (square 'vith. one 
diagonal vertical) with a black legend and border on a yellow 
background..... · 
MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Section 2C.42 provides for lane ends signs. 
MUTCD, 2009 Edition, Figure 2C-8 shows various signs. 
The sign 1fr_ Colvin passed while traveling in the right-hand southbound lane of 
5th Street~ prior to the two southbound lanes converging to become a single southbound 
lane, is a warning sign and is shown in Figure 2C-8 of the MUTCD, 2009 Edition and is 
designated "W4-2~'and addressed in Section 2C.42 of the MUTCD, 2009 Edition. The 
sign, as sho\Vll below, is a symbol sign for right lane ends. 
. . 
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The above-referenced sign, posted along the right-hand shoulder of the 1-ight,·h21..nd 
southbound lane of 5th Street, was a warning sign that called attention to a situation that 
might not have been readily apparent- the right-hand southbou11d lane of 51b Street ··would 
be ending and a motorist in the right-hand lane would have to move left and merge ·with 
the left-hand southbound lane to continue.1 
In Dewbre the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a 
traffic stop, alleging the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures .. The trial court denied the· defendant's motion, holding that LC. § 
49-808 required the defendant to signal. The Court of Appeals affinne.d on appeaL 
In Dewbre a sign directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass \Vas located. 
near the beginning of the passing area. Near the end of the passing area two traffic signs 
and painted arro\:vs on the roadway ad_vised traffic the passing lane \.Vas ending and traffic 
in the right lan.e should merge left. Upon entering the passing area the defendant kept to 
the right and traveled through the passing area in the right-hand lane. After chiving past 
the last dashed line separating the tWo san1.e-directionallanes the defendant traveled fr01n 
the right-hand lane into the single remaining lane without signaling the maneuver. 
In affrrming the trial court, the Court of Appeal~ stated: 
'"Whenever a movement is made to the left or right on a highway, 
regardless of whether the movement is made necessary to cotnply 
with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to 
LC. §49-808 ... 
. . . whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one 
lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an 
appropriate signal is required puxsuant to LC. §49-808". 
1 When two parallel lanes converge, one or the other will have to "move~> towards the other; othenvise tlJ.e 
two parallel lanes will remain parallel and never converge. In this case the warning sign advised that the 
righ.t·hand southbound lane was ending and motorists in such lane had to move left to continue. 
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Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391. 
The void for vagueness doctpne, pre1nised on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worde.d ·with 
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand vvhat cotl_duct is 
prohibited and the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatozy enforcement. Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 936. A statute may 
be void for vagueness if it" fails to give adequate notice of conduct it proscribes or if it 
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others "\Vho JJln.st 
enforce the statute. !d.; State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126. 131__(2.003)..;_ 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31. 34,218 PJd 10, 13 CCt.App.2009). 
The language of I. C. §49-808 is plain and unambiguous. Dewbre, 133 IdaJJo at 
666, 991 P.2d at 391. By its plain and unambiguous language, LC. §49-808 provides that 
no person is to tum a vehicle upon a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a 
highway or merge onto or exit from a highway without giving an appropriate signaL .L G. 
§49-8080). Idaho Code Section49-808 also provides that a signal of intention to turn or 
move right or left ·when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. .T. C, 
{49-808(2). On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, 
the signal of intention is to be given for not less than five (5) seconds and in all other 
instances for not less .than the last one hundred (1 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before 
turning. !d. 
Idaho Code Section 18-808(1) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that ordinary people, and in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that 'Witl1· his traf£.c 
hme (the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) ending and his having to merge left 
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into another traffic lane (the left-hand southbound lane of 5th Street). to continue on, an 
appropriate signal was required. 
Further, !.C. § 49-808(2) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that 
ordinary people~ and in this case Mr. Colv~ could understand that the appropriate sig11a.l 
to signal an intention to move left from the right-hand southbound lane to the left-hand 
southbound lane was a left signal- similar to (but opposite of) the signaling l\1-tY. Colvin 
performed a few seconds prior when he activated his right signal to signal his intention to 
move right from the left-hand southbound lane to the right-hand southbound lane. 
After considering the relevant facts and applicable law, as set forfu hereins tbis 
court does not find or conclude that I.C. §49-808 is constitutionally vague as applied in 
this case. Idaho Code Section 49-808 gives adequate notice of conduct it proscribes and 
establishes minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others ·who must enforce it. 
Mr. Colvin did not directly assert or argue, but did. suggest or infer, that Officer 
Talbott had an ulterior motive for following him and stopping him. fio"\'v·ever, as 
discussed in the concurring opinion in Dewbre. an officer.,s subjective intent is irrelevant 
and a stop is not pretextual when there is objective reasonable and articulable s11.spicion 
that a law violation, however minor, has occurred. See: Dewbre~ 133 Idaho at .66.L..221 
P.2d at,392; State v. Mevers. 118 Idaho 608. 798 P.2d 453 (Ct.App.1990); Stqte v. Law~ 
115 Idaho 769, 769 P.2d 1141 (Ct.App.l989); United States v .. Michael R.._, 9.9 t.3d 340,_ 
347 (9th Cir.l996). 
After considering this matter, as set forth herein, this court finds and concludes 
Officer Talbott had reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Colvin's vehicle was ddven 
contrary to a traffic law and his stop of Mr. Colvin was a lawful investigative ~etention. 
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2. STATEMENTS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO ARREST 
Mr. Colvin seeks the suppression of all statements he made subsequent to his 
arrest bt~.t prior to being advised of his constitutional rights. 
Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect who is subject to custod~al 
interrogation. State v. Silva, 134 I~aho 848= 854, 11 P.3d 44. 50 (Ct.A,Q12:20Q_O_llii_tLug 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384.U.S. 436, 86 S.C~ 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 {1966). The obligation 
to give Miranda warnings arises only when there has been a restriction of a person's 
freedom such that he is ~'in custody". State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 81 L 814,} 248 P.2d 166. 
169 (Ct.A]2p.l997). 
For the purpose of Miranda requirements, "custody'' is equivalent to faunal arrest 
or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. §jlva", 
134 Idaho at 854 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121. 1125, 1.03 S.Ct. 35J7~ 
3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275. 1279-80 (1983). The standard for such deteniLination is an 
objective test, being: would a reasonable person believe he or she \Vas in police custody 
to a degree associated "With a formal arrest. The test is not whether a person vrouJd 
believe he qr she was free to leave. Silva. 134 Idaho at 854~ (citing Berkemer v. 1\1c9aGY.::-
468 U.S. 420. 442. 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-52. 82 L.Ed.2d 317. 336 (1984). 
Stopping an automobile· and detaining· its occupants constitutes a seizuxe \Vi thin 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, however, a traffic stop is more an.c1logous to an 
investigatory Te~ stop than an arrest, therefore it is not subject to the requ.irem.ents of 
Miranda. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3149-50; State v. Beneflr;l, 131 
Idaho 226. 953 P.2d 976 C1998). 
2 . Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
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Although a defendant may be subject to a seizure ·within the n1e.aning of 111c 
Fourth Amendment during the adn1inistration of field sobriety evaluation-S conducted 
pursuant to a traffic stop, such a seizure is an investigative detention and is not a seizure 
equivalent to ''custody'' requiring the giving of Miranda waroings. See F'err.Ktr.f! ..~JJ.'J 
Idaho 474,480-81.988 P.2d 700,706-7 CCt.App.l999): State v. Pil,gk 1{9 I~lahQ.SO, __ ZLL 
P.2d 750 C~t.Ano.l996). 
In the curren~ case Mr. Colvin has not identified any specific staternents be seeh-:s 
suppression of, when such statements were made, or the circumstances pursuant to which 
the statements were made. Further, there is insufficient evidence before 11"1.e court to 
determine when Mr. Colvin was placed in "custody" for Miranda warnings purposes 
and! or when Miranda rights were given, if at all. T11erefore, this court cannot detennine 
whether any statements made by I\1r. Colvin were made in violation of his constitutional 
rights. This court can only make general determinations regardin.g unidentified and 
unspecified statements: 
• If 1v1r. Colvin· !nade any statements prior to being arrested and/or 
restrained of his freedom of movement to the degree associated. \·vith a 
formal arrest, such staten1ents would not have been in violation of his 
Miranda rights. 
• If Mr. Colvin made any statements in response to questioning by a la"iV 
' enforcement officer after being arrested and/or resu;ained of.his freedorn 
of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrests, but prior to 
being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving such rights, such 
statements would have been in violation of his Miranda rights <;~..nd would 
be subject to suppression. 
• If Mr. Colvin made any statements after being arrested and! or restrained 
of his freedom of movement to the degree associated vvith a fotn1al 
arrests, but the statements were not in response to questioning by a law 
enforcement officer, or the statements were made after :M:r. Cohin -vvas 
advised of his IVfuanda rights and waived such rights, such state1nents 
would not have been in violation of his Miranda rights. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13 
128
:A.pr.22. 2013 11:19AM No. 0488 p. 15 
3. INFORMATION AND/OR RESPONSES GIVEN TO LA.w· EN1~0E.C.K~_IJ;l{I 
Mr. Colvin seeks ·to exclude any comment, reference, or questions rcgm·din.g 
information and/or responses given to la\v enforcement agents. 
Mr. Colvin does not identify any specific information and/or response that he 
seeks to prevent the State from commenting on, making reference to, or asking qnc:sticm.J 
regarding; when such info~tion and/or response was obtained at1d/or made; how· such 
information and/or response was obtained or made; or, the cjrcmnstances pursuant to 
which the information and/or response 'yas obtained and/or made. Therefore, ·t11is court 
cannot determine whether any ·specific information and/or response was· obtained and/or 
made in violation of Mr. Colvin's constitutional rights.· 
4. EVIDENCE OF "PRIOR BAD ACTS" 
11r. Colvin seeks to exclude any evidence of i'prior bad acts", specif:ics.Uy 
including any prior convictions. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, \vTongs or 
acts is prohibited if offered to prove the character of a person, but may potentinJ.ly be 
used for other purposes. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: 
"Evidence of other crimes, 'Wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove t.he 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however~ be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause sho\vn~ of 
the general nature of the evidence it intends to introduce at triaL~' 
11r. Colvin does not identify any specific ''prior bad acts'~ or prior c.ritninal 
convictions that he seeks to exclude& 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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The State identifies a prior driving under the influence conviction a.s the on.lv 
' ~ 
"prior bad act'' it intends to introduce, and then only for enhance1nent puxposes i~1 ·1lr.e 
event the jury fmds :MI. Colvin guilty of driving under the influence. 
Mr. Colvin is charged ·with driving under the influence, a second offense. 
Therefore, in the event 1v1r. Colvin is convicted of driving under the hlfluence, the State 
may thereafter offer evidence of a plior driving under the influence conviction for tl1o 
purpose of proving l\1r. Colvin had a prior driving under the influence conviction. 
However, ·the State may not offer evidence of a prior driving under the influence 
conviction unless and until Mr. Colvin is convicted of the current charge. Further, the 
State may not offer evidence of any other "prior bad ~ct'' unless and until it cornp1ics w.i.th 
I.R.E. 404(b). 
5. FOUNDATION FOR OPINION AND/OR EXPERT TESTIMONy 
Mr. Colvin seeks to require the State to establish, ou~side the presence of th~ jury, 
adequate foundation for any opinion and/or expert evidence pursuant to LH.,E. 702 and 
705, and prevent the State from mentioning ~y such opinions or expert evidence uDtil 
the foundation requirements have been met. 
Idaho·Rule of Evidence 702 provides: 
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized lmowledge vd.ll assist the tTJer 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a \Vitness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.~, 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 705 provides: 
"The expert .may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the 
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, 
provided that the court may require otherwise, and provided fTh.-ther that~ if 
requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlyjng facts or data 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
15 
130
---- ...! 
_________ .._,_ ................ - ·--"'"' ...... ---------------------------" - ~------------- .. --~---"-··-- .. ,.~ ........ - ___ ,.._ ____________ ~-------------~ 
A p r. 2 2. 2 0 13 11 : 19 AM No. 0488 
were disclosed. The expert may in any event be require-d to disclose the 
underlying facts or data on cross-examination." 
P. 17 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 requires that an expert be "qualified". Th.::; JJ:vo 
sources of expert qualification in the rule, being: knowledge, skill, experience, 1:tniuh.s;,;, . 
and education, are disjunctive. State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 414, 3 J2.3d 5)2~~;i~.2J 
CCt.App.2000). There n1ust be some den1onsttatiori that the Yvitn,ess has acquired G1c 
necessary expertise and knowledge to render the proffered opinion~ through scnne type of 
training, education or experience. Any one of the five souTces of qualification provided 
for by the rule may be sufficient to qualify a 'Witness as an expert. Id 
For opinion or other testimony of an expert to be admissible, two foundation 
grounds must be established: 1) a reliable basis for the proffered testimony; aD.d, 2) the 
proposed expert's qualification to provide that testimony. See Kum.ho Tire Co .. Lt~t. ~E. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann 's, Inc . .:.. 509 U.S. 593 
(1993); Konechnv, 134 Idaho at 417, 3 P.3d at 542. 
The current case is a driving under the influence case in which evidence regarding 
various sobriety evaluations may be offered, inducting; 1) horizontal gaze uystagm.us; 2) 
walk-and-tum; and, 3) one-leg stand. 
In regard to the horizontal gaze nystagmus evaluation, the Idaho Suprerne Court 
has held that the horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety evaluation is scientifica1ly 
reliable and evidence of the results of such an evaluation are admissible with a foUJadation 
that the witness is competent and reliable enough to introduce horizontal gaze nysta.gn111s 
testimony and testify that nystagmus may be an indication of intoYication. State v. 
Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65. 844 P.2d 691, 694 C1992); State v, Garrett. 119 I®LliLl;LL~_t 
811 P.2d 488 (1991). However, horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence n1uy only be 
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admitted in conjuction with other field sobriety evaluation evidence and the \VitJ.;t:=:.:;s tnny 
only testify that nystagmus may be an indicator of intoxication. CileasQtb_l23 Id0J.1o~gt 
66. 844 P.2d at 695. Horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence n1ay not be adcniUcd to 
establish or infer any particular alcohol concentration level. Id 
A police officer may qualify as an expert to testify about a. do.t1:.ndant' s 
performance on a horizontal gaze nystagmus evaluation. State v. AJ1der.s:rzt£~-l~~Q_I~Lf!1H~~ 
765. 767. 947 P.2d 1013 .. 1015 (1997). The Idaho Supreme Court has recog:niz(;d tbat H. 
police officer may be qualified to t~stify regarding .horizontal gaze nystagu1us based on 
his training by the Idaho State Police and.his attendance at field sobriety test sen.1irwxs.ld .. ._ 
at 767. 947 P.3d 1015, citing Garrett. 119 Idaho at 882-83, 811 P.2d at 492-9~.· 
As noted by in Anderson, citing Garrett: 
"Qualifying police officers as experts on the administration of the I-IGl'J 
test is a simple matter because ... ''[t]he observation of HGN in a person 
and its interpretation as an effect of alcohol intoxication do not necessc.uiJy 
require expertise in physiology, toxicology, or any other scientific field. 
The nystagmus effect can be observed without n:~,echanic(lJ~ eleclTou1c or 
chemical equipment of any kind. At least in the sin1ple form presented in 
this case, it requires no more medical training th;m administration of o1l1er 
field sobriety tests::o such as the one-legged balance." 
Anderson. 130 Idaho at 767-68. 947 P.2d at 1015-16: Garrett, 119 Idaho ~ttJl83,7_ 8tl 
P.2d 493. 
In Garrett, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished the horizontal gaze nys1.ag;.cnl.lS 
evaluation from the -vvalk-and-turn evaluation and the one-leg stand evaluation in that the 
walk-and-tum evaluation and the one-leg stand evaluation do not rely upon Sl~ience for 
their legitimacy, but rather rely on facts within the realm of con1mon knowledge. ~..')ee 
Garrett., 119 Idaho at 881, 811 P.2d at 491. Therefore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 does 
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not govern the admissibility of evidence as to the walk-and-tum evaluation and H1e one·~ 
leg stand evaluation. 
The trial court has broad discretion regarding the adrnissio.n of c vidence, 
Gleason, 123 Idaho at 65, 844 P.2d at 694. 
After considering this matter, specifically including the relatively routine nature 
of establishing a foundation for opinion and!or expert evidence at a driving under the 
influence trial, this court does not find or conclude that it is necessary or appropriate to 
require the State to establish the foundation for any such evidence outside tll,e presence of 
the jury or prevent the State from referring to any opinions or expert evidence that .. will 
be admitted at trial until the foundation requirements have been1net 
6. EXCLUDING WITNESSES AT TRIAL 
Mr. Colvin seeks to exclude witnesses from trial such that they c~mnot hear the 
testimony of other witnesses. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 615(a) provides that the court·may order that ·witnesses be 
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. \Vhether to exclude 
witnesses fron1 the courtroom is a discretionary determination for the court. 
After considering this matter this court fmds and concludes that the interests of 
justice ~ould be served by excluding all witnesses from the courtroom \Vh1.1e ot11cr 
vvitnesses are testifying, except for Mr ... Colvin who may remain in the cm.rrt.room and be 
present during the testimony of other witnesses even though he may be a ·vvitness. 
DATED this ~day of April, 2013. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFCATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned Dep'!lty Clerk of the .above-entitled Cou:ti5 do hereby certit)r that 
a copy of the foregoing document was mailed or delivered by n1e on ..:Q!.J.J..___12_ __ ~-~-~-' 
2013, to: 
Scott. Chapman 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box2627 
Orofmo, ID 83544 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERC:E 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)· 
) 
) 
) 
) 
.) 
Case No. CR 13-676 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER REGARDll\JG 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant 
) 
The defendant, Gaylord Jay Colvin, filed various pretrial nwtions. On t11e 
grounds and for the reasons set forth in this court's findings of fact ond conclusions of 
la\V filed simultaneously herewith, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1) .Mr. Colvin's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop 
of his vehicle and/or the seizure ofhis person is DENIED. 
2) Mr. Colvin's motion to suppress all statements he n1ad.e subsequent to lJis 
a.tTest and prior to being advised of his constitutional rights is GRANTED in 
regard to any statements Mr. Colvin made in response to law enforcement 
ORDER REGARDING 
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questi.onmg subsequent to his arrest but prior to being a.d:viscd. of 
constitutional rights. However, the court is unable to detenniuc: vihut 
statements, if any, would be suppressed because no such staten:J-ents have been 
identified to the court. :Mr. Colvin's n1otion is DE1\fffiD in regard to any 
statements Mr. Colvin made subsequent to his arrest but prior to being advised 
of his constitutional rights that were not made in response to questioning by 
law enforcement agents. 
3) Mr: Colvin's motion to .exclude conunent, reference, or questions regarcti.ng 
information and/or responses given to questioning by lavr enforcernent agents 
is GRANTED in regard to any evidence or response suppressed or excluded 
by the court. Mr. Colvin's motion is DENIED in regard to evidence aJJd 
responses that are not suppressed or excluded by the coUJ.-t. 
4) Mr. Colvin~s motion to exclude evidence of')>rior bad acts" is GI·lANTJ~D in 
regard to evidence of ''prior bad acts~' and prior convictions, other tlum. 
evidence of prior driving under the influence convictions used after a 
conviction on the pending driving under the influence charge (in t..~e ev(~1Jt of a 
conviction on the pending drivmg under the influence charge) to prove prio.r 
driving under the influence convictions for enhancement purposes: Tho 
motion is DENIED in regard to evidence of prior driving under the influence 
conviction as specifically excepted herein. 
5) Mr. Colvin's motion to :require the State to establish> outside the presence of 
the jury; adequate foundation for any .opinion audlor expert evidence) m1cl 
prevent the State from mentioning any such opinions or evidence until the 
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foundation requiren1ents have been met is DENIED. 
6) Mr. Colvin's motion to exclude witnesses from trial such that they cannot hear 
the testimony of other witnesses is GRANTED, except that Jvf...r. Col'vin :is not 
excluded, even though be may be a witness. 
DATED thls t?m) day of April, 2013. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFCATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court .. do hereby C(\t1ify thu.l 
a copy of the foregoing document was mailed or delivered by nie on Jj-f- (', f._d:.~-··~~: 
2013, to: 
Scott Chapman 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston., ID 83501 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
P .0. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
Se"'': '-'1d Judicial District Court, State of ld~~o 
An and For the County of Nez Perce 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Defendant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Change of Plea & Sentencing Wednesday, June 05, 2013 09:00AM 
Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
May 22, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, ID 8350100000 
Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
E Clayne Tyler 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered_x_ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered_x_ 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin, 
Defendant. 
~:~}:~ond Judicial District Court, State ot~I~%~ho 
In and For the County of Nez Perc\.. 
1230 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
JL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Change of Plea & Sentencing Thursday, July 11, 2013 
Judge: Jeff P. Payne 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
08:30AM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
June 05, 2013. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, ID 8350100000 
Scott M Chapman 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
E Clayne Tyler 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered_x_ 
Mailed_x_ Hand Delivered __ 
140
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, Idaho 83 501 
(208) 743-1234 
Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
Ffl 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CR13-676 
vs. RULE 11 AGREEJVffiNT 
16 GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Defendant. 
COME NOW, the State and the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, 
and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(c) hereby agree to the following 
disposition of the case: 
PLEA: The defendant agrees to conditionally plead guilty pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (9)(2) to a violation of Section 18-
8004 of the Idaho Code (Non-enhanced). 
Defendant reserves the right to appeal the court's Order 
Regarding Pretrial Motions filed April 22, 2013, and if 
successful may withdraw his plea. 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
RULE 11 AGREEMENT 1 
· Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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----:-:- ... 
TERMS: On the following understandings, terms, and conditions: 
1. The defendant will receive: 
(a) A fine of$1000.00 with $250.00 suspended plus Court 
costs. 
(b) Any jail time imposed shall left to the discretion of the 
court and defendant may request community service in 
lieu of any actual imposed jail time. 
(c) Probation may be ordered within the discretion of the 
Court, under such terms and conditions as the Court 
feels appropriate; 
(d) Defendant shall comply with any recommendations 
from alcohol evaluation; 
(e) Driver's license suspension of 90 days retroactive to 
date of ALS suspension; 
(f) Sentencing will be stayed pending outcome of appeal. 
(g) That if after accepting this agreement the Court 
concludes that any of its provisions regarding the sentence or the 
term and condition of probation are inappropriate, it can reject the 
plea, and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. 
2. If after accepting the plea the court concludes that any of the terms 
and provisions of this agreement are unacceptable, both parties shall be given 
the opportunity to withdraw from this agreement' or the court can reject the 
agreement. If the plea is rejected or withdrawn, the original charges are 
automatically reinstated. Unless the plea is rejected or withdrawn, the 
Defendant hereby gives up any and all motions, defenses, objections, appeals, or 
requests that defendant has made or raised or could have served hereafter to or 
against any matters preceding the Court's entry of judgment and imposition of 
sentence. 
RULE 11 AGREEMENT 2 
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3. The Defendant understands the following rights and understands 
4 and gives up said rights by pleading guilty: 
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4. 
(a) The right to a jury trial; 
(b) The right to confront the witnesses against defendant and 
cross-examine them; 
(c) The right to present evidence and call witnesses in 
defendant's defense knowing that the State will compel 
witnesses to appear and testify; 
(d) The right to be represented by counsel (appointed free of 
charge if defendant cannot afford to hire one) at the trial of 
proceedings; and 
(e) The right to remain silent and refuse to be a witness against 
defendant and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This plea agreement contains all the terms and conditions of the 
plea agreement, and the Defendant understands that any promises made by 
anyone, including defendant's lawyer, that are not contained within the written 
21 plea agreement are without force and effect and are null and void. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
5. Any predication or promise as to what the possible sentence will be 
is understood to be voided by this agreement. 
6. The Defendant is not under the influence of any drug, medication, 
liquor, or other intoxicant, and defendant is at this time fully capable of 
understanding the terms and conditions of this plea agreement. 
RULE 11 AGREEMENT 3 
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I HAVE READ AND u·NDERSTAND THE ABOVE. I HAVE 
DISCUSSED THE CASE AND MY CONSTITUTIONAL RlGHTS WITH MY 
LAWYER. I UNDERSTAND THAT BY PLEADING· (GUILTY) I WILL BE 
GIVING UP MY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY. JURY, TO CONFR.ONT, CROSS-
EXAMINE, AND COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES, AND 
MY. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIJ\1INATION. I AGREE TO ENTER 
MY PLE.A AS INDICA TED ABOVE ON. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
SET FORTH HEREIN. 
:DATED this .t] day of June, 2013. 
I have discussed this case with my client in detail and advised n1y client of 
the constitutional rights and all possible defenses. I believe that the plea and 
disposition set forth herein are appropriate under the facts of this case. I concur 
in the entry of the plea as indicated above and on the tenns and conditions set 
forth herein. 
DATED this ~ay of June, 2013. 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
I have reviewed this matter and concur that the plea and disposition set 
forth are appropriate and are in the interests of justice. 
DATED this 1?~·day of June, 2013. 
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FILED 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 2D13 JUL Jl 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ---- __::----'-'"+-1~--.;::~-_ 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Gaylord Jay Colvin 
3131 4th St D 
Lewiston, ID 8350100000 
Defendant. 
1230 MAIN ST. 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
Case No: CR-2013-0000676 
NOTIFICATION OF PENALTIES 
FOR VIOLATION OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE 
DO
DL:
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you plead guilty to or are found guilty of driving 
under the influence in the future, the penalties will be as follows: 
A SECOND DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years, including withheld judgments, is a 
MISDEMEANOR and you: 
1. Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten (10) days, 
the first forty-eight ( 48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five days of which must be 
served in jail, and may be sentenced tO. not more than one (1) year; and 
2. May be fined up to Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00); and 
3. Shall surrender your driver's license to the court; and 
4. Shall have your driving privileges suspended for a minimum one (1) year during which 
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be granted; and 
5. Shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, 
following the (1) year license suspension period. 
TWO DUI VIOLATIONS when both violations involve an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or 
above, within five (5) years; A TIDRD DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years; or a 
SUBSEQUENT DUI VIOLATION with a previous felony DUI or aggravated DUI within 
fifteen (15) years; including withheld judgments, is a FELONY and you: 
1. (a): Shall be sentenced to the State Board of Corrections for not more than five (5) years 
for TWO DUI VIOLATIONS involving an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or above. But 
NOTIFICATION OF PENAL TIES FOR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF 
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if the Court imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a 
minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days: or 
(b): Shall be sentenced to the State Board of Corrections for not more than ten (10) 
years for a TIDRD DUI VIOLATION within ten (10) years or a SUBSEQUENT DUI 
VIOLATION with a previous felony DUI or aggravated DUI within fifteen (15) years. 
But if the Court imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a 
minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first forty-eight ( 48) hours of which 
must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must be served in jail: and 
2. May be fined up to Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00); and 
3. Shall surrender your driver's license to the court; and 
4. Shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least one (1) year and not more than 
five ( 5) years following your release from imprisonment during which time you shall have 
absolutely no driving privileges; and 
5. Shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, 
following the (1) year license suspension period. 
Upon application to the Court by the defendant and proof of valid liability insurance or other 
proof of financial responsibility (as provided in chapter 12, title 49 Idaho Code), the Court may 
authorize a restricted driving permit. The acceptable terms for driving will be set by the court. 
No driving outside the scope of the authorized stated use will be acceptable. In no event shall a 
person who is disqualified or whose driving privileges are suspended, revoked or canceled 
be granted restricted driving privileges to operate a commercial motor vehicle. 
I HAVE READ THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT; I HAVE HAD IT EXPLAINED TO ME; 
AND I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY. 
Dated: --~~~~----~~------------------
NOTIFICATION OF PENALTIES FOR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 7/07 
2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
CR-20 13-000067 6 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Hearing type: Change of Plea & Sentencing 
Hearing date: 7111/2013 
Time: 8:35am 
Judge: JeffP. Payne 
Courtroom: l{ 
Court reporter: none 
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport 
Tape Number: crtrm4 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Tyler - V\t;,_ t ~ \~o(\ .. L 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
083534 
Defendant present for sentencing IXl with Counsel 0 without Counsel 
Notification of Penalties reviewed and signed by Defendant lXI YES 0 NO 
State moves to amend the charge to an Unenhanced DUI-18-8004 {M}-Court grants motion. 
lXI Judgment of Conviction entered 0 Withheld Judgment entered 
Court Orders: Fine: $ 1000.00 Court Costs: $ 197.50 Suspended: $ 250.00 
P .D. Reimbursement: $ Total: $ To Pay: within 60 days after appeal final-
can be revistied 
License Suspension~ 90 days Commence on date: to run concurrent with ALS once appeal is decided 
Jail: 102 Suspended: 105 Report Date: must serve with in 60 days of appeal being fmal-may 
serve on weekends and/or 2 day increments- 5 days may be served through community service 
Community Service imposed - hours Complete by date: 
$ Community Service Fee imposed Due by date: 
PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Length 2 years-to begin upon appeal becoming final 
Termination date 2 years later 
( ~ ) 105 ~days D months of jail time is suspended and I or ( ~ ) $250.00 ofthe fine is suspended and 
will not have to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation. 
• Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours. 
• Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation. 
• Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address 
( ~ ) Other Sentence is stayed pending appeal 
( ~ ) Other Comply with recommendations of Alcohol Eval if they are reasonable-if don't appear appropriate, this 
can be revisited 
( ~ ) Other No misdemeanor or felony law violations while on probation 
Court Minutes 147
( !ZI ) Other Ingest no alcohol and enter no establishment where the primary revenue source is alcohol ( !ZI ) Other Submit to blood, breath or urine tests requested by Law enforcement for the presence of alcohol ( !ZI ) Other Not to drive any vehicle with any amount of alcohol in system ( !ZI ) Other Chapman will prepare order re: stay of sentence 
Recess 090432 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STf':::::~ OF IDAHO FILE:C::::=:=:::c AT M 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERL~ . CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGMENT BY , DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO V~~--'-"'· O;_:_(d~,~(J !..3f--=-=-~~----::-----CASE NO. aDI3- (JQ{)Ql93{o 
Address 3131 · ·fhr · 
DEFENDANT: 
pq· Is represented by counsel ( ) Waived right to counsel (.>.::::)Waived right to jury trial 
(>-) Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea 
(/)Waived right against incrimination (><)Waived all defenses P<)Acknowledged plea is voluntary 
COURT ENTERS: 
_(?<[Judgment after plea of guilty ( ) Judgment after trial- guilty 
( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below 
THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY THE FOLLOWING: 
(X) Fine $ l cw~ (X) Costs $ __ _.__, q..::.._;·1._.__J2io<--"0"'----
( ) Reimbursement for public defender services $ _____ _ 
(:x) To be paid by (oDduwp aft~.,. cu~;4ro/ f}v,..f Pay~ A 
( ) Restitution $ 1 11 To: l7ra;-tcf (>.('·"1ol·w; t:/fl't"'r!J 
per ______ to begin: _____ _ 
by $ ____ per month 
BE INCARCERATED AS FOLLOWS: 
(.><] Jail I 10 fdayJ I months 
~ ... 
(><)Report to jail o1" , 1-e 1-f v/fhrrr, 
( ) Work Release _ __..,_.,"'-'-11""'!7"-----""=~"-----"'"-'-'--~=-'-~=-r---""-"'~-"'-"---"--::....::;__:_:.=t--'--i.£.!.,~:LS..:::..!"-'--'---'7----+--'-"--"--'j'-,~:.L.! ... ~~ f--L.c.:L·r~S...::;.:·€1'-.!!,.&_;;,~"-<~tl-.! _ 
( ) In-home monitoring y ·th l/t:ii.t1h cJ,11/!rTI/,ru' fc_,z ?:Ervlo-r 
( ) Complete hours of community service by ____ , and pay workers compensa4ion insurance in 7the amount 
of$ by _______ _ 
DCJ ( HAVE DRIVING PRIVILEGES (><} Suspended for ~[ 1 days I months commencing COtt1C{!IYtr-~'.11 -} Wlt-b /tl.5 
Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive- apply to: 
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129. 
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application. &j·\~1 ~>fc'·'~'~ uf(~«:/ O.ec~~ifi11i') / 
PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Length "J_ \ ,~.eur5 .. Termination date ']"'.pa.rs {qt<,r 
0<) ~~months of jail time is suspended and /or C>0-$ ').ij[J;Y of the fine is suspended' and will not have 
to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation. 
*Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours. 
* Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation. 
*Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address 
()Oilier _____________________________________________________ _ 
( )Oilier ____________________________________________________ _ 
()Oilier ________________________________________________________ _ 
MAKE PAYMENTS PAYABLE TO NEZ PERC~ OUNTY CLERK AND INCLUDE CASE NUMBER 
DATE 7/t//){)1/3 JUDGE 1 U---J/1~ l I / -----',;~/+-~---1--~--=--J~"-----------------~ 149
1 
Ir~ THE DISTRICT CCL1RT OF THE ScCOr·JD IUDICI;.L Dl RICT CF Tnc 
STATE OF IDAHO, Il'J A.ND FOR THE COL'NT'I OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO I 
Plaintiff, 
~O-()Lrsvrl '-) Co\ o U'l 
. • . Defendant. 
OFFENSE QLA \ 2Y\Dl 
POSTEE: fLbPt&-- fLt.L ~ 
Defendant __ >c_...-_Surety 
---
BOND AMOUNT$ ~\ OOJ _l0 
ADDRESS 
-------------------
ORDER OF BOND FORFEITURE 
F I L_O~ ~LEASE 
r')- LolG 
Cost $ _____ _ 
Viet_ Fund $ ____ _ 
C. J. Fund $ ____ _ 
C. I_ Fund $ 
------
Dst. Crt. Fund $ 
------
TOTAL REFUND $ ______ _ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond is forfeited to the Court· and Notice is 
----
hereby sent to the. following on the day of , 20_ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond be returned. 
____ IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Bond be applied to fines, costs, and to any 
other funds as ordered by the Court, and any sums remaining be. disbursed to the 
Poste.e. 
DATED this ( / i.}f'{ day a f _____:7'-f-~-::::=:i=:=-r:=--~::::::_~~_:.k..==:::::::=-,~~z: 
Check # ________ _ 
Drown by ___________ _ 
Received by _______ _ 
Mailed to 
----------
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FILED:-::~=-= ______ __:AT ____ M 
'· __ ~ERK OF THE DISTRlCT COURT 
BY ,DEPUTY 
(~Is represented by counsel ( ) Waived rig t to counsel (K..) Waived right to jury trial 
(>9. Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea 
(j() Waived right against incrimination ( yj Waived all defenses ()') Ack.11owledged plea is voluntary 
COURT ENTERS: 
W Judgment after plea of guilty ( ) Judgment after trial- guilty 
( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below 
BE INCARCERATED AS FOLLOWS: 
~) Jail / 1)o ., (claY~; months 
(>§Report to jail >l e . v-1 I '} ~J /;;; 
. , . 
( ) Work Release -"=(J,f-1.· +->. "lJ'¥-·'""""'· ~ "':?J:....l.l "-"--'"'-'-'-~w..L.l:=..w:;~~-"""+""-'-~~=r-----'-'~ ............ -"--"'-'-:'-'--7'--+~~::.-L--1-L-!~'----=--~:..::_.=:_-=.LL_ 
( ) In-home monitoring _______________ --!--!-1-~~l--J,~....!!"--!..L~'-4-:f:.__,..,~~~-----
( ) Complete ____ hours of community service by ____ , 
of$ by _______ _ 
HAVE DRIVING PRIVILEGES ()C) Suspended for~ months commencing ((JnCiJlt/llnf 1 A)Jfl!J ffL_5 
, Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive- apply to: 
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129. 
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application. 
PROBATION ORpERED/CONDITIONS: Length 1J ~") . . Termination date l foAJl. /aJ;A ~)~~months of jail time is suspended and /or ~) $ J-r:;;t:J~ of the fine is suspended and will not have 
to be served and I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation. 
*Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours. 
* Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation. 
* Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address 
()<.) Other ~, I ' , ( ) c:v , o 
~lAKE PAYMENTS PAYABLE TO NEZ PERCE COUNTY CLERK 
'7-!L )-.· ·3 u· ,r~, ;n'1 DATE Tll:JD I · JUDGE .. /, . .'J f cr;, 11-£-, 
I -~r~~~~-+~.~~,~r. ------------------~3,~896 
r / f t 
151
F t LED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CR13-676 
vs. ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
Based upon the Rule 11 Agreement of the parties and the Judgment 
entered by the court on July 11, 2013, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the judgment entered on said date is stayed in 
its entirety pending final determination of the appeal to be filed by the 
defendant. 
Dated this fl+/1 day of July, 2013. 
Judif [I I 
ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT 1 152
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 
a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was on 
this Jl!!]_ day of July, 2013, 
_1 Mailed 
Hand Delivered 
Faxed 
/ 
Messenger .-
-
to the following: 
Scott Chapman 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83 501 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83 544 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
ORDER STAYING WDGMENT 2 153
' •, 
;. . I 
;• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
SCOTT CHAPMAN 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
11 06 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 7 43-1234 
Idaho State Bar No. 3467 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Fl LED 
2m3 JUL 12 PP1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO.: CR13-676 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
TO: 
AND TO: 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and its attorney; 
Clerk of the above-entitled court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
(1) The above-named Defendant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to Nez Perce County District Court from the Order Regarding Pre-
Trial Motions entered on April 22, 2013, by the Honorable Jeff P. Payne. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 154
1 
2 
3 (2) Defendant has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Order 
4 
5 
6 
described in paragraph (1) is an appealable order pursuant to Rule 54.1 of the 
Idaho Criminal Rules. . 
7 (3) This appeal is taken to address both matters of law and matters of fact. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
( 4) Issue to be presented on appeal: 
(a) Did the Magistrate Court err in denying Defendant's motion to 
suppress all evidence? 
(5) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(a) Appellant has requested the preparation of the transcript of the 
Pre-Trial Motion hearing held on April18, 2013. 
17 ( 6) Appellant requests all memoranda, affidavits,· and exhibits submitted 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
to the Court to be included in the Clerk's Record in addition to those automatically 
included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
(7) I certify: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter 
with whom a transcript has been requested as set forth below: 
Nancy Towler 
Nez Perce County Court House 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 155
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(b) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the Reporter's Transcript. 
(c) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 156
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Certificate of Service 
I declare that on the day indicated below a true and correct copy of this 
Notice of Appeal was sent to the following parties via the method( s) indicated 
below: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 4 
[v(Mailed 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Faxed 
[ ] Messenger 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 157
~: 
I 
"7115/2013 
08:43AM 
Seco~~? Judicial District Court- Nez Perce Coun~y 
---- Receipt :-:-·, 
NO. 0011252 
. <eceived of: Chapman Law Offices 
P 0 Box446 
Lewiston, I D 83501 
One Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars 
Case: CR-2013-0000676 
Cash bond: 
Check:2450 
Payment Method: Check 
Amount Tendered: 
Clerk: DEANNA 
150.00 
150.00 
$ 150.00 
Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk Of The District Court 
By: --------------------------------------
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COU~~ 0filEtsE€0NfjJJUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
CASE NO. CR 13-00676 
CASE ON APPEAL 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE 
[ X] The undersigned Judge voluntarily disqualifies himself/herself from presiding over this case. 
[ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under IRCP § 40. 
The motion is [ ] with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [ ] granted [ ] denied. 
[ ] State [ ] Defendant has moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge under ICR § 25. 
The motion is [ ] with cause [ ] without cause. 
The motion is [ ] granted [ ] denied 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing Order Regarding Disqualification of 
Judge were delivered this \\ day of ~ , 20~, to: 
Scott Chapman 
E Clayne Tyler 
Order Regarding Disqualification 
159
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FILED 
ZUI3 JUL 3 0 Art 8 02 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
Of-T:HH··-E······O.'l·$-ffll.-C fRT. '1 j (} L /l,) VLA.Jl; ,UvfLW L 
OEPUF( ....... . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SECOND1 J"UDICIA.L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO-UNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
Case No. ·CR-20 13-676 
10RDEI~ J~SSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Carl B. KerJt·ick, whos1~ ehambers are located in 1\Tez 
Perce~ Idaho~ is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter. &" {'~"' 91\.. A 
DATED this~ July 2013. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 1 
(1 )\ ~ :-:-
"--:. { ~~-----
J . St1~gner 
A.dn1inistrati ve District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full~ true~ con1plete 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
ASSIGNING JUDGE was delivered to: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Special Prosecutor 
V: o. Box ZG?.._I () ro t;·· {\ o J t() S2 3 s,l-{ Lf 
r- Scott Chapman -p 0, 3ox Lf L{ ~ c;c;liJl~ Attorney for Defendant L-tWiShJv'~ 1 \ t) ~Y\_( / 
~l1/l-
on this ~)U -day of July 2013. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE- 2 
- _____ j 
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NEZ PERCE COUNTY 
Transcript Payment Voucher 
REPORTER'S NAME: Nancy K.Towler 
ADDRESS: 235 Larkspur Lane 
Lewiston, Idaho 83 501 
CASE NAME: State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin, Case No. 
CR2013-676. 
#of pages 
54 
County of Nez Perce ) 
State of Idaho ) 
Rate Total 
$3.25 $ 172.25 
The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes that the within is a fully itemized, 
true and correct account against Nez Perce County, Idaho; that the same is justly due, and 
that no part thereof has been paid. 
SIGNED: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC=Q1 f~. c ..  ·~· ....~., 1 ~ E 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT.,()!..~~~ · . 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-13-0676 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 
GAYLORD J.Al.Y COLVIN, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
A transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates' Division has now been lodged with 
this Court. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Appellant shall file their brief on or before September 6, 2013; 
2) The Respondent shall file their brief on or before October 4, 2013; 
3) Appellant shall file a reply brief by October 25, 2013; 
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom 
of the l~ez Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, November 19,2013, commencing 
at 11:00 a.m. 
DATED this __ day of August, 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 1 
163
CERTIFICATE OF MAILll-JG 
I hereby certify that a ttue copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIE,--ES ~D 
ARGUMENT \\ras mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this ~ay of 
August, 2013, on: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Scott Chapman 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 2 
( 
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FIL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T~ SE<PfJ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND R([)~ff'T.' ..... ::r-1.-v:--.L,...,. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Magistrate's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Honorable Jeff P. Payne, Presiding 
Scott Chapman 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Respondent! Appellant 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Attorney for Petitioner/Respondent . 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 165
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gaylord Jay Colvin (Jay Colvin) was arrested for Driving Under While 
Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. He 
was stopped for failing to signal when two uphill lanes merged into one while he 
continued to travel in the right lane, an alleged violation of Section 49-808 of the 
Idaho Code. 
The stop was based solely upon in alleged violation of Section 49-808 of the 
Idaho Code, which statute is unconstitutionally void as applied because it failed to 
provide fair notice that signaling is required when roadway design results in two 
lanes down to one and that the same section is unconstitutionally void as applied 
because it fails to establish minimum guidelines as to what is an "appropriate 
signal" to govern enforcement of the statute. 
Evidence at the suppression hearing adduced the following: 
1) On January 28, 2013, at a little before 10:30 p.m. State Trooper Jeffory 
Talbott stopped a vehicle operated by Jay Colvin; 
2) The sole basis supplied by Talbott was: "As I was behind the pickup, it 
appeared to be weaving in its lane and traveling 30 miles per hour (mph) 
in the posted 3 5 MPH zone. The pickup then activated its right hand tum 
signal and moved into the right hand lane as we passed a traffic sign 
indicating the right hand lane was ending. The pickup continued south 
and merged back to the left in front of me without signaling. I activated 
my vehicle's overhead emergency equipment ... "; 
1 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
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1. 
A. 
- - _j 
3) All of the foregoing appears on video from the "dash cam" video in 
Talbot's patrol vehicle and fails to support any contention of weaving. 
Further testimony was adduced that indicated the vehicle operated by Jay 
Colvin was in an older model small pickup, which will not go up 5th 
Street grade (location of the stop) any faster than 30 mph, which is why 
plaintiff pulled over to the right (actually changed lanes with an 
appropriate signal) to let the car behind him (Talbott) pass, and Talbott 
chose not to pass. · 
4) There was evidence showing that no discernible leftward movement or 
motion is required for a vehicle to continue straight forward movement 
down 5th street. Further, that no "tum" is required. 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the Magistrate erred when it determined that there was legal cause 
under Idaho Code §49-808 for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic 
stop when defendant failed to use his tum signal when the lane he was 
traveling in merged into another lane. 
III. ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS 
LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE DRIVEN BY 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE A TURNING SIGNAL WAS NOT 
REQUIRED. 
1. SECTION 48-808(1) OF THE IDAHO CODE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID 
State v. Morgan, 2013 SLIP opinion No. 14 at Page 3, states: 
"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). 
Limited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified 
by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v. Bishop, 146 
2 
Chapman Law Offices, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Post Office Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 169
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable 
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the 
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id. 
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." !d. (quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). The test for reasonable 
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to 
the officer at or before the time of the stop. I d. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with 
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited" and that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 
(2003). 
Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[ s] to provide fair notice 
that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[s] to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. 
Id. at 712. The statute involved in this matter, I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally 
void for both of these reasons. 
24 A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in all of its 
25 
26 
27 
28 
applications," i.e. invalid in toto. Id. However, even if a statute is not facially 
vague, it may still be vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. I d. 
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Burton is not arguing that I.C. § 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void 
as applied to her conduct. 
Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code states: 
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a 
highway unless and until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 
933, 935 (Ct.App. 2008) in construing said statute under remarkably similar 
circumstances states: 
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not 
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 
612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 
(1998). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised 
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil 
sanctions[fn1] be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and 
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 
1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 
138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 
Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App. 2009). Thus, a statute may 
be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of 
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it 
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or 
others who must enforce the statute. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 
P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
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2 The court continues and holds: 
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This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not 
specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is 
necessary to trigger the duty to signal. Admittedly, a very literal 
interpretation of the statute might lead to a conclusion that a signal is 
required when two lanes simply merge because a driver in either lane 
must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into the 
emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly 
literal application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a 
vehicle literally moves to the left or the right when a driver weaves a 
bit within his or her lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but 
no one would contend that a signal is required in those instances. It is 
simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a 
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary 
intelligence can only guess at the statute's directive in this 
circumstance. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to Burton's conduct. 
Because Section 49-808(1) could not be constitutionally applied to 
her, Burton has shown that no legal cause existed to effectuate the 
traffic stop that led to her breath tests. 
18 Burton v. State, at 749-750, 936-937. 
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Obviously, the Burton holding overrules State v. Dewbre, in the instant case. 
The Burton court stated: 
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 
133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct.App. 1999). The driver there 
contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did 
not apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended and two traffic 
signs as well as painted arrows on the highway advised motorists that 
the right lane was ending and traffic should merge left. The Dewbre 
case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of 
Appeals judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement 
applied in that circumstance. A second judge concurred in that result 
but did not join in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge 
5 
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dissented. The Dewbre op1n1on does not have precedential value 
bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First, the Court in 
Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue 
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a 
majority, and third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable because in 
Dewbre, road signs and arrows on the roadway informed motorists 
that the right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must merge into 
the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there is no evidence 
of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the 
other surviving. 
Burton v. State, at 749, 936. 
The crucial element is the necessity of some distinct movement left or right 
prior to the requirement of a signal. The position of Jay Colvin is no distinct 
movement herein was required, and application of the Section 49-808(1) of the 
Idaho Code is void for vagueness to the circumstances of the case. 
Section 49-808 was last amended by the legislature in 2005. The Burton 
decision came down in 2010. The legislature has been in session four times since 
and has done nothing to clarify or remediate the statute's infirmity. One must 
assume the legislature has placed its seal of approval on the Burton, interpretation 
of its statute. 
The Idaho Drivers manual does not at any place require a signal must be 
used in the "Colvin" situation. In fact the signage indicating a lane ends is 
denominated as "advisory" ... not mandatory. If a driver goes around a comer 
28 faster than the "advised" speed on a yellow sign there is no law violation 
warranting a stop (absent exceeding the overall posted speerl limit\ Offi Cliapman Law Ices, PLLC 
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Lastly and most importantly ... the evidence shows that no distinct right to 
left movement was made by Jay Colvin on the night of the stop requiring a 
signal. .. nor is such a movement ever required at that location making the statute 
void for vagueness as applied herein. 
While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to avoid 
a deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in the road 
is not. Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45°- 90° tum is 
not. Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and more in vogue 
is not. In fact, signaling in these latter situations would actually constitute a 
hazard. 
Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The 
passing lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one. 
Thus, it is the lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that a 
vehicle proceeding forward to the right of a passing lane, who remains in that lane 
throughout (and may even be passed by other cars) needs to signal to lawfully 
continue moving forward. In the present case, Jay Colvin was proceeding down a 
three lane road, moved to the right-hand lane and continued in that lane, never 
changing direction, exiting or merging. 
Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho 
Code, a person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal 1s 
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appropriate and, therefore, required. The vagueness doctrine does not require 
every word in a criminal statute to be statutorily defined, State v. Casano, 140 
Idaho 461, 464 (Ct. ·App. 2004). However, "a statute must be construed so that 
effect is given to every word and clause of the statute" and "words and phrases are 
8 construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language." 
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Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 656. Therefore, effect must be given to the word 
"appropriate" as it is used in this statute. 
"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, 
person, occasion" (http://www.dictionary.com, accessed Oct. 15, 2009) or 
"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" (http://www.encarta.msn.com, 
accessed Oct. 15, 2009). Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the 
statute implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not 
19 appropriate. However, because the statute provides no definition of the term 
20 
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"appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your "movement" 
could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary intelligence 
are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are many situations, 
including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal under 
the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." 
Jay Colvin was traveling in the right-hand lane of a road that narrowed from 
two lanes to one. Therefore, the design of the road forced Jay Colvin to continue 
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1 
2 forward in the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one. While 
3 
the lanes merged (in a manner of speaking), Jay Colvin no more merged or 
4 
5 changed lanes by remaining in the right-hand side than someone in the left-harid 
6 
lane in the same place may have merged or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an 
7 
8 issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the merger, changes direction or changes 
9 lanes. The result, according to the anticipated State's position would actually 
10 
11 
require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one could envision a situation where 
12 a driver in the left-hand lane, would signal a right-hand tum and a driver in the 
13 
14 
left-hand lane would signal to tum left, even though both continued in the same 
15 direction with neither turning. 
16 
17 
There was no other traffic in the vicinity at the time whose travel was 
18 potentially impeded or interfered with by Jay Colvin's action. Therefore, it is 
19 likely that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However, 
20 
21 
because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
22 whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such situations, it 
23 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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2. I.C. § 49-808(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS 
APPLIED TO THIS CASE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT GUIDELINES . AS TO WHEN A SIGNAL IS 
APPROPRIATE THEREBY GIVING POLICE UNBRIDLED 
DISCRETION IN ENFORCING THE STATUTE. 
9 
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A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement 
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
4 
5 resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
6 
arbitrary and discriminatory application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586 (1990). 
7 
8 This failure to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement is often "what tolls the 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. This is "perhaps the most meaningful aspect 
of the vagueness doctrine." Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 
(1974)). 
In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to 
15 provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 118 Idaho at 590. Under the ordinance, 
16 
17 
18 
a person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to identify himself and 
offer an explanation for his presence and conduct. Id. However, the ordinance did 
19 not provide any guidelines for what constituted credible and reliable identification 
20 
and, therefore, gave police officers complete discretion to make that determination. 
21 
22 Id. at 589-590. Although that ordinance was found to be facially void, the 
23 reasoning is equally applicable in this "as applied" vagueness challenge. 
24 
25 Similar to Bitt, I.C. § 49-808(1)'s use of the phrase "appropriate signal" 
26 without providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers 
27 
28 
complete discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. 
Although a facial challenge of I. C. § 49-808(1) might not prevail because there are 
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obvious situations in which a person of ordinary intelligence would understand a 
signal to be appropriate, the statute is vague as applied to Jay Colvin's conduct. 
As discussed above, there are many situations in which a signal is not 
necessary. Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase "appropriate 
signal" leave a person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is 
"appropriate," this failure to provide minimal guidelines provides police with 
unbridled discretion in determining whether the statute has been violated. 
Therefore, Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to Jay Colvin because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a 
signal is appropriate thereby giving police officers unbridled discretion in 
enforcing the statute. 
B. THIS REVIEWING COURT HAS ALREADY RULED ON THE 
SAME FACTS AND LAW 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Memorandum Opinion 
and Order on Petition for Judicial Review in Gaylord Jay Colvin v. State of 
Idaho Department of Transportation, Nez Perce County Case No. 2013-
0518, 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, Gaylord Jay Colvin respectfully asks this 
Court to reverse the Magistrate's decision and order the suppression of any 
evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop and/or seizure of Gaylord Jay 
Colvin. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September, 2013. 
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Certificate of Service 
I declare that on the day indicated below a true and correct copy of 
Appellant's Brief was sent to the following parties via the method(s) indicated 
below: 
E. Clayne Tyler 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83 544 
[~ 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Faxed- (208) 983-1401 
[ ] Messenger 
10 DATED this 12th day of September, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GAYLORDJAYCOLVIN, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2013-0518 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This matter came before the Court on the Petitioner's appeal from the Transportation 
Department Hearing Officer's order sustaining the Petitioner's Administrative License 
Suspension pursuant to I. C. § 18-8002A. The Petitioner was represented by Scott Chapman, of 
Chapman Law Offices. The Idaho Transportation Department was represented by Edwin L. 
Litteneker, Special Deputy Attorney General. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on 
July 16, 2013. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
ON PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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'f 
FACTS 
In the early morning hours of January 28,2013, Idaho State Police Trooper Jeffory 
Talbott stopped a white 1992 Toyota SR5 for failing to signal on a roadway where two lanes 
merged into a single lane. The vehicle was heading southbound on Fifth Street, near Stewart 
Avenue, in Lewiston, Idaho. Administrative Record for Judicial Review1 at 5. Trooper Talbott 
could smell the strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle and the driver, 
identif1ed as Mr. Colvin, appeared to have bloodshot eyes. !d. Colvin admitted to consuming 
alcohol prior to driving. Trooper Talbott asked Colvin to perform standardized field sobriety 
tests, and Colvin complied with the request. !d. Trooper Talbott determined Colvin failed the 
field sobriety tests, and thus proceeded to obtain a breath test from Colvin. 
Trooper Talbott played an audio of the ALS advisory and conducted a fifteen minute 
observation period before obtaining breath samples from Colvin. The breath sample results were 
.123 and .134. Colvin was placed under arrest and transported to the Nez Perce County Jail. !d. 
Colvin made a timely request for an Administrative Hearing, which was conducted 
telephonically before Hearing Officer Skip Carter on February 14, 2013. The Hearing Officer 
sustained the suspension, issuing a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on March 
14, 2013. R. at 28. Colvin filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review, and this Court stayed his 
suspension pending consideration of that Petition. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined the Trooper had legal cause to 
stop the vehicle driven by the Petitioner. 
2. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined that the administration of the 
breath alcohol testing complied with the ISP standard operating procedures based upon 
the evidence presented in the record. 
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 2 
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. i 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(8) states that a "party aggrieved by the decision of the hearing 
officer may seek judicial review of the decision in the manner provided for judicial review of 
final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." Generally, judicial review of 
"disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial review." I. C. § 67-
5277. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence on questions of fact. I. C. § 67-5279(1). Idaho Code§ 67-5279 further provides: 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
In an administrative hearing, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof. I. C. § 18-
8002A(7). Further, 
The hearing officer shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the petson had been driving 
or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-
8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
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!d. 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Whether the Hearing Officer erred when he determined the Trooper had legal cause 
to stop the vehicle driven by the Petitioner. 
The hearing officer determined the Trooper had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by 
the Petitioner "for an improper lane movement (failure to signal) when he merged from the right 
lane into the left lane on 5th Street near Stewart Avenue in the city of Lewiston, in violation of 
Idaho Code, $49-808." R. at 34. The hearing officer also reviewed video and the officer's 
sworn statement, and found "it is clear that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing, 
thus requiring the signal for motorists in the right lane to signal." !d. Based upon these facts, the 
hearing officer determined there was legal cause to stop the vehicle. 
part: 
The vehicle was stopped for violation ofl.C. § 49-808. This statute states in pertinent 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon 
a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement 
can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
I. C. § 49-808(1 ). The· Petitioner has challenged whether the trooper had legal cause to stop his 
vehicle, claiming that I. C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as it is applied to the 
Petitioner's conduct. In this case, the Petitioner asserts that he did not move a vehicle right or 
left upon a highway, but rather maintained a straight line of travel where two lanes merged into a 
single lane. 
The Petitioner relies on Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 PJd 933 (Ct. App. 2010) in 
support of his argument. In similar circumstances, Burton was stopped by an officer when she 
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 4 
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did not signal as she approached the end of a double lane expanse, where two lanes became a 
single lane. 1 Id. at 747,240 P.3d at 934. Burton argued that I. C. § 49-808(1) was "vague as 
applied to her because it does not provide fair notice that a signal is required before one drives 
into a single lane that stems from the merger of two lanes. The statute does not give notice ... 
that such a continued forward movement constitutes 'moving' a vehicle 'right or left upon a 
highway."' Id. at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. 
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the 
meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574,94 S.Ct. 1242, 
1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197,969 P.2d 
244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised upon the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining 
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and 
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94,71 L.Ed.2d 362, 
370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009). Thus, a statute 
may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
!d. at 74_8, 240 P .3d at 935. Ultimately, the Burton Court determined that I. C. § 49-
808(1) was void for vagueness as applied to Burton. The Court looked specifically to the 
1 In Burton, the Court of Appeals found the officer's description of the events as "cryptic": 
The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he stopped Burton's 
vehicle after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton 
testified that in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was 
traveling in the right lane, and when the two lanes became one, "the left lane disappeared." She said that 
she passed a sign which said that the lanes were going to merge, but there was no evidence of signage 
indicating that one lane was terminating and one continuing. 
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749,240 P.3d at 936. The facts in the case at hand are similar. The trooper stopped Colvin for 
an improper lane movement, failure to signal, when he merged from the right lane to the left lane. R. at 34. In this 
case, the video indicates there is also a yellow sign which indicates the lanes were merging. Important to this case is 
Colvin's testimony that he did not move his car to the left, but instead maintained a straight line of travel. 
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fact that the statute does not specify how much or what type of movement is necessary to 
trigger the duty to signal. 
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section 49-
808( 1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute 
does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when two lanes merge with 
neither lane clearly ending and neither clearly continuing. This situation differs 
significantly from that where one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as 
occurred in Dewbre. In the Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a 
signal because a driver in the terminating lane must change lanes in order to 
continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move to the left 
or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is terminating and the 
other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single lane, it is not clear that the 
continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the 
emerging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Section 
49-808(1) signal requirement. 
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how 
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty 
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a 
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes simply merge because a driver 
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into 
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal 
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to 
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply 
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in 
those instances. 
It is simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a 
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence 
can only guess at the statute's directive in this circumstance. Therefore, the statute 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's conduct. 
Because Section 49-808(1) could not be constitutionally applied to her, Burton 
has shown that no legal cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop that led to her 
breath tests. We therefore reverse the district court's decision affirming the 
administrative suspension of Burton's driver's license. Costs on appeal to 
appellant. 
!d. at 749-750,240 P.3d at 936-937. 
The Department contends that the case before this Court is similar to State v. Dewbre, 
133 Idaho 663,991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999). The hearing officer relied on Dewbre in 
determining that it was "clear that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing, thus 
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___ I 
requiring the signal for motorists in the right lane to signal." R. at 34. The hearing officer failed 
to address the issue of whether Colvin's vehicle moved to the left or right, triggering the 
requirement to signal as required by I. C. §49-808(1). Further, the Burton Court distinguished the 
situation in Dewbre from the constitutional challenge before that Court. 
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 
663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct.App.l999). The driver there contended that the signal 
requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not apply where a two-lane portion of 
a highway ended and two traffic signs as well as painted arrows on the highway 
advised motorists that the right lane wa.S ending and traffic should merge left. The 
Dewbre case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of Appeals 
judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement applied in that 
circumstance. A second judge concurred in that result but did not join in the lead 
opinion's reasoning, and the third judge dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not 
have precedential value bearing upon the present case for several reasons. First, 
the Court in Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue 
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a majority, and 
third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and 
arrows on the roadway informed motorists that the right-hand lane was ending and 
that traffic must merge into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there 
is no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the 
other surviving. 
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. 
The hearing officer determined that the Petitioner's reliance on Burton was misplaced and 
that State v. Dewbre was applicable to the case at hand. R. at 34. The hearing officer erred in 
this determination because the Petitioner in the case at hand brings forth a constitutional 
challenge to the statute, which did not happen in Dewbre. The hearing officer specifically found 
that the right lane was ending and the left lane continuing; however, the hearing officer neglected 
to make a finding regarding whether the Petitioner was required to move his vehicle to the right 
or left, which would trigger the requirement to signal as set forth in I. C .. § 49-808(1). Based on 
the similarities of the case at hand to Burton, and no evidence in the record which established the 
Petitioner moved his vehicle to the left, triggering the signal requirement, the Petitioner's 
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argument that I.C. §49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to him is well taken. Therefore, 
the hearing officer's decision is in violation of constitutional and statutory provisions. LC. § 67-
5279(3)(a). As a result, the hearing officer's determination is reversed? 
CONCLUSION 
Colvin's license suspension was sustained by order of the Hearing Officer. 
Colvin challenges the hearing officer's determination arguing that I. C.§ 49-808(1) is void 
for vagueness as it applies to him. Based upon the Court of Appeals determination in 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010), and the unique 
circumstances of this case where there is no evidence that Colvin moved his vehicle to 
the left, the Petitioner's argument that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to him 
is well taken. Therefore, the hearing officer's determination is set aside, and remanded 
for further proceedings reversing the Notice of Suspension, consistent with this opinion. 
2 Because the bearing officer's determination is set aside regarding the question of whether the stop was legal, it is 
not necessary for this Court to determine whether the test for alcohol concentration was conducted in accordance 
with I.C. § 18-8004. 
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ORDER 
The Hearing Officer's Order of March 4, 2013, sustaining the suspension of Colvin's 
·driver's license set out in the Notice of Suspension dated January 28, 2013, is hereby SET 
ASIDE and REMANDED for further proceedings reversing theN otice of Suspension, consistent 
with this analysis. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J...?flay of August 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
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I. ST.ATEMENT OF Tl:lE CASE: 
The defendl::lnl was charged ·with <:1 .second olfen~~e (enhanced) .Drivi.n.r-r, Li1Fk1· thi.' 
Inilu.encc of Alcohol {DUI) on January 28. 2013. The Defendant sought to supprcs:; 
evidence resulting in the ~vlagistratc Court issuing Findings or Fact and C.cmclu~>iu.rt~.; '.!I· 
Law RegardingPretrial1\1otions on the 22nd day of April~ 2013. 
Follo·wing a hearing on .the .n1otion to SlJppress e-.;,r.iclence~ the l\1agisLnllC Court. 
found that 'rrooper Ta1l1ott, who made the traffic. stop, noted ·Mr. Col v1n's vch1ck 
\Veaving -ii1 its lane at tiJnes. The Troopet .al~o noterlthar the J_).eJe.n.dant \vas consisLC!l Uy 
traveling ynder tl!e. sp~ed lin;11t;includihg traveling ·on 5th Street at approxi.rnately 3 U u 1 i 1 c~:: 
per hour when the spce,d lhn1t :vvas 35 tniles per hour. The Magistrate fcrund ·that as 
Trooper Talbott an.d the D~fen9,a:nt were trc;~.veling op_ ·~th Street, in the l.~·ft-hund 
southbound lane that the Defendant activated his . .right turn signal and moved i!1Lo tile 
right hand southhound lane~ while Troop.er Talbott re1na.incd in the ]eft hand southtlound 
lane .. Thereafter~ the .Defendant·passed a yellovv dic.nnond shaped traffic sign contcdrJing a 
black sy1nbol vvhich is depicted and defined as follows: 
Tlhereafler the Defendant continued .south in the righl hand h1n.e und the 1yvo (2.') 
- ,, ,, 
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'.···,. 
use any signals while he traveled in the right-hand southbound lane through the nre:u 
·where the two (2) southbound lanes converged. After passing th1·ough the m:cn, 0 fli ccr 
Talbott conducted a traffic stop. 1 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
I.C.R. 54.17 provides: 
All appeals from a magistrate shall be heard by the district cou.rl as n.n oppcH:,Jc 
proceeding unless the district court oi"ders a trial de novo as pro'\lidcd in thc:-;c 
ru]es."'Tlie s6ope of appellate review~ 011 appeal to the district COUlt shaiJlJC as foJJuYV~!: 
(~~) "Qpph ~h,appe~l ~l~oni.:a,Inagistratc to the district court, not involving~~ tri;d dr: 
novo, the district court shall revie'v the case on the recoi'd and determine the 
appeal as an appellate court in the same 1nanncr and upon the .sante standards or 
revie\V as an appeal from the district court to the Suprc1nc Court under the lchdH> 
appellate rules. 
(b) ... 
In State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P .3d 702, 704 (200 I), the Idaho 
Supreme Court succinctly clarified T.C.R. 54.17 in the context of a claim that n statute j~; 
unconstitutional as follow~ [internal citations omitted]: 
I ~ I . 
. . . 
When this Courl considers a claim that a statute is unconstitutionaL we re-v ic1-v t1 Jl:' 
tri~i"couli's.n{Hng de novo since it involves purely a question of lm~r. ''" /\pr)cll:1ic: 
.· •. cout!:s ~r~:obUgat~d tq seek an in~cq.,retation of a statute that upholds it::_; 
constit{ttionality. : .. The pi:uty L:hallenging a slatule on constiLuUonul gnJlutds 
the burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and '\uust uvcrcoJnc ;\ 
strong presumption of validity.~' Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idnho 706, 70<.1., 
791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). 
Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLavfRegarding PretriaJ Jvfotions, pages)·-,:!. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF-~2 
196
Fax,server 10/16/2013 2:13:55 PM PAGE 7/017 
The proper consideration on appeal fr01n an order of the district cuw:L i (.~.vi~~\\'iiJg :~ 
detern1inationmade by a magistrate: "Whether 1n a civil or criminnl C(1~;c, i.s for (hi:: 
Court to exa1niue the record of the trial court jndepenclcntly of, but \Vi [lJ <.ht(_' rq;:,<lrd 
for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision .... 
Vagueness m·ay invalidate a criminal law either because the statute fails to provide 
the kind of notice that will enable ordinmy people to understand ·vvlwt conduct it 
prohibits or because it may authorize and even encourage arbjt.rary and 
discriminatory enforcetnent. The test for vagueness to be applied in Idnho~ if the 
lmv does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct or a significant amount o !' 
that conduct, is to ask whether the statute gives notice to those \Vho arc subject tu it 
and whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for the exercise of discrcLirm 
by those who must enforce the ordinance. It has long been held that?\ ;,tc1iuk 
should nol be held void for uncertainty if any practical intcrprctntior1 can be 
the statute. 
While specifically considering the statute at issue in this case., LC. § 49 .. ·KO?<.(l)., the 
Idaho ~0\,.I~t:q.f APP~als in Stat~v. De·wbre, 1.33 Idaho 663, 665, 991 P.2d 38~\ 3:)() (Ct. 
App. 1999).sta,ted. a~{plluws: .. 
. , i. ·.~·- ... . . i ·~ 
On revie·w of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capadty, we 
examine the record of the trial court independently ot~ but with due regard for, the 
district court's intennediate appellate dec.~ision. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 5R4 1 5g5 n. 
l, 798 P.2d 43, 44 n. 1 (1990); State v. Bm.vman, 124 Tdaho 936, 939, 86(} J).2.c1 
193, I 96 (Ct.App.1993). 'l11e standard of review of a supprcssionutolJon is 
bifurcated. When a decision on a tnotion to suppress is c.haltenged, \VC acCCJll the 
trial court's findings of fact vvhich Y\rere supported by substantial cvjucnc.~\ bu I \-Vt..~. 
tl'eely review the application of constitutional principles to lbc DKI.s a.•; fow1d. /)'tor-e~ 
v. A£kinson 128ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2cl128L~, 1286 (CL~pp. '1996). 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
. 1 i 1 Tl).~: ~?le i?spe r;?Lised on appeal is ·whether or not the Nlagistru tc (:.rrcd \Vh c.n it 
J ' ~ 1 • ' • ,- - ' • ' 
det.ennin~q.. tha~.tht1.r~ ;was., sulTident legal cause for a traffic stop to be conrlnci r:.d \Vhcn 
~ .. : .. . . ·. ; - ' . . . ·' ~- . ·; . ·.. . ~ ' 
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s~:nne direction lane, failed to signal \¥hen the lane he wos traveling jD ended, cnu:.~ing hin1 
to merge with the through Jane. The Defendant argues that l.C.§ 49-sog, whid1 
id~~tifies:"whep.'a t~~n signal is required, is unconstitutionally vague ns npplkd jn thb 
. -~ ... · .. ·:·.·:: :·~.,_ : ·: .. ~~~ ~·.: .... ~-r ... ~.·:...,' ... 
case; The Pef~n~antdo.es ngt ftrgue the statute 1s tl.nconst1tutionally vague in u 11 c.(l~~cs . 
. . ·! ·~·;~~·J·~.~:·,· .·.~.~~ ·,,. . 
In the event the traffi·~ stop was inappropriate., all evidence that f1mvcd from said 
stop ·would be subject to suppression. Altetnatively, if the stop \vns appropriate, cll.l. 
evidence which t1oyved from said stop is not subje-ct to suppression. 
IV. ARG-UMENT: 
l.C. § 49-808 provides as follo .. ws: 
(l) No person shall tutn a vehicle onto a highway or n1ove a vehicle right or len 
upon a high,vay or merge onto or exit fron1 a hjghvvay unless and unLi l lhc 
; ufo~etl1:~nt Call be mc;t.de with reasonable safety nor 'vithout giv jug f.lll npprupri<.J\.c ;,j L'·! 1·! l . 
. (2):A ~-~g~a)o(fri:rerition' to turn or tnove right or )ell when required Kh:dl be; givt:n 
continuously.:to'>\vaql'othei· traffic. On controlled~access high·way~ and lJcforc 
turning fl·om a parked position, the signal shall be given continuousl~y fur nol .lc.s.':l 
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last ouc 
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
(3) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle \:YilhouL Lir:::L 
giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to Lhc rear 
vvhen there is opportunity to give such a signal. 
(4) The signals required on vehicles by section 49-809, Idaho Code, sh:t!J nut he 
flashed on one (1) side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a comtcsy or ~\lo 
pass" signal to operators of other vehicles approaching frmn the rear, nor be 
flashed on on~ (1) side only of a parked vehicle except as n1ay be necessary for 
con}plia,~lce ·with this section. 
'S{op :and investig"atory.detentions are recognized exceplions Lo t.hc. wnrr:ml. 
' . . 
requirement.· Tei·fy~: .. Ohio::~9;(lJ.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). An offlc.cr Jnny ~src,p :md 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF--4 
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detain an individual if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the nfJ!c.cr·lw:·: ;1 
reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that t.he suspcc.L h:1~' l::r:c.n, i:;, 
or is about to engage in criminal activity, or that the vehicle is being driven in vio1:Ji i'.)11 :1 f 
trat1ic la}VS.: State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2c1 520 (1992) . 
. . A ~top is an_ int~nnediate response that allo-ws an officer to nutintain {he slnl.tL~:; qn:.l, 
• 1 - .. ' ; ' ~ ; ; : - ~. 
identify the s~spect an~l il)v.estigqte possible crin1inal activity, even though the ofl)ccr 
.' '. ,, ·1 ..... , ., •• '. ' 
docs not have sufficient-'infonnation to establish probable cause to n1akc an arrc:1t. Sec 
Terry (supra). Therefore any assertion that the officer tnust have probable caw:;e Lo 
conduct an investigatory stop is a misstatement of the hrw. State v. ](night~ 128 J:~hho 
862, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1996). 
To determine ·whether a stop is lawful, the reviewing Court rnust evaluate the Cnc.ts 
!mown to the officer at the time of the stop based on the totality of the circumsta11ces or lhe 
whole picture. State v. GalleF;os, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2cl 949 (1991). In addition, <Jn o[J.lccr is 
permitted to draw rational inferences from the facts in light of his/her experience nnd trnin1n.g. 
See· Terry, :Gallegos (supra) ... 
Thc:Mag{sh·atc>Comi documented the evidence presented at the supprcssiontnotiotL :1nd 
' - -l • i l :~- • 
held ,that ·,~Ofli~vr. Tal99i~ hac,t ,fe~sonable articulable suspicion that Jv[r. Colvin's vchj clc w:·l:j 
• ...' ~ • • • • • • :., --;: j.. .: • ;' -. • •' .. ·, ' ~. 
driven cont~ary to a trafficJ~w'and his stop of Mr. Colvin was a lawful inve~tig(.!livc cklc.u1iou. 
As heavily discussed by the Magistrate and by the Defendant in hdefing, there: ;uc l\vu ()) 
opinions issued by the 1daho Court of Appeals which review the const.Hntionnllty ns npplicd <Jf 
I. C. § 49-808 in the specific context of merging, san1e directional traffic lanes. 
The first case being State v. DerFbre, 13 3 Idaho 663 ~ 991 P .2c1 3 8 8 (Ct. App. 199~J) and 
the second case, Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 922 (Ct. App. 2008). In th.c Cir:3t e:r3c, 
the Idaho Com1 of Appeals found the statute constitutional as applied. In the second~ the ldnl10 
Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional as applied. 
The Defendant argues that Burton, the second case, overrules Dewbre, the first crLse:, at H.! 
' ~ • - ; ' I 
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provides the controlling law. This argument ignores the specific holding iu Burton tllnt it dm:;: 
not overrule De1vbre. 
Whether or not a statute is lmconstitutlonal as applied to a specific ca~;c or set. u [ f:lct~; 
depends heavily on those facts. The argument that Burton overrules Dewbn.: ignurc~:; the 
difference in the facts of those cases. 
To explain: 
Dewbre involved·a motorist traveling on State Highway 57, 1:1 divided two (2) lnnc 
r 'f, ; ) . • ~ ~ , 
highway, who encountered a portion of the highway where the traffic lane he wns in :;plit inlo 
two (2) lanes, a right and left hand lane. The signage indicated he was to stay righlunJcss kr 
pass. He moved into the right hand lane without signaling. Traffic signs and arnnvs painicd in 
the lane advised that the lane was ending, and he was to 1nerge left. Afler passing the cad nf iJ 1c 
dashed line separating the two lanes, he moved into the left hand lane, again without sign(' line, 
Because Dewbre failed to signal while making these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre Cor 
violating I.C. § 49-808. Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 664, 991 P.2d at 389. 
Dewbre contended that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion i.o ~top his vehicle 
because LC~ § 49-808 does' not require the use of signals when entering or exiling (I pn:~Sltl(!, 111C<1. 
The rd~~aiTt poitio'n oftC. § 49-808 provides that no person "shall turn a vcldclu or IllfJ\'f:.! d. 
or left updn'·a;hlgh~ay!ml~ss:.an~ 11_ntil the n1overnent can be n1ndc with reasonable ~;~1 fdy JHJr 
without ·giving lli{ap~roprlt1te·slgiial>' Dewbre contends that I. C. § 49-808 requires the usc or 
turn signals only when a vehicle turns or tnakes a lane change. Devvbrc contends Lhal be rJid 1J<1( 
turn or change lanes, that he continued in the same lane while entering uncl exiting the pn:;sing 
area, and that he, therefore, was not required to usc his signal. Dewbre also argues that T.t.~- ~~ 
49-808 requires the use of signals only when appropriate and that no turn signal b the 
"appropriate signal" when the vehicle rnovemcnt can he n1ade with reasonably safety_ .!d. I J 3 
Idaho at 663, 991 P.2d at 390. 
The Court held specifically as follows: 
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. 'IIv~ 
follo-vvmg holding .from the district court's order affirn1ing the magistrate's dl'ni::ll of 
. , De\.~br:e1s :supp~e.ssion motion correctly analyzes the siatute1s application: 
,, • \" t. 
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When Dewbre approached the portion of the high\vay containing a passing Lmc, !he nitll 
required hlm to '~keep right accept to pass." As such, Dewbre moved hi.s n:hic!c fo fl1e 
right to comply with this requirement. \'\'hen De\vbre reached tbc end or Ll1{~ porli\ n 1 ()r 
the highway that contained a passing lane, the record clearly eslahlis_hcs that lhcrli -..,v,_\:~ n 
sign requiring Dewbre to merge back into the left lane. This required (1 turning l!ZO\'I"lllC!1( 
to the left_ lt is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre .made these movcincnts, and it is nlso 
undisputed that he did not signal when he made either turn. By failiug to signal when lw. 
made these turns; De·wbre violated I. C. § 49-808. 
It is tn1e that at ;1oir:t De'l.ivhre made these tw11ing ma11euvcrs, the clashed Jiuc did nut 
separate the 1ef.t lar-i'd:ri'ght i11drthbotidd lanes. However, the s1atule Jocs nui sLric! i y I i u J i i j L'; 
application to the lane changes. Instead, the stalute requires a signa 1 whcnlwcr ~m 
individual makes a "move right or left upon a higlnvay.'' Had the legislature intcudcd 
to regulate tmns and lane changes, it could have stated so spccificaHy. By moving f:it·:i 
right, and then left, Dewbre came within the ambit of the statute, and \Vas required tu 
make to [sic] signal. (Emphasis added.). 
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle tu 
the right in order to comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the~ passing :::trca: 
Dewbre moved his vehicle to thelefi, complying once again \vith the highway ~3.ignagc. 
There are no exceptions in I. C. § 49-808 to the signal requirement. S'tate v. Pressley, 1 :; t 
Idaho 277~ 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct_App.1998). Whenevel' a movement i.·~ mnde ln 
the left or rtght on a highway, regardless ofwhethcr the moven1ont is made ncccs~:nry fu 
corhJHY -vvith.highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. ~;. ,! S)--::Wt;_ 
, j j \ i : • • , ~ : ·: 1 \ : • ' l : : I : ~. ·~ ' f 
1 db 1tldt~att~riip~:by hJ_s;holding to define the boundaries of·vvhat consli.lutcs a c;nwvcrnco! 
~o ~ly_ rigfl;t qr l,ef,t UJ~on. a P,igh\vay.:~ I .condude only that De\vbre's movements placed l1i1 11 
~itli:ii-1 ti16~ ~i~b'~(:~~ltJ1e ;:h~itM·e. UnGL't'tniher clarification is provided by the ldahu 
legisiaiiu·e~ (afilc6Ii~ti~i1I~-c!'to ho]dthat whenever a vehicle J:noves to the righl or to the 
left because one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into une lane, em 
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. § 49-808. Therefore, I.C. § 4:J- i\08 
required Devvbre to use an appropriate signal when he moved to the right \vhilc ct\lcrinJr, 
the passing area and then to the left while exiting the passing area. State v_ De1vl;re, 1 .. n 
Idaho 663, 666, 991 P.2d 388 1 391 (Ct. App. 1999) 
Dewbre argued for the first time on appeal that the statule was unconslilutionally vnguc 
as applied, and the Court recognizing the issue was raised for lhe first time on appeal dcclilJcd to 
consider it. 
'• 
;,'11 ,J, ,' 
l-i<f:iY'l~-,i~)De:l·Ff:n;tf.:P-~n~,istent_with lhe case at hand? First, the Defe..ndant .moved to the 
t ' r • . ' I , ; .' ~ ' : 'I ' ' J ' • 
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right, after signaling his intent to do so. Dewbre did not signal the right hand movcmcnl. 
Regardless, both movements were clearly identified as con~lituling both a lane change :JiHJ a 1 it•,hi 
hand movement upon the highway requiring a signal. 
Second, signage on the high\vay indicated that the right hand lane was abont to end, ;u1ci 
',\ \: ~·~' 
on the highway, and as a lane change: The sign specifically meallR 'T~anc I~l!_~,~l.!~_l~.:rJ:S 
Left. Two (2) lanes of traffic will soon become one (1) lane {)f traffic. l{iJi;ltLhln~Jr.;~tJts~ 
must yield when merging.» 
In Dewbre, highway signage (not spec.ifically identified in the decision) and arrow~; un l h~-~ 
roadway informed Dewbre that his lane was ending, and he was to merge left. 
Neither driver signaled their intent, which \:vas the basis for the traffic stop. 
The. Burton Cou11 considered simllar facts specifically 1vith the consthut.ional.i Ly DS 
. . . 
signage. j~e ~0~f6nll;;i4~~~~j;\JVerrul~ Dewbre, but instead distinguished it on thcfnctc. 
holding: 
The Dewbre opinion does not have precedentiai value bearing upon the present c:1sr fur 
several reasons. First) the Court in De~rbre was not called upon to nddress Lhe. 
constitutional issue presented here. Second, there vvas 110 opinion that comiun.ndc cl n 
1najority, and third, Dewbre is factually distinguishable bccansc in Dc\Ybrc, road ~ii ~~,n:1 
and arrows on the roadway infonned tnotorists that the right-hand.lanc W8S ending <"Uld 
that traffic n1ust 1nerge into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there 1s no 
evidenec of such s1 gnagc or other indicator that one lane was end ill g and the other 
surviving. 
We are persuaded lhat_there is merit in Burton's contention thal Section 49-80/~i( J) !~; 
uncon.stitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute does not. c.icarly 
'... '•'. 
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indicate that a signal is required when tvw lanes rnerge 1rithJ1cither l~UJ}.~ dendy_gn~l~IH~ 
and neither dearly continuing. Tltis situation differs sh~Mifi.cantly frou~ tllaL\\'_hs.n.~ 
one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as occurrc.d in. I~_f.Jl.p_f;r_g_. 1n the. Ilc.~.v1·.n: 
circumstance, the statute plainly requires a signal because a c.h'ivcr in the krminating l<ln•,) 
must change lanes in order to continue travel on the high1vay, and changing lanes 
constitutes a 1nove to the left or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lcmc 
is terminating and the other surviving~ but rather the two blend into a single Jane~ iL is nol 
dear that the continued forward movement of a vehicle ±l'om either of the two lanes into 
the en1erging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Scclion 
49-808(1) sign~1.l requirement. 
.·r. (} / -·. ···~ 
Burton v. Stat.~,__L!:'f!.lL::~{l..l:.{:J:~nsp .. 149 Idaho 74~ 749_, 240 P.3d933, 936 (Ct. ,{np. 20/0). 
(Emphasis add~cl/ -
It is clear frotn both cases that when a traffic lane ends, requiring the driver to merge i u!n 
an adjacent tlu·ough traftlc lane, it is considered a right or left hand movement on the higi·!\'v'H}'. \1. 
is also a merge onto a highway. Both circumstances are clearly defined by LC. § 49~BOB a:_; 
requiring a signal. 
The Magistrate found that indeed the Defendant in this case 1nade a nwvcmcnt t.lJH.>ll the 
high\vay1 _This. is afactual deter!n~nationnot reviewable on appeal. Specifically the f.vJngi:::frt1\c 
:;·i'.' ,. ·;_ '.: · ... ' f; 
found: 3., i_} / J.: .. : ~· . 
+h~/~b~-~e~i~ikidi1~ed·':s;tJ:,;~~osted' albrlg the right-hand shoulder of the rlght-l.mnd 
southbound lane ~f 51b Street, was a wmning sign Lhal called attention t.u <-1 :s.iluu1.il.ln that. 
tnight not have been readily apparent- the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street -vvuuid 
be ending and a 1notorist in the right-hand lane \V011ld have to move kfl and merge wil11 
the left-hand southbound lane to continue. [footnote 1: \Vhen ti\'U parallel hue:; c.unvcT!~C., 
one or the other with have to Hmove~' toward the other; otherwise the l-rvo parallel !:mi.;~; 
will ren1ain parallel and never converge. Jn this case the \varning .sign ndvi;;cd. t h:li.! hr:. 
right-hand southbound lane was ending and n1otorist in such lane had to mcrvc left Lo 
continue.]. 
Tbis is the exact finding in Dewbre (supra), in which the Court spcciJ)c::llly Jcnmd l'llnl. 
"whenever a ·vehicle moves tq the.right or to the left because one lane splits i.ntu two lm1e:3, or 
: ~ • ' . . ' \ I ' ! ; .- ' ' 
! .::·. 
I.,T.:.'-SPOND'_;~-E':·Ni'.·r'' ;S·.· BR·,~yi_;~·~x-''. :\..Ci • ·.' .-' •,' • ·-8~11' /.,i 
. · ~. ,'' i. • I 
.·;·:·· 
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two lanes 111erge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to LC. § 119--80({. 
Dewbre, supra. 
Because I. C. § 49-808 required a signal, both because of the movc1ncnt upon lhe 
high\vay and the lane change, the next question is '\Vould the Defendant have been given 
rea;onab~c:n:otiee· bf the, r~q~irements of the statute. 
l': •.-
.. ·,_ .. · Agairi:;. thhsigh~~e-'-along the road answers the question. Signage, as pointed out in 
Dewbre·and.··B~;~ii:iz"tf'f::i{~e~{"fb}~He analysis~ In this case, the Magistrate took grcHt care ·rn 
outline the Idaho Departn1ent of Transportation rules, the l\.1anual for ·uniform Traffic Co1Jl rot 
Devices for Streets and Highways, and the IDAPA rules which apply to the analysis. 
That analysis is not re-stated here. 
The Magistrate correctly concluded that the unifonn signage usctl by the Idaho 
Department of Transportation and authorized by IDAP A and the MUTCD, is to _promote 
highway safety and efficiency, and to notify road users of regulations and to provide -warning aud 
guidance.1reeded for the 'uniform and e±licient operation of a11 clcn1ents or lho lraiTic stream. 
j • • • 
Wan1ing'sigii~;:·s~cl~:~i~\iie on~ at issue here, arc to call attention to unexpected condition~{ on <-1 [ 
•',. '!·' .._ ,?·,··: ... 
'.' , ' I • ""-~ :-.. • :; 
adjacent to a highway to situ~tions ~hich 1night nol be readily apparent to road users. 
This Defendant, Mr. Colvin was advised of three things by the vvarnjng sign at is~n.~c~ hc.rv: 
1. The lane he was traveling in was not the through lane~ and he \Vas to yield tu 
. traffic in the adjacent lane; 
2. The lane he was traveling in was about to end; 
3. I-Ie was required to n1ergc into the through lane (1ncrge ldt) to c.ont.im1c traveling 
fo_incllings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Pre-Trial IV1otions~ p. 7 - 1). 
' . 
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on the highway. 
In other words, (a) he needed to change lanes, (b) by m.oving to the lel't. Both cin.:un1::t:mcc.'; :.1n; 
clearly contemplated by the statute as requiling a turn signal. 
I.C. § 49-808, as applied to this situation, was clear, U11atnbiguous} and wa~; violated by 
the Defendant. ln other words, it is "worded with suffic]ent clarity and deflnitenes5 tlwt urdin:.Hy 
people, ~~'·in thi$ CC;I~~ !Yf~·.>~Colvin, could understand that witl1 his trafGc lane (the 1 ighL--h:ltJd 
~ ., ;_.: :~·~·! : -~ ~~ \ \1 :., l;.) :,:;· ·-· .: • J 
· -~r:, .. -.· 
southbo1.mdlane of 5 1h'st;·e3~:~ el~.cting and his having to m.etgc left into another 1ri.lfFiL: lru tc (tlK 
"·~ -.. - . . ' . 
.. 
left-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) to continue on, an appropriaLc signal was req11ircd~). '1 
The Defendant goes on to argue that the ten11 "appropriate signal" is nol defined in T.C. 
49~808 therefore the statute contains a second ambiguity which should c.ause it to CDil. Thb 1~; 
raised for the first time on appeal. Regardless, it is clear that the Defendant failed to sign:1l :1L :-.dl. 
so the length or appropriateness of his signal is inelevant. The. Defendant also :1rgues thnl th<"; 
Magistrate's decision would give unbridled discretion to law enforceniCnt without guidcl.i..11cs 
which woul.4'lcadJo ,arbitrary and discrin1inatmy application. The 11agistrute 1 ~ ruliug 'Nmdd 
. '. ', ' ' .. ··. . ' : '. ; . ~ ' ._ . : . ~;!~. (.,_ .. 1•: ( :} ~; . .. •' '. 
provide ab.s~iutely 9l:e~t:tdtrid ui18inbiguous guidelines to law enforcement as to ~vvhcn a driver 
,-. . ..... ,···-.-·i' :\ ._: .. ·._:·:.~·-,··: 
'·:~:---~~--~~.'i.{ ~~:~·: .. 1:~'-·.l~?< . .j.:·:~i;·;·.~ l .. ·,!;r(: •. ~. · .. : 
1TIUSt signal a Ian~ cliatig~.·OJ,:;:JJ.~~q~;i(;~' and wheri a driver is not obligated to signal. 
Finally, the Defendant points out that this Court has already reviev·.,red on appeal tile ~;;mJC 
issue arising from the same trai11c stop in the context of an ad1ni11istrativc license suspension 
proceeding, and found the referenced statute unconstitutiona1 as applied .. The St.nl.c n-:::;pt.~c.l fully 
submits that the record in this instance, as documented in the Tvfagistrate~s op1nion, djl.J\::.L~-> 
signi±icantly from the record referenced by the Cmnt. in the A.L.S. suspension, 1..uost spcc1 fll.;l\ly 
. Finding;s o~PacL_ and Conclusions of Law Regarding Pre-TrlallVIotions, p. I 0- .t J 
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:. ,.,. :;_:.r :.<~·, ,/: .. {[:'Y::~:~ .. ~~ 
' . ~ ... 
205
Fax .:Server 
' ,. :··.; ... 
-~.,. :\_t:~t%·~1,G_~:2~?~13 2: 13:55 PM PAGE 16/017 
with. rc.spcct to the Magis.tratc.'s findings and analysis regarding: n1oving- ]cJ'l o1· dglli ('ll 5' 11 :~-;(J ·:·,,-;. 
Given:the record in the ALS hearing was d~void of those t1nd.ing~:; and that a.na1ysi;.>, the ~3!<~\r: 
argues this appeal is substantially different. 
V. CONCLUSION: 
. ' . . 
. · Accordingly/1~i:i~·:1:e{.1lles:ted that the Dishict Court ·uphold the.l\11agistraie's d12.r.:i::;iun ill 
i 
re.tl.1sing tq. ~:~lpp~·es's~';tf~~·~~\i::i·(}~;:ic~:i'~iferenced Hy the Defencltmt. ln light of tbe lVh\gi~:;{Jn(c 
Judge' s· ±1ndh1gs. of fact, .exhaustive anaJ.y.l)i·s of the law, and in Ugb.t of the pn~o:dei1rinl \';due. 
found in Dewbre and B1-Jrton, and in light of the deference to be paid to tlH~. JVfagisln1\c~s l\;:··r.:i:'~i~ :11, 
lhis Com·( should a11inn. 
.rt:'.'~'::.;J""' • .:-'' 
•.• ~· .~ .. ·¥······~ .:~ .• ~;-~c;-~:1~~~-;._.. .... :~::~::~ 
./ E. CLA\~E T\1I .. ER 
SPne.f:~L PROSECUTING l\'T'-rCJI\.Nf\Y 
". ·. 
•• ,.!;, 
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CRRTIFTCATl~ OJ<"' lVfA TI ,n·..rG/ORI .J'/.E.RY 
The undersigned hereby certH1e$ that a true and correct copy of I he 1·-rwcgn'tnc . .,,..:.,~: 
deH·,te1'ed to the followi11g on the //.ri~P\ciay of October, 2013: 
Scott Chap1nan 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
PO Bo:x446 
Lew'lston,·ID 8.3$01 
Fax: 208-743-1266 
!· •j • 
1.,·'" 
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CR-2013-0000676 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 11/19/2013 
Time: 11:01 am 
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Courtroom: #1 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM #1 
Defense Attorney: Scott Chapman 
Prosecutor: E Clayne Tyler 
110103 Mr. Tyler and Mr. Chapman present and ready to proceed. 
110135 Mr. Chapman presents argument. 
110430 Mr. Tyler presents argument. 
110940 Mr. Chapman presents rebuttal argument. 
111025 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
111057 Recess 
Court Minutes 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GAYLORD J. COLVIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2013-0676 
APPELLATE OPINION 
AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court on appeal of the magistrate's denial of the Appellant's 
motion to suppress. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on November 19, 2013. The 
Appellant was represented by Scott Chapman, of Chapman Law Offices. The State of Idaho was 
represented by Clayne Tyler, Clearwater County Special Prosecuting Attorney. The Court, 
having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its 
decision. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL ffiSTORY 
On January 28,2013, Idaho State Police Trooper Talbott stopped a vehicle being driven 
by the defendant, which ultimately resulted in the defendant being charged with driving under the 
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in:fluence.1 The Trooper first noticed the v~hicle as it turned from 8th Avenue onto 21st Street, in 
Lewiston, Idaho. The Trooper followed the vehicle for three or four miles until he effectuated 
the traffic stop on 5th Street. The Trooper testified that he observed the vehicle weaving within 
its lane of travel, that the vehicle consistently traveled under the speed limit-including driving 
30 mph on 5th Street where the posted speed was 35 mph-and that the vehicle appropriately 
signaled and made three turns and one lane change. 
Trooper Talbott was following the Defendant's vehicle traveling south on 5th Street. 5th 
Street initially consisted of three lanes of travel-a single northbound lane and two southbound 
lanes. The two southbound lanes were parallel lanes, separated by a dashed white line. Both 
vehicles were initially in the left-hand southbound lane as the Trooper followed the Defendant. 
The Defendant then activated his right tum signal and moved from the left-hand lane to the right-
hand lane as he continued south. The Trooper remained in the left-hand lane behind the 
Defendant. 
The Defendant continued in the right hand lane when he pa~sed a yellow, diamond 
shaped traffic sign which contained a symbol indicating the right lane would be ending. 2 The 
sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of the roadway. The Defendant continued his 
travel in the right-hand lane, and shortly after passing the sign he passed through an area where 
the two southbound lanes converged to become a single southbound lane. The Defendant did not 
use any signals while he traveled in the right-hand southbound lane as he approached and 
traveled through the area where the two lanes converged into a single lane. After the Defendant 
1 The facts of this case are set forth in detail within the Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Pretrial 
Motions, filed by the magistrate court on April22, 2013. 
2 A picture of the sign is included in the magistrate's Findings of Fact at page 3. 
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passed through this area, the Trooper activated his lights and stopped the Defendant for failing to 
signal, in violation ofl.C. § 49-808. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the Magistrate erred when he determined that there was legal cause under I. C.§ 49-808 
for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop when defendant failed to use his turn signal 
when the lane he was traveling in merged into another lane. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, a bifurcated standard is used. State v. 
Decker~ 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 (Ct App. 2011). A reviewing court must defer 
to the lower court's findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence. State v. Emory, 119 
Idaho 661, 662, 809 P.2d 522, 523 (Ct. App. 1991). However, the court may exercise free 
review over a lower court's determination of whether constitutional requirements were satisfied 
in light of the facts found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 
1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. Decker, 152 
Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. See also State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 
993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
ANALYSIS 
When an officer activates his lights and stops a vehicle, this action constitutes a "seizure" 
of the occupants, which implicates the Fourth Amendment guarantee3 against unreasonable 
search and seizure. State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 491, 111 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2005); 
3 
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Its purpose is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental 
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Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). "[I]n order for a stop to 
be la.vvful, it 1nust be based upon an officer's reasonable suspicion that the verJcle is being driven 
contrary to traffic laws or that other criminal activity is afoot." Id.; United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); In re Driver's License 
Suspension ofDeen, 131 Idaho 435,436,958 P.2d 592,593 (1998). 
The reasonable suspicion standard is lower than that of probable cause, but nevertheless, 
a stop must be based upon more than the officer's speculation or a hunch. 
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. The reasonableness of the suspicion must be 
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances-the information known to the 
officer at the time of the stop must yield a particularized and objective basis for 
the officer's suspicion. 
Kimball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d at 627 (internal citations omitted). "When a defendant 
challenges the validity of a vehicle stop or other seizure, the burden is on the state to prove that 
that stop was justified." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
Trooper Talbott stopped the Defendant's vehicle on the basis that the driver failed to 
signal a lane change when he passed through a portion of the roadway where the right-hand lane 
and left-hand lane converged to create a single lane of travel. The magistrate made a factual 
finding that the Defendant passed a yellow, diamond shaped traffic sign which indicated the right 
lane of travel would end. The magistrate did not make any factual fmdings regarding whether the 
Defendant moved the vehicle to the left when he traveled through the area where the lanes 
converged into one lane. 
agents to safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 
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I. C. § 49-808 sets forth the requirements for signaling when moving a vehicle right .or left 
upon a highway, or merging or exiting a highway. This statute states in pertinent part: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon 
a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement 
can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
I. C. § 49-808(1 ). 
The Defendant asserts the statute is void for vagueness as it is applied to the facts of this 
case. He relies on Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010) in support of 
his argument. In similar circumstances, Burton was stopped by an officer when she did not 
signal as she approached the end of a double lane expanse, where two lanes became a single 
lane.4 Id. at 747, 240 P.3d at 934. Burton argued that I.C. § 49-808(1) was "vague as applied to 
her because it does not provide fair notice that a signal is required before one drives into a single 
lane that stems from the merger of two lanes. The statute does not give notice ... that such a 
continued forward movement constitutes 'moving' a vehicle 'right or left upon a highway."' Id. 
at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. 
Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the 
meaning ofthe criminal law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 
1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 
244, 246 (1998). Accordingly, the ~aid-for-vagueness doctrine, premised upon the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining 
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and 
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 2004). 
4 In Burton, the Court of Appeals found the officer's description of the events as "cryptic": 
The officer's description of the event is cryptic. His affidavit states only that he stopped Burton's 
vehicle after he observed it "fail to signal when it merged lanes." At the administrative hearing, Burton 
testified that in the two-lane segment of the highway there was a passing lane on the left, but she was 
traveling in the right lane, and when the two lanes became one, ''the left lane disappeared." She said that 
she passed a sign which said that the lanes were going to merge, but there was no evidence of signage 
indicating that one lane was terminating and one continuing. 
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. 
APPELLATE OPINION AND ORDER 5 213
discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estares, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 
370-72 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009). Thus, a statute 
may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
!d. at 748, 240 P.3d at 935. Ultimately, the Burton Court determined that I.C. § 49-
808(1) was void for vagueness as applied to Burton. The Court looked specifically to the 
fact that the statute does not specify how much or what type of movement is necessary to 
trigger the duty to signal. 
We are persuaded that there is merit in Burton's contention that Section 49-
808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this circumstance, for the statute 
does not clearly indicate that a signal is required when two lanes merge with 
neither lane clearly endL."'lg and neither clearly continuing. Tris situation differs 
significantly from that where one of two lanes ends and the other continues, as 
occurred in Dewbre. In the Dewbre circumstance, the statute plainly requires a 
signal because a driver in the terminating lane must change lanes in order to 
continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move to the left 
or right. But when there is no basis to discern that one lane is terminating and the 
other surviving, but rather the two blend into a single lane, it is not clear that the 
continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the 
emerging lane constitutes a "move ... right or left" that is subject to the Section 
49-808(1) signal requirement. 
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how 
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty 
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a 
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes. simply merge because a driver 
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into 
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal 
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to 
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply 
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in 
those instances. 
It is simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a 
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence 
can only guess at the statute's directive in this circumstance. Therefore, the statute 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's conduct. 
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Id. at 749-750, 240 P.3d at 936-937. 
The magistrate court relied on State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 
1999). Dewbre also addresses a similar situation wherein the defendant was stopped by law 
enforcement for failing to signal when a passing lane ended. In this case, there was significant 
signage which indicated that the passing lane was ending. On appeal, the defendant argued the 
statute did not require the use of signals when entering or exiting a passing area. 5 The magistrate 
court found the defendant moved his vehicle to the right in order to comply with a sign that 
stated "Keep right except to pass." Then the defendant moved his vehicle to the left at the end of 
the passing portion of the highway. The appellate court focused on this factual determination 
that the defendant's vehicle moved to the right and to the left, thus an appropriate signal was 
required pursuant to I. C. §49-808. 6 
5 The argument was set forth as follows: 
In the instant case, Dewbre contends that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to stop his 
vehicle because I. C. § 49-808 does not require the use of signals when entering or exiting a 
passing area. The relevant portion ofl.C. § 49-808 provides that no person "shall turn a vehicle or 
move right or left upon a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable 
safety nor without giving an appropriate signal." Dewbre contends that i.e. § 49-808 requires the 
use of turn signals only when a vehicle turns or makes a lane change. Dewbre contends that he did 
not turn or change lanes, that he continued in the same lane while entering and exiting the passing 
area, and that he, therefore, was not required to use his signal. Dewbre also argues that I. C. § 49-
808 requires the use of signals only when appropriate and that no turn signal is the "appropriate 
signal" when the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety. 
Id. at 665, 991 P.2d at 390. 
6 Justice Perry relied on the magistrate's finding of_fact as follows: 
The language ofl.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. The following 
holding from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of Dewbre's suppression 
motion correctly analyzes the statute's application: 
When Dewbre approached the portion of the highway containing a passing lane, the sign 
required him to "keep right except to pass." As such, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right 
to comply with this requirement. When Dewbre reached the end of the portion of the 
highway that contained a passing lane, the record clearly establishes that there was a sign 
requiring Dewbre to merge back into the left lane. This required a turning movement to the 
left. It is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre made these movements, and it is also undisputed that 
he did not signal when he made either turn. By failing to signal when he made these turns, 
Dewbre violated I.C. § 49-808. 
It is true that at the point Dewbre made these turning maneuvers, the dashed line did not 
separate the left and right northbound lanes. However, the statute does not strictly limit its 
application to the lane changes. Instead, the statute requires a signal whenever an individual 
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I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his 
vehicle to the right in order to comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the 
passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the left, complying once again with the 
highway signage. There are no exceptions in I. C. § 49-808 to the signal 
requirement. State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 
(Ct.App.1998). Whenever a movement is made to the left or right on a highway, 
regardless of whether the movement is made necessary to comply with highway 
signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. § 49-808. 
I do not attempt by this holding to defme the boundaries of what constitutes a 
"movement to the right or left upon a highway." I conclude only that Dewbre's 
movements placed him within the ambit of the statute. Until further clarification is 
provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained to hold that whenever a 
vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane splits into two lanes, or 
two lanes merge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I. C. § 
49-808. Therefore, I. C.§ 49-808 required Dewbre to use ati appropriate signal 
·when he n1oved to the right while entering the passing area and then to the left 
while exiting the passing area. 
Id. at 666, 991 P.2d at 392. 
The case at hand is factually more similar to Burton than Dewbre. In Burton, the 
defendant testified that there was a sign which said the lanes were going to merge, but nothing 
indicated that one lane was terminating and one continuing. Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d 
at 936. In Dewbre, there was significantly more signage which stated the addition of the passing 
lane, the requirement to keep right, and the indication that the right lane would be ending. 
Consistent with this signage and the roadway itself, Dewbre's vehicle first moved to the right, 
and then to the left. 
1.~ the case at h:m.d, the magistrate succinctly described the roadway in question as 
initially consisting of two southbound lanes that converged to become a single southbound lane. 
makes a "move right or left upon a highway." Had the legislature intended only to regulate 
turns and lane changes, it could have stated so specifically. By moving first right, and then 
left, Dewbre came within the ambit of the statute, and was required to make to [ sic ] signal. 
(Emphasis added.). 
Id at 666, 991 P.2d at 390. 
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However, the magistrate did not make a factual finding regarding whether Colvin's vehicle 
moved to the left as a result of the narrowing of the roadway into one lane. 7 According to the 
magistrate's conclusions of law, the Defendant had to merge left into another traffic lane, and 
thus, should have signaled: 
Idaho Code Section [ 49]-808(1) is worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people, in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that 
with this traffic lane (the right-hand southbound lane of 5th Street) ending and his 
having to merge left into another traffic lane (the left-hand southbound lane of 5th 
Street) to continue on, an appropriate signal was required. 
Further, I. C. § 49-808(2) is worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that ordinary people, and in this case Mr. Colvin, could understand that the 
appropriate signal to signal an intention to move left from the right-hand 
southbound land to the left-hand southbound lane was a left signal- similar to 
(but opposite of) the signaling Mr. Colvin performed a few seconds prior when he 
activated his right signal to signal his intention to move right from the left-hand 
southbound lane to the right-hand southbound lap.e. 
Findings ofF act, Conclusions of Law, at 10-11. 
However, this conclusion of law is not consistent with the Findings of Fact. The 
magistrate found that the Defendant completed a signaled, lane change to the right hand lane, but 
then traveled through the area where the lanes converged into a single lane. 
Officer Talbott and Mr. Colvin were both initially in the left-hand southbound 
lane with Mr. Colvin's vehicle directly in front of Officer Talbott's vehicle. As 
Mr. Colvin traveled south in the left-hand southbound lane he activated his right 
turn signal and moved from the left-hand southbound land into the right-hand 
southbound lane and continued south. Officer Talbott remained in the left-hand 
southbound lane. Thereafter, while· traveling in the right-hand southbound lane, 
Mr. Colvin passed a yellow, diamond shaped traffic sign that contained a black 
symbol. The sign was located along the right-hand shoulder of 5th Street and 
appeared as follows: 
[a picture of the sign is inserted in the opinion here] 
7 In a footnote within the conclusions of law, the magistrate judge addressed this issue as follows: "When two 
parallel lanes converge, one or the other will have to "move" towards the other; otherwise the two parallel lanes will 
remain parallel and never converge. In this case the warning sign advised that the right-hand sopthbound lane was 
ending as motorists in such lane had to move left to continue." Findings ofF act and Conclusions of Law, at 9. 
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After passing by the above-referenced sign Mr. Colvin continued south in 
the right-handed southbound lane and the two southbound lanes converged to 
become a single southbound lane. Mr. Colvin passed through the area where the 
two southbound lanes converged and continued south in the single remaining 
southbound lane. Mr~ Colvin did not use any signals while he traveled in the 
right-hand southbound lane as he approached and traveled through the area where 
the two southbound lanes converged into a single remaining southbound lane. 
After Mr. Colvin passed through the area where the two southbound lanes 
converged Officer Talbott activated his overhead lights and stopped Mr. Colvin 
for failing to signal, in violation ofl.C. § 49-808. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 3-4. The magistrate found that the Defendant 
traveled through the area where the two southbound lanes converged into a single lane. The 
magistrate did not find that the vehicle moved to the left in a manner which triggered the 
requirement to signal. 
The statute is void for vagueness as applied to the situation at hand. The requirement to 
signal is triggered by the movement of the vehicle, thus, a reasonable person in the same situation 
may not know whether a signal is required or not based upon the gradual convergence of the two 
lanes. In Dewbre, the magistrate made specific factual fmdings that the vehicle moved right, and 
then left, each movement triggering the requirement to signal. In Burton, a sign indicated a lane 
was ending, but the statute was found void for vagueness as applied because it was "simply not 
apparent from the language of Section 49-808(1) whether a signal is required when two lanes 
blend into one. Persons of ordinary intelligence ca.n only guess at the statute's directive in this 
circumstance." 149 Idaho at 750, 240 P.3d at 937. 
In the case at hand, there is not a factual fmding regarding whether Colvin's vehicle made 
a leftward movement in order to trigger the requirement to signal. Although the magistrate found 
there was a sign which indicated to the driver that the lane was ending, this is not dispositive of 
the issue of whether the vehicle in fact moved to the left in a manner triggering the need to 
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signal. As the Burton Court explained, the statute does not specify how much or what type of 
movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty to signal. 
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not specify how 
much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty 
to signal. Admittedly, a very literal interpretation of the statute might lead to a 
conclusion that a signal is required when two lanes simply merge because a driver 
in either lane must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into 
the emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal 
application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to 
the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply 
negotiates a bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in 
those instances. 
Id. at 750, 240 P.2d at 937.8 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I. C. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as it is applied 
in this situation. In this case the driver activated his signal when he executed a lane change from 
the left-hand southbound lane into the right-hand southbound lane, because his vehicle made a 
distinct movement to the right. However, such a movement is not evident when the lanes 
converged together, thus a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would not know whether 
the statute required a signal or not in this situation. Therefore, the magistrate's ruling denying to 
8 Further, the Burton Court distinguished the situation in Dewbre from the constitutional challenge before the Burton 
Court. The case at hand is similarly distinguishable from Dewbre. 
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 
3 88 ( Ct.App.1999). The driver there contended that the signal requirement defined in Section 49-
808 did not apply where a two-lane portion of a highway ended and two traffic signs as well as 
painted arrows on the highway advised motorists that the right lane was ending and traffic should 
merge left. The Dewbre case generated a separate opinion from each of the three Court of Appeals 
judges. The lead opinion stated that the signal requirement applied in that circumstance. A second 
judge concurred in that result but did not join in the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge 
dissented. The Dewbre opinion does not have precedential value bearing upon the present case for 
· several reasons. First, the Court in Dewbre was not called upon to address the constitutional issue 
presented here. Second, there was no opinion that commanded a majority, and third, Dewbre is 
f~ctually distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and a_lTows on the roadway informed 
motorists that the right-hand lane was ending and that traffic must inerge into the surviving, left-
hand lane. In the present case, there is no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane 
was ending and the other surviving. 
Burton, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. 
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. ~~ 
the motion to suppress is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court considered whether the Magistrate erred when he determined that there was 
legal cause under I. C.§ 49-808 for a law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop when 
defendant failed to use his turn signal when the lane he was traveling in merged into another 
lane. I. C. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to the case at hand because the statute 
does not specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger 
the duty to signal where two lanes converge into a single lane. Based upon the foregoing analysis, 
the determination of the magistrate court i~ reversed. 
ORDER 
The magistrate's determination in the foregoing matter is hereby REVERSED. The 
matter is REMANDED to the magistrate court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
It: . 
Dated this jJ_ day of December 2013. 
C!Y:JL \ 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1 0), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred by reversing the magistrate and suppressing evidence based on a 
perceived violation of due process. 
4. To undersigned 7S knowledge, no part of the record has been 
sealed. 
5. Apperlant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript Appellant requests that the transcript prepared for the 
appeal to the district court be included in the record. The Appellant does not 
request the preparation of any additional transcript. 
6. AppeUant requests the normal clerkrs record pursuant to Rule 28, 
I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
LINDA CARLTON 
Court Reporter 
PO Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Nez Perce 
County Prosecuting Attorney who wilf be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
224
JAN. 7. 2014 2:40PM ID ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV NO. 8 7 2 P. 4 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code§ 31-321·2); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a criminal case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(e) That service is being m·ade upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
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Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce 
County, do hereby certify that the following list is a list of 
the exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with 
the Supreme Court or retained as indicated. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the Court this day of March 2014. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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Date: 3/17/2014 
Time: 01:45PM 
Page 1 of 1 
Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
Exhibit Summary 
Case: CR-2013-0000676 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
State of Idaho vs. Gaylord Jay Colvin 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Description 
Defendant's Exhibit A, CD with 
footage of traffic stop, admitted 
4/18/13 
Defendant's Exhibit 8, Probable 
Cause Affidavit, admitted 4/18/13 
Defendant's Exhibit C, CD with 
footage taken by Colvin, admitted 
4/18/13 
Result 
Admitted 
Storage Location 
Property Item Number 
Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Chapman, Scott M 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Chapman, Scott M 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Chapman, Scott M 
Destroy 
Notification 
Date 
User: 
BDAVENPORT 
Destroy or 
Return Date 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, SUPREME COURT NO. 41762 
vs. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
GAYLORD JAY COLVIN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and 
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and 
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate 
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and 
additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered 
or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any, 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
Additionally, a CD with photographs of exhibits and 
recordings has been submitted in lieu of original 
Defendant's Exhibits A, Band C. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this day of March 2014. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 1 Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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